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Abstract 
Why some people recover emotionally after diagnosis and treatment of cancer, while 
others experience persistent or recurrent symptoms of emotional distress is not well 
understood.  The literature exploring predictors of persistent distress after cancer has not been 
able to explain this.  In addition, predominant theoretical perspectives (based on the cognitive 
paradigm) have fallen short of being able to explain causal mechanisms that underlie the 
maintenance of distress.  A more promising perspective is offered by the metacognitive 
model of emotional disorder.  This model implicates beliefs about thinking (metacognitive 
beliefs) that drive a repetitive and problematic thinking style (the Cognitive Attentional 
Syndrome; CAS), as the key to understanding why such problems persist.  The overarching 
aim of this thesis is to explore for the first time the utility of this model for understanding 
persistent emotional distress in cancer.  
In order to achieve this, a series of linked empirical studies were conducted using data 
from a prospective cohort study of recently diagnosed breast and prostate cancer patients 
(n=206).  Data were obtained at a pre-treatment baseline (T1) and twelve month follow-up 
(T2) using self-report questionnaires to assess emotional distress (HADS), illness perceptions 
(IPQ-R) and metacognitive beliefs and CAS processes (MCQ-30 / CAS-1). 
The first study tested the validity of the MCQ-30 for use in cancer.  Confirmatory and 
exploratory factor analyses provided evidence supporting the validity of the previously 
published 5-factor structure of the MCQ-30 in this population.  In addition structural equation 
modelling (SEM) indicated that metacognitive beliefs were significantly associated with 
anxiety and depression as predicted, providing further evidence of concurrent validity.  
Following this, three studies used hierarchical regression and SEM techniques to test 
theoretical predictions from the metacognitive model by exploring cross-sectional and 
prospective associations between maladaptive metacognitions and emotional distress as well 
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as testing whether metacognitive beliefs could explain more of the variance in emotional 
distress than could content of cognition (i.e. illness perceptions).  The findings of these 
studies provided evidence supporting theoretical predictions that metacognitive beliefs cause 
and maintain distress by activating a style of inflexible responding to thoughts.  The view that 
metacognitive beliefs may be more important in the development of emotional distress than 
the specific content of negative thoughts about cancer was also supported.  Such findings 
suggest a potential to reduce anxiety by modifying metacognitive beliefs and processes as an 
alternative to more traditional cognitive approaches.   
Finally, a small pilot study tested the potential of a single component of metacognitive 
therapy (MCT), Attention Training Technique, for reducing emotional distress in cancer.  
The findings did not provide clear evidence of benefit, but did indicate that intervention was 
effective, when undertaken appropriately, and was well received.  This suggests there is 
promise in pursuing further development of interventions based on MCT in this population. 
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Prelude 
Thesis Overview 
This thesis represents the first evaluation of the utility of the metacognitive model of 
emotional disorder for understanding persistent emotional distress after diagnosis of cancer. 
Following three introductory review chapters exploring the problem of persistent emotional 
distress in cancer, the existing literature on its predictors, and current theoretical approaches 
used to understand it, a new theoretical approach is proposed - The metacognitive model of 
emotional disorder.  The remaining five chapters describe empirical studies conducted to test 
predictions from the metacognitive model in order to explore whether it is applicable in 
cancer and useful for understanding why emotional distress persists for some patients but not 
others. 
The first introductory chapter provides a basic overview of cancer, as well as the 
prevalence, course and consequences of emotional distress among cancer patients and an 
overview of the psychotherapeutic interventions currently available for reducing distress.  
This introductory chapter is not intended to provide an exhaustive account; rather it is 
intended to set the scene for the thesis regarding the problem of persistent emotional distress 
after diagnosis of cancer and the need for greater understanding of the factors that underlie it 
– a problem which has been recognised worldwide as a significant clinical and research 
priority. 
The second chapter continues setting the scene by reviewing the literature on potential 
predictors, available around the time of diagnosis, of persistent distress.  For this chapter, and 
indeed for the thesis as a whole, the following working definition of persistent emotional 
distress is used:  
‘a clinically significant or elevated level of emotional distress at any point greater than 12 
months after receiving a diagnosis of cancer and/or starting primary treatment.’ 
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This definition was decided upon based on the understanding that in cancer the 
majority of spontaneous psychological recovery occurs between 4-13 months of receiving a 
diagnosis (Helgeson, Snyder, & Seltman, 2004).  Studies were selected for review where they 
tested predictors of persistent distress that were available around the time of diagnosis (i.e. 
within the first three months). 
The final introductory chapter provides an overview of theoretical approaches that are 
typically used to understand emotional distress after diagnosis of cancer.  These include the 
Cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey & Greer, 1989) and the Common Sense 
Model of self-regulation in health and illness (CSM: (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980; 
Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984). While again not intended to be an exhaustive review, 
this chapter highlights the main features of these approaches and the evidence available to 
support each model in cancer.  Several limitations, for understanding persistent distress, are 
identified and an alternative model, the metacognitive model of emotional disorder, is 
proposed and described. 
Before evaluating the metacognitive model in cancer, it is first necessary to establish 
that existing measurement tools are valid for assessing metacognitive beliefs and process in 
this population.  Therefore, the first of the empirical studies, Study 1 presented in Chapter 4, 
uses confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling to validate the 
Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30; (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) in a sample of 
breast and prostate cancer patients. 
The next three chapters (Chapters 5-7) each present studies (using the same sample as 
Study 1) that provide an empirical test of theoretical predictions from the metacognitive 
model.  The first of these, Study 2 presented in Chapter 5, tests the prediction that 
metacognitive beliefs, specifically negative and positive beliefs about worry, are associated 
with emotional distress around the time of diagnosis; that they explain more of the variance 
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in emotional distress than content of cognition (i.e. illness perceptions); and that the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress is mediated by worry- 
and/or threat-focussed attention.  Following on from this cross-sectional study, Study 3, 
presented in Chapter 6, tests the prospective relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
around diagnosis and emotional distress 12 months later. This study uses hierarchical 
multiple regression to test whether metacognitive beliefs are able to explain additional 
variance in emotional distress over and above baseline symptoms of distress and content of 
cognition.  The final study of the three, Study 4 presented in Chapter 7, addresses the 
limitations of regression analysis, identified in the preceding study, for identifying underlying 
causal processes when baseline distress is controlled.  This study uses Latent Growth Curve 
modelling to test theoretical predictions that changes in metacognitive beliefs effects changes 
in emotional distress via changes in worry and / or threat-focussed attention. 
The final empirical study of the thesis, Study 5, is presented in Chapter 8. This study 
is a small pilot study aimed at testing the potential of a single component of metacognitive 
therapy, Attention Training Technique (ATT), for reducing emotional distress after diagnosis 
and primary treatment for cancer.  As such, it also provides  an additional small-scale 
experimental test of the predicted relationships between metacognitive beliefs, worry and 
threat-focussed attention and emotional distress. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction: Cancer and emotional distress 
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1.1 What is cancer? 
Cancer is not one single disease, but a term used for a collection of diseases in which 
abnormal cells grow in an uncontrolled way, invading and destroying surrounding tissue and 
putting pressure on other bodily structures.  If left untreated, cancer cells from primary 
tumours metastasise (spread) via the blood or lymphatic system to other parts of the body 
where they form secondary or metastatic tumours, and it is this ability that makes them 
particularly dangerous.  There are as many different types of cancer as there are types of cells 
in the body and each may behave quite differently, causing different symptoms and 
responding differently to available treatment.  The National Cancer Institute identifies five 
broad categories of cancer: 
 
 Carcinoma (the most common category) – begins in the skin or tissues that line or 
cover internal organs 
 Sarcoma – begins in connective or supportive tissues such as bone, cartilage, muscles 
and blood vessels. 
 Leukaemia – begins in the blood-forming tissue (i.e. bone marrow) and causes large 
numbers of abnormal blood cells to be produced  
 Lymphoma & Myeloma – begin in cells of the immune system 
 Central nervous system cancers - begin in the tissue of the brain and spinal cord. 
 
1.2 Cancer: prevalence and outlook 
An estimated 12.7 million people were diagnosed with cancer worldwide in 2008 
(Ferlay et al., 2010). Of these, 6.6 million were men among whom the most common 
diagnoses were cancers of the lung (16%) and prostate (14%).  Among the six million women 
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diagnosed, breast cancer was by far the most common disease accounting for almost 1 in 4 of 
all diagnoses (23%).  In the UK, the most commonly diagnosed cancers are prostate cancer, 
which accounts for almost a quarter of male cancers (24%), and breast cancer, almost a third 
of female cancers (31%). 
Although mortality figures remain high (7.6 million people died from cancer worldwide 
in 2008 (Ferlay et al., 2010)), significant improvements in cancer care over the past decade 
have led to corresponding improvements in survival (Department of Health, Macmillan 
Cancer Support, & NHS Improvement, 2010; Institute of Medicine, 2007).  It has previously 
been estimated that there are over 10 million long-term cancer survivors in the United States 
(Institute of Medicine, 2006) and more recently, around 2 million cancer survivors in the UK 
(Maddams et al., 2009) with numbers estimated to grow in excess of 3% per year.  Three 
types of cancer (breast, prostate and colorectal) account for over half of all survivors in the 
UK, with the former two having estimated survival rates of greater than 85% (Department of 
Health et al., 2010). 
Despite this improvement in prognosis, cancer diagnosis is still a diagnosis of a life-
threatening disease and often has a profound emotional impact on the individual.  
Furthermore, it has been recognised that this impact does not end after treatment (Elliott et 
al., 2011) but can affect the lives of survivors for many years (Meyerowitz, Kurita, & 
D'Orazio, 2008).  The importance of addressing psychosocial needs has figured prominently 
among concerns raised by cancer survivors both in the US (Reuben, 2004) and the UK 
(Department of Health et al., 2010).  In a recent study across 66 cancer centres in the UK, 
psychological needs and fear of recurrence were the most common unmet need reported 
(Armes et al., 2009).  In recognition of the continuing psychological impact of cancer on 
patients’ lives after treatment, official reports in both the UK and US have highlighted the 
importance of assessing and addressing patients’ psychological needs at key stages as a key 
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component in planning supportive care in both the treatment and survivorship phases 
(Holland, 1999; Institute of Medicine, 2007; National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2004)  
 
1.3 Emotional distress after cancer? 
In 1975, Hans Selye (Selye, 1975) for the first time distinguished between two types of 
stress,  ‘Eustress’ a stress which has positive outcomes, enhancing physical and/or mental 
functioning and ‘Distress’ a persistent stress, that fails to resolve through coping and 
adaptation and may lead to anxiety or withdrawal.  More recently the term ‘distress’ has been 
defined by the National  Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) as ‘an unpleasant 
emotional experience of a psychological, social and /or spiritual nature that often interferes 
with the ability to cope effectively. It extends along a continuum, ranging from common and 
understandable feelings of vulnerability, sadness or fear to problems that can become 
disabling such as depression, anxiety, panic, social isolation and spiritual crisis’ (Holland, 
1999).  It was chosen as the term for describing patients’ negative responses to cancer for 
reasons of political correctness (considered less stigmatising than terms such as 'psychiatric 
disorder', or 'psychosocial' or 'emotional' problems, and more acceptable to patients) and 
because it was suitable for measurement by self-report, and has now been adopted worldwide 
(Holland, 1999). 
In the literature, prevalence of emotional distress after cancer is usually defined in 
terms of prevalence of general distress, anxiety disorders and /or depression with estimates 
ranging from 15% to 50% (Derogatis et al., 1983; Strong et al., 2007).  Distress is particularly 
common in the period after cancer diagnosis, with around half of all newly diagnosed patients 
reporting clinically significant levels of anxiety and /or depression (Henselmans et al., 2010; 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2004).  However, as survival rates continue to 
improve, it is increasingly recognised that long-term survivors remain at risk of clinically 
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significant distress.  Over a third of patients in treatment or long-term follow-up report levels 
of distress, including anxiety and/or depression, that warrant intervention (Carlson et al., 
2004).  Annual prevalence of major depression or generalised anxiety disorder remains 22% 
in the fourth year after breast cancer diagnosis (Burgess et al., 2005), while life-time 
prevalence of cancer-related PTSD is 10-12% for breast cancer and 20% for other cancers 
(Andrykowski & Kangas, 2010).  Furthermore, a  USA population-based survey (Hoffman, 
McCarthy, Recklitis, & Ng, 2009) reported a 6% prevalence of psychiatric disorders amongst 
cancer survivors - double that in the non-cancer comparison group, even after controlling for 
socio-demographic and clinical correlates. 
Consequently, psychological distress after cancer is recognised worldwide to be a 
significant problem. So much so that, in 2004, it was designated by the Canadian Strategy for 
Cancer Control (Bultz & Carlson, 2006), to be the ‘6th vital sign’ which should be used 
alongside the traditional biomedical indicators (temperature, respiration, heart rate, blood 
pressure and pain) to assess whether a patient’s functioning is sufficient to achieve 
‘wellness’. 
 
1.4 Trajectory of emotional distress after cancer diagnosis 
Emotional distress around diagnosis should not be assumed to be evidence of 
psychopathology.  For most people it represents a ‘normal’ and potentially adaptive stress 
response to a traumatic and threatening event, and would be expected to resolve 
spontaneously without the need for specialist help (Brennan, 2004; Salmon, 2000).  For 
example, in a cohort of breast cancer patients, point prevalence of anxiety and/or depression 
cases dropped from 33% at diagnosis to 15% at one year (Burgess et al., 2005).  In addition, a 
study (Helgeson et al., 2004) investigating trajectories of emotional distress in breast cancer 
over four years noted that most spontaneous improvement in mental health scores occurred in 
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the period between 4 and 13 months since diagnosis with little occurring across the remaining 
assessment points (Helgeson, Snyder, & Seltman, 2004).  However, while many studies 
provide data that support this view, it is also recognised that there are groups of patients 
whose distress trajectories do not conform to such expected declines (Helgeson et al., 2004; 
Nosarti, Roberts, Crayford, McKenzie, & David, 2002).   
A recent study (Henselmans et al., 2010) which assessed distress at five key points in 
the breast cancer journey (i.e. after diagnosis, after surgery, immediately after adjuvant 
treatment, and two and six months after the end of treatment), identified four groups with  
different trajectories of emotional distress across the study period.  The first group (36%) 
experienced no significant distress at any point.  The second group (33%) recovered 
emotionally and became indistinguishable from the first by six months after the end of 
treatment.  The third group (15%) experienced persistent distress throughout the period, while 
the final group (15%) experienced a delayed emotional response, becoming distressed only 
after active treatment had ended.  These trajectories are consistent with those found in 
previous studies of breast cancer patients, assessed immediately post-operatively and 12 
months after surgery (Millar, Purushotham, McLatchie, George, & Murray, 2005), and in 
other cancer populations assessed at 3 and 15 months since diagnosis (Schroevers, Ranchor, 
& Sanderman, 2003a, 2003b).  The interesting thing to note from these studies is that, while 
between 22% and 48% of patients were distressed at baseline, around a half to two-thirds of 
these improved psychologically (i.e. no longer met ‘case’ criteria) before the follow-up 
assessment.  Conversely while most patients (52-78%) in each study were not ‘cases’ at 
baseline, between 7% and 29% of these met criteria by the follow-up assessment.  Thus it 
cannot be assumed that patients who are emotionally distressed at diagnosis are necessarily 
vulnerable to persistent problems, or that those who appear emotionally well at this point will 
remain that way. 
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1.5 The impact of emotional distress after cancer 
Studies conducted by cancer support charities such as Macmillan in the UK have 
indicated that unmet psychological needs figure prominently among the concerns raised by 
patients themselves, and that they pose a considerable burden to the individual’s quality of 
life and that of their families.  Indeed in a survey of over 1500 people who had or were 
affected by cancer, 45% said that it was the emotional rather than the physical or practical 
effects of cancer which were the most difficult to deal with (Macmillan Cancer Support, 
2010). 
As well as the impact on quality of life, it is recognised that neglecting psychological 
distress can also exacerbate illness and increase health care costs.  In a recent systematic 
review, evidence collated from 25 independent studies conducted worldwide indicated that 
mortality rates were 26% higher among cancer patients reporting depressive symptoms 
(based on 14 studies) and 39% higher among patients with major or minor depressive 
disorder (based on 3 studies) (Satin, Linden, & Phillips, 2009).  However, it should be noted 
that this finding relates to ‘all-cause’ mortality and as yet no direct effect of depression on 
cancer-specific development or mortality has been demonstrated (Garssen, 2011; Schneider 
& Moyer, 2010).  In addition, studies have also shown that when patients' emotional needs 
remain unresolved, they are more likely to use community health or accident and emergency 
services (Carlson & Bultz, 2004) and place higher demands on scarce provider time and 
resources (Bultz & Carlson, 2006).  Indeed, a recent estimate of the cost of extended bed days  
due to preventable psychological illness in cancer patients at one UK NHS trust was 
£366,000 per year (Macmillan Cancer Support, 2010). 
Consequently, it is suggested that providing appropriate and timely psychological and 
emotional support can not only improve patients’ long-term quality of life but also save 
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money for health and social care providers and provide benefit for the wider community in 
terms of enabling cancer patients to return to work, as well as their community and social 
activities (Macmillan Cancer Support, 2011).  
 
1.6 Interventions aimed at reducing emotional distress after cancer 
In recognition of the continuing impact of emotional distress after cancer, health 
policies have recommended that all patients undergo systematic psychological assessment at 
key points from diagnosis, and have prompt access to psychological support.  However, in 
reality it is often the case that specialist help is limited and few patients have access to it.  
Thus most psychological care that is provided is offered reactively, i.e. at the time of 
emotional crisis (Zabora et al., 2001).  
Psychological interventions offered in cancer can take many forms, with the four most 
commonly used approaches being: relaxation training, psychoeducation, individual cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), and group or individual supportive therapy (Carlson L, 2003).  It 
is often suggested that such psychological interventions show positive benefits for cancer 
patients across a range of psychosocial, physical and survival outcomes.  However, in reality 
systematic reviews and meta-analytic studies of CBT and other psychotherapeutic 
interventions in cancer have produced mixed results.  In 2002, a rigorous systematic review 
(Newell, Sanson-Fisher, Savolainen, & Pro, 2002), excluding trials of low internal validity, 
concluded that only tentative recommendations were possible regarding the benefit of 
psychological therapies for improving cancer outcomes.  This review found some limited 
evidence: that group therapy, psycho-education, counselling and CBT could improve 
psychosocial outcomes; that relaxation training and guided imagery could improve physical 
side effects; and that psychological therapies in general could improve immune system 
outcomes.  However, for all outcomes the reviewers reported there was too little research of 
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sufficient methodological rigour to make any strong recommendations supporting these 
therapies.  Furthermore, meta-analytic studies in cancer (Faller et al., 2013) have concluded 
that small to moderate effect sizes are typical.  The earliest of these (Sheard & Maguire, 
1999) reported that when estimating robust effects of psychological interventions, these 
ranged from negligible for depression (0.19), to moderate (0.36) for anxiety.  Similarly, a 
more recent study reported that initial moderate to large effects of psychological treatments 
for anxiety and depression (Naaman, Radwan, Fergusson, & Johnson, 2009) in breast cancer 
were not robust to study quality.  Overall effects were reduced by almost 50% to -0.26 for 
anxiety, and by 75% to -0.24 for depression when just the studies with high internal validity 
were considered.  Collectively these studies indicate that there is considerable room for 
improvement in psychotherapeutic effectiveness. 
Conclusions that can be drawn regarding the efficacy of psychological therapies for 
reducing emotional distress in cancer are limited not only by the methodological quality of 
reviews but also by the wide variety of interventions employed, outcomes assessed, and 
variation in timing of intervention delivery.  It is difficult to reach conclusions across studies 
where those studies are in effect asking different questions.  In order to generate useful and 
meaningful guidance on how to help cancer patients manage emotional distress we need to 
move away from the imprecise question of, ‘do psychological interventions work in cancer?’, 
in favour of testing specific components or therapies that target clearly defined outcomes.  
Only then can comparisons be made and conclusions drawn across studies.  
Given that we know a significant number of patients are likely to experience clinically 
significant levels of emotional distress at some point in their cancer journey a more ethical 
approach would be to identify those ‘at risk’ and provide some form of preventative 
intervention at the outset.  However, the different trajectories of distress after diagnosis and 
the small effect sizes found by the meta-analyses described above indicate that current 
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interventions are unlikely to be considered cost-effective if delivered to all patients on the 
basis of cancer morbidity alone (Sheard & Maguire, 1999).  In addition to being unnecessary 
for many patients, there is also the possibility that early, and indiscriminate, intervention may 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate emotional distress for some.  Evidence from the post-
traumatic stress disorder literature (Litz, Gray, Bryant, & Adler, 2002; Rose, Bisson, & 
Wessely, 2003) suggests that early interventions, such as psychological debriefing, can for 
some people aggravate distress by undermining confidence at a time of personal vulnerability 
and by disrupting  normal processes of coping and psychological adjustment. In line with 
this, a recent study conducted at Liverpool (Baker et al., 2012) found that some newly 
diagnosed cancer patients were reluctant to discuss emotional needs and were hostile to a 
psycho-educational intervention designed to help them recognise, understand and self-
manage emotional distress, complaining that it compounded their problems.  Consequently, 
in order to potentially provide such support, we first need to know more about the factors that 
underlie vulnerability to emotional distress after cancer so that intervention can be targeted 
effectively. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Predictors of persistent emotional distress after diagnosis of cancer: 
A literature review 
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2.1. Introduction 
The need to identify factors early in the cancer trajectory that underlie patients’ 
vulnerability to persistent distress after cancer was highlighted in Chapter 1.  The aim of this 
chapter is to explore whether such factors can be reliably identified from the literature.  Over 
the last 10-15 years a substantial body of research has arisen out of the focus on 
psychological morbidity in cancer.  However, much of this has been aimed at quantifying 
prevalence and improving early detection of emotional distress, rather than identifying the 
factors that cause and maintain it. 
Cross-sectional studies have identified clinical, socio-demographic and psychological 
factors that are associated with emotional distress after cancer.  However, such studies are of 
limited use for identifying causal factors as they are unable to provide information about their 
relationship with future levels of distress.  In contrast, prospective studies, while still falling 
short of proving cause, are able to identify factors that predict vulnerability to persistent 
distress by demonstrating an association between baseline factors and future levels of 
distress, and as such they provide greater insight into potential causal relationships.  
Consequently, a review of the literature was undertaken focussing specifically on prospective 
studies that sought to identify predictors of longer-term or persistent distress (i.e. at least 12 
months since diagnosis) from those available early in the cancer journey (i.e. within three 
months of diagnosis), on the basis that these might indicate factors that potentially cause and 
maintain emotional distress that could be targeted by therapy.   
 
2.2. Method 
The literature search used the EBSCO database, which searches across five different 
medical, nursing and psychology databases incl: Medline full text, Psychinfo, 
PsychARTICLES, CINAHL plus, AHMED.  The search combined the term ‘cancer’ with 
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terms relating to emotional distress (including: emotional distress or psychological distress 
or anxiety, depress* or posttraumatic stress or PTSD or psychological morbidity or psych*, 
adjustment or emotional adjustment or mood or adjustment disorder or acute stress disorder 
or fear of recurrence (all fields)) and those commonly used to describe the focus of relevant 
studies (predict* or risk factors, caus* or vulnerability (all fields)).  Studies were restricted to 
adult populations (NOT: adolescent cancer or child* cancer or paed*carers or palliative 
(abstract)) and to those with a primary cancer diagnosis (NOT: genetic testing, genetic 
screening (abstract)); (NOT: palliative, metastatic cancer, advanced cancer, survival, 
mortality (title)).  No date restriction was applied, although only English language articles 
were included. In addition, the references of all of the full articles screened in ‘Sift 5’ (see 
Figure 1) were searched to identify any additional studies that may have been missed by the 
database search. 
This search yielded 11,080 papers.  After removing the duplicates, an Endnote title 
search was used to exclude papers where the primary focus was not relevant to the search 
topic (i.e. Cardio, Arthritis, Stroke, Obesity, Diabetes, Childhood, Adolescent, Parent, 
Mammogram, Caregiver, Genetic Menopause, Mortality, Terminal, HIV, AIDS, Non-cancer, 
Benign, Fatigue, Smoking).  Two further sifts were conducted by hand (using titles & 
abstracts, respectively) to identify papers reporting primary studies with a prospective or 
cross-sectional (with historical predictors) study design, where predictor variables were 
assessed before or within three months of cancer diagnosis and used to predict persistent 
distress or emotional distress a minimum of 12 months after diagnosis. Where this 
information could not be ascertained from the abstract the articles were obtained for detailed 
scrutiny. 
The literature search and sifting procedure is detailed in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 Flow diagram of literature search and sifting procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Records identified through 
EBSCO (PsycARTICLES, 
PsychINFO, CINAHL Plus, 
MEDLINE, AHMED) 
Refs exported to ENDNOTE 
(N = 11,080) 
(Sift 2) Endnote keyword search 
(retained N= 5059) 
(Sift 3) Title screened  
(retained = 945) 
Articles retained (Table 1) 
(N = 38) 
(Sift 1) Duplicates removed 
(retained N=7586) 
Records excluded (N = 3494) 
Records excluded (N = 2527) 
Records excluded (N = 4114) 
(Sift 4) Abstract screened 
(retained N=113) 
(Sift 5) Full articles screened  
Records excluded (N = 832) 
Records excluded (N = 75) 
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A standardised data extraction protocol was applied in order to evaluate the evidence 
supporting different factors (available around the time of cancer diagnosis) as predictors of 
persistent distress.  Data extracted included: general study details (author, date, country); 
participants’ details (age, gender, cancer diagnosis); study design and methodology (sample 
size and attrition, outcome and predictor variables, timing of baseline and follow-up 
assessments, and analysis); and a summary of the reported findings (i.e. betas/odds ratios  
(where available) or % variance explained).  Details of each study’s sample characteristics 
are presented in Table 2.1, while details of study design and reported findings (grouped by 
distress outcome) are presented in Table 2.2.  A glossary of the outcomes measures used in 
the included studies is provided in Table 2.3.  The evidence is grouped, evaluated and 
summarised in turn for each of three categories of predictors: socio-demographic and clinical 
predictors; social and environmental predictors and psychological predictors.  The findings 
from each summary are drawn together and discussed in a concluding paragraph. 
 
2.3. Results 
A total of 38 articles reporting 34 primary studies were reviewed.  The sample 
characteristics for each study are presented in Table 2.1. 
Most studies were conducted in Europe (n = 21); eight in North America (USA & 
Canada) and the remaining five in Australia, Japan and Korea.  All except two (Andrykowski 
& Cordova, 1998; Grassi, Malacarne, Maestri, & Ramelli, 1997) were prospective cohort 
studies.  These two exceptions were cross-sectional but tested whether premorbid psychiatric 
history and retrospective self-report of emotional response around the time of diagnosis could 
predict depression at 12 months post-diagnosis.  
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Table 2.1: Sample characteristics of included studies  
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Dean 1987 Prospective BC 100 122 111 48.7 (20-60) UK 
Ramirez et al, 1995 Prospective BC 100 102 91 - 56 (24-69 UK 
Grassi et al 1997 Cross-sectional Mix 80 113 - 52.3(11.5) (20-67) Eur 
Andrykowski & Cordova 1998 Cross-sectional BC 100 82 - 56.6 (10.5) (37-85) USA 
Carver et al, 1998 Prospective BC 100 66 61 52.9 (11.2) (28-76) USA 
Tjemsland et al, 1998 Prospective BC 100 Not stated 106 - 50 (33-70) Eur 
Hammerlid et al, 1999 Prospective HN 28 357 215 63  (18-88) Eur 
Bleiker et al, 2000 Prospective BC 100 244 200 51.9 (10.5) (29-75) Eur 
de Leeuw ,et al 2000
*
 Prospective HN 21 204 155 59 (10.8) - Eur 
de Graeff, et al 2000
*
 Prospective HN 20 204 153  (29-76) Eur 
De Leeuw 2001
*
 Prospective HN 22 204 171/139/123 59 (10.6) - Eur 
Ranchor et al, 2002 Prospective Mix 42 167 99 73.4 (7.46) - Eur 
Stanton et al 2002 Prospective BC 100 80 70 52.6 (11.94)  30-80 USA 
Mehta et al, 2003 Prospective PC 0 519 259 64.8 (4.8) - USA 
Shroevers, Ranchor & Sanderman, 2003
**
 Prospective Mix 73 475 403 58(14.3) - Eur 
Shroevers, Ranchor & Sanderman, 2003
**
 Prospective Mix 73 475 403 58(14.3) - Eur 
Uchitomi et al, 2003 Prospective LC 40 262 212 62.1 (10.8) 63.5 (22-83) Japan 
Schou et al 2004 Prospective BC 100 195 165 56 (10.3)  21-78 Eur 
Aarstad et al, 2005 Prospective HN 0 27 27 59.9 (1.3) - Eur 
Burgess et al, 2005 Prospective  BC 100 202 170 48.5 (7.8) - Eur 
Millar et al 2005 Prospective BC 100 371 279 59.4 (10.9)  29-98 Eur 
Karnell et al, 2006 Prospective HN 32 235 148 - - USA 
Steginga et al, 2006 Prospective PC 0 111 104 61.54 (8.13) - Eur 
Gustavsson-Lilius et al, 2007 Prospective Mix 68 349 123 58 (8.6)  34-76 Eur 
 17 
 
 
N.B: BC – breast cancer; Mix – mixed diagnoses; HN – Head & Neck Cancer; PC– prostate cancer; LC – lung cancer; RC – rectal cancer; UK – United Kingdom;  
Eur  - Europe; USA – United States of America; Aus – Australia; Can – Canada 
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Lebel et al, 2008 Prospective BC 100 146 86 61-7 (10.8)  37-88 Can 
Barez et al, 2009 Prospective BC 100 129 101 48.03 (8.4) 25-65 Eur 
Den Oudsten et al, 2009 Prospective BC 100 223 144 58.7 (9.4) - Eur 
Risvedt & Trinkaus, 2009 Prospective RC 44 123 80 67.5 (12) 29-88 USA 
Couper et al, 2010 Prospective PC 0 211 175 66.2 (8.3) 43-92 Aus 
Scharloo et al, 2010 Prospective HN 24 177 95 59.6 (10.8) 36-84 Eur 
Elkit & Blum, 2011 Prospective BC 100 81 64 56.3(9.1) 41-89 Eur 
Lee et al, 2011 Prospective BC 100 299 206 - (20-79) Korea 
Carlson et al 2013 
***
 Prospective BC 43 877 505 62.3(14.1) - Can 
Enns et al, 2013
***
 Prospective Mix 43 1196 480 60.4 (13.3) - Can 
Lockefeer & de Vries, 2013 Prospective BC 100 227 163 58.9 (9.3) - Eur 
Neilson et al, 2013  Prospective HN 16 101 37 63  (37-85) Aus 
Adachi et al, 2014 Prospective HN 22 116 78 61.2(11.4)  20-85 Japan 
Kohler et al, 2014 Prospective PC 0 390 329 65.3 (6.4) - Eur 
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The reviewed studies were predominantly of breast cancer patients (n=16) 
(Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Bárez, Blasco, Fernández-Castro, & Viladrich, 2009; 
Bleiker, Pouwer, van der Ploeg, Leer, & Adèr, 2000; Burgess et al., 2005; Carver et al., 1998; 
Dean, 1987; Den Oudsten, Van Heck, Van der Steeg, Roukema, & De Vries, 2009; Elklit & 
Blum, 2011; Lebel, Rosberger, Edgar, & Devins, 2008; Lee et al., 2011; Lockefeer & De 
Vries, 2013; Millar et al., 2005; Ramirez, Richards, Jarrett, & Fentiman, 1995; Schou, 
Ekeberg, Ruland, Sandvik, & Karesen, 2004; Stanton, Danoff-Burg, & Huggins, 2002; 
Tjemsland, Søreide, & Malt, 1998), although head & neck, (n=7) (Aarstad, Aarstad, Heimdal, 
& Olofsson, 2005; Adachi et al., 2014; de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; 
Hammerlid et al., 1999; Karnell, Funk, Christensen, Rosenthal, & Magnuson, 2006; Neilson 
et al., 2013; Scharloo et al., 2010), prostate (n=4) (Couper et al., 2010; Köhler et al., 2014; 
Mehta, Lubeck, Pasta, & Litwin, 2003; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006), lung (n=1)(Uchitomi et 
al., 2003), rectal (n=1) (Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009), and heterogeneous cancer populations 
(n=5) (Carlson, Waller, Groff, Giese‐Davis, & Bultz, 2013; Enns et al., 2013; Grassi et al., 
1997; Gustavsson-Lilius, Julkunen, Keskivaara, & Hietanen, 2007; Ranchor et al., 2002; 
Schroevers et al., 2003a, 2003b) were also included.  The mean ages of samples studied 
ranged from 48 to 73 years.  Reflecting the cancer populations investigated, most studies 
(n=18) (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Bárez et al., 2009; Bleiker et al., 2000; Burgess et 
al., 2005; Carver et al., 1998; Dean, 1987; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Elklit & Blum, 2011; 
Grassi et al., 1997; Lebel et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2011; Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013; Millar et 
al., 2005; Ramirez et al., 1995; Schou et al., 2004; Schroevers et al., 2003a, 2003b; Stanton et 
al., 2002; Tjemsland et al., 1998) reported on samples that were entirely or mostly female.  
Of the 32 prospective studies, one had a pre-morbid baseline (Ranchor et al., 2002), two 
completed baseline assessments just prior to receiving a diagnosis (Den Oudsten et al., 2009; 
Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013), seven (Aarstad et al., 2005; Enns et al., 2013; Gustavsson-
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Lilius et al., 2007; Hammerlid et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2011; Scharloo et al., 2010; Schou et 
al., 2004) immediately after diagnosis, thirteen before primary treatment started (Adachi et 
al., 2014; Carver et al., 1998; Couper et al., 2010; de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 
2000, 2001; Dean, 1987; Karnell et al., 2006; Köhler et al., 2014; Mehta et al., 2003; Neilson 
et al., 2013; Ramirez et al., 1995; Stanton et al., 2002; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006; 
Tjemsland et al., 1998) and eight after primary treatment finished (Bárez et al., 2009; Bleiker 
et al., 2000; Elklit & Blum, 2011; Lebel et al., 2008; Millar et al., 2005; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 
2009; Schroevers et al., 2003a, 2003b; Uchitomi et al., 2003).  The one remaining study 
(Burgess et al., 2005) interviewed patients five months after diagnosis to retrospectively 
assess the occurrence of predictor variables within the period from one month pre-diagnosis 
to four months post-diagnosis.   
The predominant outcome assessed across studies was depression (n = 23) (Aarstad et 
al., 2005; Adachi et al., 2014; Burgess et al., 2005; Carlson et al., 2013; Couper et al., 2010; 
de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; Dean, 1987; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; 
Enns et al., 2013; Grassi et al., 1997; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007; Hammerlid et al., 1999; 
Karnell et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2011; Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013; Neilson et al., 2013; 
Ramirez et al., 1995; Schou et al., 2004; Schroevers et al., 2003a, 2003b; Uchitomi et al., 
2003).  Ten of these studies also assessed anxiety (Burgess et al., 2005; Carlson et al., 2013; 
Couper et al., 2010; Dean, 1987; Enns et al., 2013; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007; Hammerlid 
et al., 1999; Neilson et al., 2013; Ramirez et al., 1995; Schou et al., 2004).  No studies 
assessed anxiety in isolation.  Nine of these 23 papers predicted anxiety and/or depression 
‘caseness’ at follow-up or change in ‘caseness’ while the remaining 14 predicted the severity, 
or change in severity of, symptoms.   
Generic emotional distress/functioning was assessed across twelve papers (Bárez et al., 
2009; Carver et al., 1998; de Graeff et al., 2000; Köhler et al., 2014; Lebel et al., 2008; Millar 
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et al., 2005; Ranchor et al., 2002; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Scharloo et al., 2010; Stanton et 
al., 2002; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006; Uchitomi et al., 2003) and fear of recurrence in two 
(Mehta et al., 2003; Stanton et al., 2002).  Finally, six papers predicted symptoms of trauma 
(Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Bleiker et al., 2000; Elklit & Blum, 2011; Lebel et al., 
2008; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Tjemsland et al., 1998).   
Twenty-four studies (Adachi et al., 2014; Bleiker et al., 2000; Carver et al., 1998; Couper 
et al., 2010; de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 2000; Dean, 1987; Den Oudsten et al., 
2009; Elklit & Blum, 2011; Enns et al., 2013; Grassi et al., 1997; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 
2007; Hammerlid et al., 1999; Köhler et al., 2014; Millar et al., 2005; Neilson et al., 2013; 
Ramirez et al., 1995; Ranchor et al., 2002; Schou et al., 2004; Schroevers et al., 2003b; 
Stanton et al., 2002; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006; Tjemsland et al., 1998; Uchitomi et al., 
2003) assessed point prevalence of the outcome between 12 and 18 months after baseline, 
five (de Leeuw et al., 2001; Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013; Mehta et al., 2003; Ristvedt & 
Trinkaus, 2009; Scharloo et al., 2010) after two years, and two (Aarstad et al., 2005; Lebel et 
al., 2008) after five or more years.  In addition, four studies (Bárez et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 
2013; Lee et al., 2011; Schroevers et al., 2003a) assessed predictors of change in depression 
over the follow-up period, one study (Burgess et al., 2005) assessed predictors of one or more 
episodes of anxiety or depression between two and five years after diagnosis and one study 
assessed predictors of persistent depression (defined as scores of 10 or higher on two or more 
BDIs administered at least six months apart) (Karnell et al., 2006). 
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2.3.1 Socio-demographic and clinical predictors:  
2.3.1.1 Age. 
Age was a significant predictor in only four papers.  Of these, one study (Burgess et al., 
2005) reported that, between two and five years post-diagnosis of breast cancer, younger age 
predicted one or more episodes of anxiety or depression (SCID-III).  However, the statistic 
presented (younger age Hazards Ratio 0.96) suggested the opposite to be the case, thus 
preventing any conclusions being drawn from this study.  The remaining three studies also 
reported younger age to be a significant predictor.  In two of these studies age, entered as a 
continuous variable, predicted trauma symptoms (IES) (Tjemsland et al., 1998) and 
emotional distress (POMS total) (Stanton et al., 2002) one year after breast cancer surgery, 
while in the final one age, entered as a categorical variable, predicted anxiety (HADS-A) 18 
months after diagnosis of head & neck cancer (Neilson et al., 2013).  
 
2.3.1.2 Gender. 
In the ten studies with mixed-gender samples (Carlson et al., 2013; de Graeff et al., 2000; 
de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; Enns et al., 2013; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007; Hammerlid et 
al., 1999; Neilson et al., 2013; Ranchor et al., 2002; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Schroevers et 
al., 2003a, 2003b; Uchitomi et al., 2003) only two found gender to be a significant predictor.  
In head and neck cancer patients, female gender predicted emotional distress (QLQ-C30-
EF)(de Graeff et al., 2000) but not depression (CES-D)(de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et 
al., 2000, 2001) twelve months after the start of treatment.  However, by two and three years 
post-treatment, female gender did predict depression in this sample (de Leeuw et al., 2001).  
The second study, which employed a heterogeneous sample (Enns et al., 2013), also reported 
that female gender predicted ‘occasional’ (defined as exceeding clinical cut-offs on the PSS 
 22 
 
CAN at one or more time-points) or ‘continuous’ (defined as exceeding PSSCAN clinical 
cut-offs at all time-points) anxiety or depression during the 12 months since diagnosis. 
 
2.3.1.3. Education and social class. 
Only two other demographic variables (educational level and social class) were reported 
in any study to be prospectively related to distress twelve or more months after diagnosis.  In 
one mixed diagnoses cohort, patients with more education (not clearly defined) reported a 
greater decrease in depression over time (between three and 15 months since diagnosis) 
(Schroevers et al., 2003a).  The authors postulate that patients with a higher level of 
education have greater access to social support, and in turn greater feelings of control, 
optimism and self-esteem (Schroevers et al., 2003a).  An alternative explanation is that 
patients with a higher level of education are more able to understand and integrate the 
information they are given, facilitating better adjustment over time.  However, this paper only 
considered clinical and demographic factors in isolation.  Therefore it is not known whether 
educational level would remain related to the course of depression if other social or 
psychological factors were controlled.  In a study of lung cancer patients (Uchitomi et al., 
2003), lower education level (junior high school or less) predicted depression 12 months after 
treatment.  The other 10 studies found no effect of education on depression and/or anxiety 
(Carlson et al., 2013; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Enns et al., 2013; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 
2007; Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013; Schou et al., 2004), emotional distress (Lebel et al., 2008; 
Ranchor et al., 2002) or trauma symptoms (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Ristvedt & 
Trinkaus, 2009).  
Finally, lower social class (not clearly defined) was found to significantly predict 
psychiatric status 12 months after mastectomy for breast cancer (Dean, 1987).  This variable 
was not assessed in any other of the included studies. 
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2.3.1.4 Treatment type. 
Most studies (7/9) (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Bárez et al., 2009; Bleiker et al., 
2000; Burgess et al., 2005; Dean, 1987; Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013; Schou et al., 2004) 
exploring treatment type as a predictor of distress after breast cancer found no effect of either 
surgery type or adjuvant therapy.  Of the two studies that did find an effect, one (Den 
Oudsten et al., 2009) found that having undergone breast conserving surgery rather than 
mastectomy or no surgery at all, predicted depression 12 months (de Leeuw et al., 2001) after 
diagnosis.  The other (Tjemsland et al., 1998) found no effect of surgery type but did report 
that having radiotherapy versus not having radiotherapy predicted reduced trauma symptoms 
(IES) at 12 months.  There is no obvious explanation for these findings.  Indeed, they are 
counterintuitive as one might expect patients receiving more extensive surgery or 
radiotherapy in addition to surgery to fare worse.  The authors postulate that these findings 
may be due to a subset of patients becoming concerned that breast conservation will not 
completely eradicate their cancer (Den Oudsten et al., 2009) or that daily contact with others 
in similar circumstances during radiotherapy treatment gives patients a greater opportunity to 
work through their concerns (Tjemsland et al., 1998).  However, in both studies the amount 
of variance explained is small.  This, taken together with the greater number of studies 
reporting no effect, suggests that that these findings could be attributable to measurement 
error. 
Similarly, in other cancer populations, only two of nine studies (Carlson et al., 2013; de 
Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; Enns et al., 2013; Grassi et al., 1997; Karnell 
et al., 2006; Mehta et al., 2003; Neilson et al., 2013; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Schroevers 
et al., 2003a, 2003b; Uchitomi et al., 2003) that explored treatment as a predictor reported an 
effect. De Graeff et al (de Graeff et al., 2000) reported that combination therapy versus single 
 24 
 
treatment modality predicted emotional distress (QLQ-C30 –EF) and depression (CES-D) 
twelve months after treatment for head & neck cancer. However, in this analysis, treatment 
was considered only as part of a constructed group variable (combining site, stage and 
treatment).  Therefore, it cannot be assumed that treatment was responsible for the observed 
effect despite the authors’ assertion that it was.  Patients receiving combination therapy were 
more likely to be female and had more advanced disease than those requiring single treatment 
(either surgery or radiotherapy).  Furthermore, in two further papers reporting on the same 
prospective cohort (de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001), treatment did not predict depression (CES-
D) when considered in isolation.  In a more recent study with a mixed diagnosis cohort (Enns 
et al., 2013), receipt of chemotherapy predicted occasional anxiety or depression (i.e. 
exceeding clinical PSSCAN cut-offs on one or more assessment in the 12-months since 
diagnosis) but not continuous distress (i.e. exceeding PSSCAN cut-offs at every assessment).  
This finding may arise because some, but not all, of the  assessment periods are likely to 
correspond with the stage at which patients are receiving chemotherapy, the side effects of 
which often cause a considerable physical and emotional burden during treatment but which 
is alleviated once treatment ends.  In support of this explanation, a second paper reporting the 
same study (Carlson et al., 2013) found no predictive effect of chemotherapy on overall 
reduction in anxiety or depression over the 12 months since diagnosis.  It did find, however, 
that not having surgery predicted greater improvement in depression over time, and patients 
with higher levels of depression or anxiety around diagnosis reported a greater reduction in 
distress over time if they had not received radiotherapy.  
 
2.3.1.5 Tumour characteristics 
Most studies assessing tumour-related characteristics (i.e. stage, size, site) found they did 
not predict long-term distress (Bleiker et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2005; Den Oudsten et al., 
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2009; Grassi et al., 1997; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007; Hammerlid et al., 1999; Karnell et 
al., 2006; Mehta et al., 2003; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Scharloo et al., 2010; Schou et al., 
2004; Uchitomi et al., 2003).  One exception to this was a study in a mixed diagnosis sample 
(Schroevers et al., 2003a), which found that patients with lower stage disease had a greater 
reduction in depression (CES-D) over time (between three and 15 months since diagnosis).  
In line with this, a study in breast cancer (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998) found that more 
advanced disease at diagnosis predicted more extensive trauma symptoms (PCL-C) among 
post-operative patients assessed between six months and six years after surgery.  Another 
study to report an effect was a three-year prospective study of head and neck cancer patients 
(de Graeff et al., 2000; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001).  The authors stated that they expected 
cancer stage to influence post-treatment distress only as a result of physical morbidity caused 
by the treatment it dictates (de Graeff et al., 2000).  In line with this, cancer stage predicted 
depression (CES-D) 12 months after treatment in one paper (de Leeuw et al., 2000) when it 
was entered first in the regression (alongside treatment type), but not in a later paper (de 
Leeuw et al., 2001) where it was entered  after controlling for treatment type and recurrence, 
and alongside all other pre-treatment variables.  This later paper also found that cancer stage 
failed to predict depression at two years, although it did contribute a small amount (2%) to 
the total variance (65%) explained at three years. Such inconsistency suggests it may not be a 
robust predictor. 
 
2.3.1.6 Physical health  
Five studies found measures of physical health status that predicted persistent emotional 
distress.  Three breast cancer studies found effects of pre-diagnosis physical health  
including: self-reports of being on long term medication in the ten years before diagnosis 
which predicted trauma (IES) 12 months after diagnosis (Tjemsland et al., 1998), and high 
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pre-diagnosis fatigue which predicted depression (CES-D) at 12 months (Den Oudsten et al., 
2009), and two years after diagnosis (Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013) even after controlling for 
baseline depression.  In addition, lower pre-treatment physical functioning (KPS) predicted 
worse emotional functioning (QLQ-C30-EF) 12 months after treatment for head and neck 
cancer (de Graeff et al., 2000), while post-operative sleep and health complaints predicted 
more intrusive thoughts (IES) 18 months after surgery for breast cancer (Bleiker et al., 2000).  
However, in contrast to these findings, a further five studies that considered similar indicators 
of baseline physical health found no predictive effects.  These indicators included: level of 
physical function (KPS) at diagnosis (Hammerlid et al., 1999); pre-operative menopausal 
status (Dean, 1987); single items measuring post-operative perceived health (Lebel et al., 
2008); single items measuring post-operative general health, physical function and pain 
(Millar et al., 2005); and scales measuring post-operative physical functioning (as measured 
by the QLQ-C30) (Bárez et al., 2009). 
  
2.3.1.7. Summary of socio-demographic and clinical predictors 
In summary, although it has often been suggested that baseline demographic and clinical 
factors may help to identify individuals vulnerable to long-term or persistent distress, the 
findings are inconsistent.  The lack of evidence for cancer and treatment-specific variables as 
predictors of emotional distress supports the view that emotional distress is more likely to be 
predicted by factors relating to the individual rather than the disease.  Socio-demographic risk 
factors for distress after diagnosis of cancer are reported to be similar to those in the general 
population (Burgess et al., 2005).  However, while some of the studies described above 
support this view, the predominance of negative findings make it unwise to regard any of the 
demographic variables as reliable predictors of persistent distress.  Finally, as demographic 
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and clinical variables can rarely be modified, they can only be markers of vulnerability.  They 
offer little insight into how such distress may be reduced or prevented. 
 
2.3.2 Social and environmental predictors 
Seventeen studies explored social factors within the first three months of diagnosis as 
potential predictors of persistent distress.  
 
2.3.2.1 Availability / characteristics of significant others and the social network 
One early study (Dean, 1987) reported that 12 months after mastectomy married women 
were more likely than single women to be cases (anxiety or depression) on the Present State 
Examination, which suggests that the presence of a ‘significant other’ is not necessarily 
beneficial.  In line with this a study of head and neck cancer patients (Hammerlid et al., 1999) 
also found that living alone did not predict anxiety or depression cases on the HADS.  Other 
studies with either breast or heterogeneous cancer populations found no effect of marital 
status / living with a partner (Carlson et al., 2013; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Enns et al., 2013; 
Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013).  Just one study explored partner characteristics as a potential 
predictor of persistent distress.  Specifically they assessed the relationship between ‘sense of 
coherence’(SOC) 1 and emotional distress and found that, while partners’ SOC predicted their 
own depression (BDI) and anxiety (EMAS-State) 14 months after diagnosis, this had no 
cross-over effect on the patients’ (Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007).  Finally, one study (de 
Leeuw et al., 2001) reported that a smaller (formal) social network predicted head and neck 
cancer patients who became depressed (CES-D) at one year, and a smaller (informal) social 
network predicted those who became depressed at three years post-treatment, although the 
individual contribution to variance explained was small (7% at one year, 1% at three years ).  
                                                          
1
 Sense of coherence,  defined as a global orientation based on an individual’s perception that: (1) a stressful 
event is structured, predictable and explicable; (2) the resources are available to meet the demands of the event; 
and (3) the demands and challenges are worth the investment (Antonovsky, 1987) 
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2.3.2.2 Social Support  
The concept of social support refers to an individual’s satisfaction with their perceived 
‘available’ or ‘received’ support. Several dimensions of support have been identified, 
including: emotional support (expressing concern or listening to the individual); appraisal 
support (giving assurance of an individual’s intrinsic worth as a human being, allowing 
opportunities for social comparison or providing feedback on the efficacy of a task 
performed); informational support (giving advice and direction); and instrumental support 
(giving actual physical assistance) (House, Umberson, & Landis, 1988).  Four out of eleven 
studies investigating a prospective relationship between social support and distress found that 
a lack of some specific types of support predicted later anxiety and/or depression. In breast 
cancer, a lack of a confiding relationship (which may be equated with emotional support) 
around diagnosis predicted anxiety and/or depression cases (SCID) two to five years later 
after controlling for baseline distress (Burgess et al., 2005), and deterioration in emotional 
support over the 12 months since diagnosis was associated with deterioration in depression 
(Lee et al., 2011).  In head and neck cancer, after controlling for baseline depression, lack of 
received and available emotional support (de Leeuw et al., 2001) and lack of available 
appraisal support (de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001) pre-treatment predicted depression (CES-D) 
one year later.  In addition, lack of available instrumental support and a lack of openness to 
discuss cancer within the nuclear family predicted depression two years after treatment (de 
Leeuw et al., 2001), and a lack of received emotional support predicted depression three 
years after treatment (de Leeuw et al., 2001).  Finally, in a mixed diagnosis cohort a lack of 
problem-focussed support (which may be equated with informational support) three months 
after diagnosis and more negative interactions with others predicted depression (CES-D) 15 
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months after diagnosis after controlling for depression at baseline (Schroevers et al., 2003b).  
However, in contrast to the other studies mentioned above, a lack of perceived emotional 
support was not predictive.  These differences in the specific types of support which predict 
reduced distress may reflect changing social support needs over time since diagnosis. 
However, since the contribution to variance explained in distress across all studies and at 
different stages in the cancer journey is small (1-4%), this inconsistency may just as likely be 
due to measurement error.  Finally, in contrast to the four studies described above,  and 
contrary to what might be expected, one  study in a heterogeneous population of cancer 
patients found that higher levels of supportive interactions before diagnosis predicted 
emotional distress (GHQ-12) twelve months after diagnosis (Ranchor et al., 2002).  The 
remaining six studies failed to find any predictive effects of social support either for 
depression (Adachi et al., 2014; Dean, 1987; Den Oudsten et al., 2009) or emotional distress 
(Bleiker et al., 2000; Lebel et al., 2008; Tjemsland et al., 1998).  This discrepancy with the 
previous studies may be due to differences in the measures used. The measures used in 
studies which found an effect were those that clearly distinguished different types of social 
support and, in particular, assessed perceived emotional support without prescribing the 
source of that support.  In contrast, studies that found no effect either used more general 
social support scales or subscales (Adachi et al., 2014; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Lebel et al., 
2008), were restricted to asking about partner support (Tjemsland et al., 1998), or asked about 
social interactions (Bleiker et al., 2000) (Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Ranchor et al., 2002), 
impaired social, work or family functioning (Dean, 1987; Tjemsland et al., 1998). 
 
2.3.2.3 Non-cancer-related difficulties and negative life events 
Breast cancer survivors who reported more non-cancer related difficulties before 
treatment were more likely to experience borderline or case anxiety and/or depression (on the 
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SCID) in the longer term (two to five years post diagnosis) (Burgess et al., 2005).  However, 
in contrast, having experienced  more severe (Burgess et al., 2005) or negative life events 
(Tjemsland et al., 1998) before cancer diagnosis or having had previous cancer or other 
illness-related experiences (Schou et al., 2004) were not predictive. This discrepancy may 
reflect measurement issues.  Asking about life events and illness experiences implies discrete 
events in the past, which may not have any lasting consequences, meaning the individual may 
be unaffected at the time of diagnosis.  By contrast, ‘non-cancer related difficulties’ may be 
more likely to refer to ongoing problems which may be compounded by receiving a diagnosis 
of cancer.  
 
2.3.2.4 Summary of social (environmental) predictors 
There is little evidence to support any of the social or environmental variables assessed 
as reliable predictors of longer-term emotional distress. 
Burgess and colleagues (Burgess et al., 2005) concluded that the social/environmental 
risk factors for depression and anxiety after breast cancer are the same as those for the 
general female population (i.e. lack of social support and non-cancer related difficulties).  
That is, social support affects psychological well-being regardless of the presence or absence 
of threat (Thoits, 1982, 1995). In support of this view, one study (Schroevers et al., 2003a, 
2003b) reported that the relationship between social support and depression (CES-D) was 
similar between  patients and population controls, with one difference: that the lack of 
problem-focussed emotional support three months after diagnosis was more strongly related 
to depression 15 months later among patients than among population controls. 
Furthermore, when effects are found it is difficult to establish whether reduced social 
support causes persistent distress or whether baseline distress produces this effect by reducing 
the individuals’ ability to access support.  In all of the studies that found a positive effect of 
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social support variables after controlling for baseline distress (Burgess et al., 2005; de Leeuw 
et al., 2000, 2001; Schroevers et al., 2003b) baseline distress was the largest predictor.  This 
suggests that psychological variables may be more useful predictors of persistent distress than 
social or environmental ones. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of study design and significant findings from included studies (grouped by outcome (DV)) 
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DV - ANXIETY/DEPRESSION CASE 
Dean 1987 Br 
 
Pre-op 12 Anx or Dep case (PSE) Y Stepwise LR Menopausal 
status, Trt 
Marital status, 
Social class, 
confidant 
Pre-op case 
(RDC/GHQ) 
Coping style 
Psy Trt 
Attitude  
Lower social class OR 
4.57 
Pre-op case OR 4.37 
Perimenopausal OR 8.9 
Prev Psy Trt OR 7.56 
Marital status (single)OR 
5.85 
(results not clear) 
Ramirez et al 
1995 
Br Pre-op 12 Anx or Dep case  (PSE) N  ROC None None ED (HADS>10) HADS  >10 identified 
83% cases  
Hammerlid et al 
1999 
HN Diag 12 Anx or Dep case (HADS)  Y LR KPS, Age, 
Gender, TSite, 
TStage 
Living status Baseline Anx or 
Dep case 
Anx or Dep case at 
diagnosis - no data 
provided 
Shroevers et al, 
2003
*
 
Mix Post-
Trt (3 
month 
post-
diag) 
15 Change in Dep case status 
over time (CES-D) 
N Repeated 
measures 
Anova 
TSite, TStage, 
Trt, Age, 
Gender, 
Marstat, Educ 
None None Greater reduction in Dep 
with lower stage disease 
(stage 1 vs Stage 2 or 
higher) F [2,332], p<.05 
and higher education F 
[3,332], p<.01 
Schou et al 
2004 
Br Diag 12 Dep case  (HADS) 
 
 
Anx case (HADS) 
Y 
 
Y 
LR Educ, 
Tgrade,Trt  
None Optimism 
/pessimism, 
+VE Trt 
expectation, 
Anxi/Dep, 
Coping 
Dep Case: low Opt OR 
= 0.83; Anxious 
preoccupation OR = 3.2 
Anx Case: low Opt OR 
= 0.86; Anx OR = 2.71; 
fatalism OR = 3.16 
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Uchitomi et al 
2003 
LC Post-
Trt 
(1 mth) 
12 MD Case(SCID) 
 
 
ED (POMS) 
Y 
 
Y 
LR 
(backward) 
 
MR 
(backward) 
Age , Gender, 
Educ, Pre-op  
smoking, Pre-op 
TStage, Trt, 
dypsnea, Forced 
expiratory 
volume (FEV) 
Marital status, Pre-morbid/ pre 
& post Trt MD, 
post Trt ED 
MD: Post-Trt MDD OR 
= 2.1, Educ OR =  2.4 
 
ED: post-Trt distress  β  
= 0.47, Pre-Trt MDD  β  
= 0.18 
Burgess et al, 
2005 
Br -1 – 4 
months 
post 
diag 
24-60 MD / GAD Case (SCID) Y LR -  Age, Tsize, 
Lymph nodes, 
Histology, Adj 
Trt 
Confiding 
relationship. 
Severe life 
events & 
difficulties 
Premorbid 
Psychiatric Trt, 
GAD/MD since 
diag 
Confiding relationship 
HR = 1.43; Younger HR 
= 0.96; Severe diff  HR = 
1.54; GAD or MD since 
diag  HR = 1.55 
Karnell et al 
2006 
HN Pre -Trt 3-12  Dep Case  (BDI) for 6 month 
period  
Y LR TSite,TStage, 
Trt 
Social 
disruption 
Dep Dep OR = 1.76 
Enns et al, 
2013
***
 
Mix Diagno
sis 
12 Anx Case  
 
Dep Case  
 
(PSS CAN) 
 
Grouped as never vs 
occasional/continuous case 
N  LR Age, Gender, 
Income, Educ, 
Cancer type, Trt 
Marital status,  Anx: Gender OR = 0.44, 
Chemotherapy OR = 
2.66, Head & Neck OR = 
4.10;  
 
Dep: Chemotherapy OR 
= 2.24,  
DV - ANXIETY/DEPRESSION 
Grassi  et al, 
1997 
Mix N/A 12-14 Dep (HDRS) N  MR (Cross-
sectional) 
T stage, radio, 
Karnovsky 
Performance 
Status (KPS) 
Social Sup 
Neg life events 
Maladjustment 
(Diag), 
Psychiatric 
history (pre-
morbid) 
Locus of 
Control 
 
Maladjustment (diag)  β  
= 0.55  
KPS  β  = -0.25 
Soc Sup  β  = 0.19 
Psychiatric History(Pre)  
β  = 0.16 
 
De Leeuw et al 
2000
**
 
HN Pre-Trt 12 Dep (CES-D) Y Hierarchical 
MR 
(stepwise) 
TStage  Trt, 
Age, Gender, 
Symptoms, 
General health, 
Physical 
functioning 
Received/availa
ble support, 
perceived social 
network 
Coping, Locus 
of Control, Dep 
TStage R
2
c =.0 4 
Dep  R
2
c =.20 
Available supp R
2
c = .07 
Social network R
2
c = .04 
Gen Health R
2
c =.02 
 
De Graeff et al HN Pre-Trt 12 EF (QLQ-C30-EF) N MR Gender, Age ,  Dep EF 
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2000
**
  
 
 
 
Dep (CES-D) 
 
 
Y 
(stepwise) Group(site, 
stage, Trt),  
Karnovsky 
Performance 
Status  (KPS), 
symptoms  
Dep R
2
c= 17 
KPS R
2
c=.0 4 
Gender R
2
c  = .02 
Grp R
2
c  = .01 
Dep 
Dep R
2
c = .21 
KPS R
2
c  = .03 
Grp R
2
c =.02 
De Leuw et al 
2001
**
 
HN Pre-Trt 12, 
24,36 
Dep (CES-D) Y MR 
(stepwise) 
Physical 
function , 
Symptoms, Trt, 
Recur, Tstage, 
Age, Gender 
Received/availa
ble support, 
perceived social 
network 
openness to 
discussion 
Dep, Coping, 
Locus of  
Control 
Largest predictor Dep 
R
2
c =.18 @ 1yr 
.31 @2yr 
.31 @ 3 yrs 
Coping R
2
c =.02 @ yr1 
(Religious), .02 @ yr3 
(Palliative coping)  
Emotional support 
variables R
2
c  = .14 @1 
yr, .06 @ 2 yrs, .03 @ 3 
yrs (incl. Social network 
& support) 
Physical/dem og R
2
c = 
.01 @yr1, .02 @ yr 2, .10 
@ yr 3 
Shroevers 
2003
*
 
Mix Post-
Trt (3 
month 
post-
diag) 
15 Dep (CES-D) Y MR 
(Stepwise) 
Sociodemog 
(not stated) 
,Group 
membership 
(patient vs. 
control) 
Social support Dep, Self-
esteem 
Dep  β  = 0.59 
Problem focussed 
support   β  = 0.11 
Negative interactions  β  
= 0.09 
Negative self-esteem 
(not shown ) 
Aarstad et al 
2005 
HN Diag 72+ Dep (BDI) 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
Partial 
Correlation 
None None Anx; Dep ; 
Humour; 
Neuroticism 
(controlled) 
Dep r =0.39  / NOT SIG 
N controlled; Humour r 
= 0.42 / 0.64 when N 
controlled 
Gustavsson et Mix Diag 14 Anx (EMAS-State) Y SEM - path Gender, Educ, Partner sense of SOC (life as Anx:  Anx  β  =0.32, in 
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al 2007  
Dep (BDI) 
analysis TStage coherence 
(SOC) 
predictable/man
ageable/meanin
gful) Anxiety, 
Dep 
direct effect of T1 SOC 
via T2 SOC  β  =-0.30, 
via T1 Anx  β  =-0.15 
Dep: Dep  β  =0.36, in 
direct effect of T1 SOC 
via T2 SOC  β  =-0.30; 
via T1 Anx  β  =-0.22 
 
Den Oudsten et 
al 2009 
Br Pre-
diag 
12 Dep (CES-D) Y MR 
(stepwise) 
Age, Empstat, 
Educ, Surgery, 
Adj Trt, Tstage, 
Tsize, Fatigue, 
Pain & 
discomfort 
Social support 
family status, 
Personality, 
Dep, trait Anx, 
Self-esteem, 
Body image, 
Cognitive 
function 
Fatigue  β  =0.28, 
Neuroticism  β  =0.16, 
Surgery  β  =-17, 
Agreeableness  β  =-0.15 
Dep 0.22 
Couper et al 
2010 
Pro Pre-Trt 12 Dep  
 
Anx  
 
(BSI) 
Y 
 
Y 
Hierarchical 
MR 
HRQoL  Dep, Anx,, 
Coping  
 
 
Dep:  Dep  β  = 0.48, 
QoL-vitality  β  = 0.24, 
Fatalism  β  = 0.13 
 
Anx: anx  β  = 0.62, 
QoL-vitality  β  = -0.19 
Lee et al 2011 Br Diag  0-12 
mont
h  
Deteriorated Dep  (Zung-
SDS) 
N Hierarchical 
LR  (Cross-
sectional) 
Age, Co 
morbidity, 
smoking, 
Menopausal 
status, 
Deteriorated 
finances, 
Radiotherapy, 
Deteriorated 
role functioning 
Deteriorated 
emotional 
support  
None No T1 Sig predictors. 
Deteriorated emotional 
support OR = 3.4, 
Deteriorated finances OR 
= 2.9, Deteriorated role 
functioning  = 2.3 
Carlson et al 
2013
***
 
Mix 1 
month 
since 
diag 
12 Improved Dep  
 
Improved Anx 
 
(PSSCAN) 
Y  
 
 
Y 
MR  
(improved 
DV) 
Age, Gender, 
Source of 
income , Educ, 
Ethnic/cultural 
background  
Cancer diag, Trt 
psychosocial 
resources,  
marstat,  livstat, 
Anx, Dep Improved Dep :  Dep  β  
=-0.56, No surgery  β  
=0.08,  
Improved Anx:  Anx  β  
=-0.42 
Lockefeer & Br Pre- 24  Dep (CES-D) Y Hierarchical Age Educ, partner, , Dep, trait Anx Trait anxiety  β  = 0.37, 
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Defries 2013 diag MR  empstat, Diag, 
Chemo, Radio, 
HT, Fatigue, 
Sleep quality 
children, Fatigue  β  = 0.23 
Neilson et al 
2013 
HN Pre –
Trt 
18 
post 
Trt  
Dep 
Anx 
 
(HADS) 
N 
 
N 
Multi-level 
mixed 
effects linear 
regression 
Time, Age, 
Gender, Chemo, 
Pain, 
Symptoms, Trt 
livstat,  Dep: Symptoms  β  = -
.24 
Anx: Age  β  = 0.54, 
symptoms  β  = -0.09e 
 
Adachi et al 
2014 
HN Pre-op 12 Dep (HADS)  Y MR 
(stepwise) 
Gender, Facial 
disfigurement 
Social support Dep, Coping, 
Trauma  
Dep   β  =-0.59 
DV – TRAUMA SYMPTOMS 
Andrykowski  
& Cordova 
1998 
Br N/A 6-72 
mont
hs 
post –
op  
(mea
n 
37.3) 
Trauma (PCL-C) N Hierarchical 
MR 
(stepwise) 
Cross-
sectional 
Educ,TStage at 
diag, Age at 
diag, 
Comorbidity, 
Surgery, 
Chemo, Current 
tamoxifen, Time 
Social Support Dep history, 
Pre-morbid 
stressors 
TStage  β  = .19; Pre-
cancer Stressors;  β  = 
.46; Social support  β  = 
-.39; Time  β  = -.22 
Tjemsland et al 
1998 
Br Pre-op 12-16 Trauma (IES) Y  MR Age, Adj  Trt, 
Health problem 
/ Medications in 
last 10yrs, 
Recurrence 
Work/social/fam
ily function, 
Lack of crisis 
support 
Emotionality 
(EPI-N), 
Intrusion, PTSD 
casesness 
Emotionality  β  = 0.45 
Intrusion  β   =0.36 
Medication  β  =  0.34 
Adj Trt  β  = -0.17 
Age  β  = -0.16  
Bleiker et al 
2000 
Br Post-op  18 
(21 
after 
surge
ry) 
Intrusion  
 
 
 
 
 
Avoidance 
 
(IES) 
Y MR 
(Backward) 
Age, Surgery, 
Lymph node s, 
Adj Trt, Sleep, 
Health 
complaints 
(SCL-90) 
 
Life events, 
Perceived social 
supp (SEC) 
Intrusion, 
Avoidance, 
Anx, Anger 
Dep, Personality 
(Optimism, 
Rationality, 
Anti-
emotionality, 
emotional 
expression ) 
Intrusion:  T1 Intrusion  
β  = 0.60 
Health complaints  β = 
0.28 
Sleep problems  β  = 
0.25 
 
Avoidance, T1 
avoidance explained 
47%no beta provided 
 
Elkit & Blum Br Post op  13 Trauma  (HTQ) N) Hierarchical None None Immature Avoidance  β  =0.25, 
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2011 post 
diag 
MR defence style, 
Emotional 
coping, 
Avoidance. 
Negative 
affectivity 
Negative affectivity  β  = 
0.55 
DV - EMOTIONAL DISTRESS/FUNCTIONING 
Carver et al 
1998 
Br Pre-Trt 12 ED (Affects Balance Scale) N MR  Age None Body image , 
Appearance 
concern, Body 
integrity 
concern 
None sig 
Ranchor et al 
2002 
Mix Pre-
morbid 
12 ED (GHQ-12) Y Hierarchical 
MR 
Age, Gender, 
Educ 
Social support ED, 
Neuroticism , 
Self-Efficacy 
ED   β  = 0.26, 
Neuroticism  β  = 0.22, 
Social support  β  = 0.38 
Stanton et al, 
2002 
Br Pre-op 12 ED (POMS) 
 
FOR (Fear of Recurrence 
Scale) 
Y 
 
Y 
Hierarchical 
MR 
Age None Distress, Vigor, 
Coping, Hope,  
ED: ED & age R
2
c = .30, 
Coping R
2
c = .14, Hope 
x coping R
2
c .21 
FOR – FOR R2c = .46, 
Hope x coping R
2
c  = .19 
Millar et al 
2005 
Br Post-op 12 ED (GHQ-28) Y MR 
(Stepwise) 
Age, 
Deprivation, 
General health, 
Physical 
function, Pain 
None Illness 
perceptions, 
Coping, 
Personality, 
Distress 
Distress  β  =0.32; IPQ 
Identity  β  = 0.44; 
Neuroticism  β  =0.34 
Steginga & 
Occhipinti 2006  
Pr Pre-Trt 12 Decisional distress 
(Decisional conflict scale) 
Y Hierarchical 
MR 
None None Optimism, 
Cancer threat, 
Coping, 
Decisional 
distress 
Decisional distress  β  
=.515 
Lebel et al, 
2008** 
Br Post-
Trt 
72 ED (POMS) 
 
Trauma (IES) 
Y 
 
 
Y 
Hierarchical  
MR 
(stepwise) 
Age,  Educ, 2nd 
cancer, 
Perceived health 
Social support Coping, 
Optimism, Fear 
of future, Stress 
appraisal , 
Emotional 
distress, Trauma 
Emotional distress: 
Coping (PPS)  β  =-0.28 
Trauma:  Trauma  β  =-
0.52, 2
nd
 cancer  β  =-
0.19 
 
 
Barez et al 2009 Br Post-op Chan ED (HADS & POMS Y LGC Age , Trt,   Baseline Change in perceived 
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N.B: Diag – diagnosis; Op – Operation/surgery; Trt – Treatment; MD – Major Depressive Disorder; GAD – Generalised Anxiety Disorder; Anx – Anxiety; Dep  - Depression; 
Trauma – Trauma symptoms; EF – Emotional Functioning; ED – Emotional distress; Opt – Optimism; ROC – Receiver Operating Curve; MR – Multiple regression, LR-  Logistic 
regression; R
2
c - R
2
Change; β = Beta; OR = Odds ratio; HR = Hazards Ratio; R = Correlation; Only coefficients sig p<.05 are shown; HRQoL – Health related Quality of Life; 
Tstage – Tumour stage; Tsize – Tumour size; TSite – Tumour site; Recur – cancer recurrence; Adj Trtr – adjuvant treatment; Chemo – Chemotherapy, Radio – radiotherapy, 
HT  - Hormone Therapy; Educ – Education; Marstat – Marital status, Livstat – Living arrangements/status; Empstat – Employment status; Grey font  - Cross-sectional 
ge 12 combined) Perceived 
control  (PC) 
Change in PC 
control  β  =-0.81; 
Intercept perceived 
control   β  =-0.31; 
Intercept distress  β  =-
0.51; Intercept perceived 
control via change 
perceived control  β  =-
0.28 
Risvedt 
(Ristvedt & 
Trinkaus, 
2009)& 
Trinkaus 2009 
Recta
l 
Post-op 24-60 EF (FACT) 
Trauma (IES) 
N LR Gender, Age, 
Educ,TStage, 
Ostomy , Faecal 
incontinence 
None Trait anxiety EF : Trait anxiety OR 
1.45, Trauma: Faecal 
Incontinence  OR 1.05 
Scharloo et al 
2010 
HN Diag 24 EF (QLQ-C30 - EF) Y Hierarchical 
MR (Forced 
/ stepwise) 
Age, Tstage None Illness 
perceptions , EF 
EF  β  =-0.65 
Kohler et al, 
2014 
Pr Pre-Trt 12 
post 
surge
ry 
ED (HADS) Y MR Concurrent 
urinary 
symptoms and 
erectile 
dysfunction 
None ED ED  = 0.48, Concurrent 
urinary symptomd  β  = 
0.39 
Mehta et al 
2003 
Pr Pre-Trt NOT 
clear 
of 
prosp
ective 
or 
cross-
sectio
nal 
Fear of Cancer Recurrence 
(FCR) 
N MR Age, Clinical 
characteristics, 
Trt, 
HRQoL,(SF-36) 
Symptoms 
None None QoL-physical R
2
c = 0.27, 
QoL-mental R
2
c = 0.04 
(no data) 
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2.3.3 Psychological predictors  
2.3.3.1 Emotional distress 
Most of the studies reviewed (27/34) examined whether baseline measures of distress 
(around or within three months of diagnosis) predicted distress at follow-up.  
In most cases, the same measure of distress was used for both the baseline and follow-up 
assessments and this was the largest or only significant predictor. There were a few 
exceptions to this where baseline levels of distress did not predict follow-up distress.  Two 
studies in breast cancer found that pre-diagnosis (Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013) and pre-
operative (Schou et al., 2004) depression (CES-D & HADS respectively) did not predict 
depression at follow-up (24 and 12 months later respectively).  Although in the former study 
(Lockefeer & De Vries, 2013), depression two years post-diagnosis was predicted by trait 
anxiety assessed just prior to diagnosis.  In another study (Lebel et al., 2008), post-treatment 
emotional distress (POMS) did not predict emotional distress six years after surgery for 
breast cancer.  Lastly, although depression after diagnosis of head and neck cancer initially 
predicted depression (BDI), six years later this was no longer the case after baseline 
neuroticism was controlled (Aarstad et al., 2005).  
Five studies (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998; Grassi et al., 1997; Ramirez et al., 
1995; Ristvedt & Trinkaus, 2009; Tjemsland et al., 1998) used a different measure of distress 
to predict persistent distress, instead of the outcome measure and without controlling for it at 
baseline.  Of these, three found a positive effect.  One cross-sectional study reported that 
maladjustment at diagnosis and pre-morbid psychiatric history predicted depression (HDRS) 
in a heterogeneous cancer population twelve months after diagnosis (Grassi et al., 1997).  The 
other two found that trait anxiety (assessed post-operatively) predicted emotional functioning 
(FACT-G - EF) between two and five years after surgery for rectal cancer, (Ristvedt & 
Trinkaus, 2009), and that pre-operative emotional distress (HADS) predicted psychiatric 
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‘caseness’ (PSE) 12 months after surgery for breast cancer (Ramirez et al., 1995).  In 
contrast, the remaining two studies (Andrykowski & Cordova, 1998, Tjemsland et al., 1998), 
found that pre-morbid psychiatric diagnosis (depression and PTSD respectively) did not 
predict persistent trauma symptoms (PCL-C and IES respectively) after surgery for breast 
cancer. 
These findings taken together provide fairly compelling evidence to support the view 
that baseline distress is a reliable predictor of persistent distress, especially where the same 
measure is used at both assessment points. 
 
2.3.3.2 Self-esteem 
Two studies included self-esteem as a predictor. One (Den Oudsten et al., 2009) found 
no effect of pre-diagnosis self-esteem on 12-month depression (CES-D) in breast cancer 
patients.  However, the other study in a mixed cohort (Schroevers et al., 2003b) found that 
negative, but not positive, self-esteem assessed three months after diagnosis predicted 12-
month depression (CES-D).  However, the data for this latter finding was not reported.  
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that there is any reliable evidence to support the role of 
self-esteem as a predictor of persistent distress. 
 
2.3.3.3 Coping 
Ten studies (Adachi et al., 2014; Couper et al., 2010; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; Dean, 
1987; Elklit & Blum, 2011; Lebel et al., 2008; Millar et al., 2005; Schou et al., 2004; Stanton 
et al., 2002; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006) looked at whether coping predicted distress at 
follow-up.  Studies employed different measures of coping, all of which aimed to assess the 
cognitive and behavioural strategies used to manage the stress of cancer. 
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Five studies across breast (Dean, 1987; Elklit & Blum, 2011; Millar et al., 2005), 
prostate (Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006), and head and neck (Adachi et al., 2014) cancer found 
no effect of pre-operative, or immediately post-operative, coping.  Another study, in head and 
neck cancer, reported results that were inconsistent.  In one paper (de Leeuw ,et al 2000) the 
authors reported that pre-treatment coping did not predict depression (CES-D) twelve months 
later, whereas in another (de Leeuw ,et al 2001) they reported that coping through religion 
explained 2% of the variance in depression 12 months after treatment, while palliative coping 
explained 2% of the variance after three years.  It is likely that this discrepancy in results is 
due to small differences in the way the regression analyses were conducted between papers.  
Nonetheless it suggests that pre-treatment coping was not a reliable predictor of persistent 
post-treatment depression in this sample. 
Coping did predict persistent emotional distress (after controlling for baseline distress) in 
the remaining four studies.  Pre-treatment fatalism predicted depression (BSI) 12-months 
later among prostate cancer patients, although no aspect of coping predicted anxiety (BSI) 
(Couper et al., 2010).  Pre-operative ‘acceptance coping’ and interaction of pre-operative 
hope with several aspects of coping, including turning to religion, ‘problem focussed’ coping 
and seeking social support predicted less emotional distress (POMS) 12 months after 
diagnosis of breast cancer (Stanton et al., 2002), while, in another study, fatalism at diagnosis 
predicted greater anxiety (HADS), and helpless/hopeless coping at diagnosis predicted 
greater depression (HADS) among breast cancer patients 12-months after surgery (Schou et 
al., 2004).  More surprising is the finding that ‘positive problem solving’ three months after 
diagnosis of breast cancer predicted greater emotional distress (POMS) six years later (Lebel 
et al., 2008).  The authors of this study speculated that this approach to coping predicted 
distress because of a detrimental effect of the pressure to find positive outcomes and ‘think 
positive’ that many cancer patients encounter early in the cancer journey.  Participants in this 
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study were being followed up six years after a randomised trial of a coping skills 
intervention.  While the trial found no intervention effect, it is possible that being encouraged 
towards ‘positive problem solving’ at an early stage may encourage overly optimistic 
expectations and discourage acceptance of the reality of the disease and its implications.  
Such approaches could be counterproductive, potentially interfering with normal adjustment 
processes, especially if the patient experiences further disease- or treatment-related 
difficulties.  
Due to the inconsistency of findings, the considerable differences in the ways coping was 
operationalised and the varying approaches used in design and analysis between studies 
(including different timing of assessment points, and different predictors/controls included in 
the analysis) it must be concluded that the evidence for coping as a predictor of persistent 
emotional distress is at best inconclusive. 
 
2.3.3.4 Personality 
Eight studies (Bleiker et al., 2000; Den Oudsten et al., 2009; Lebel et al., 2008; Millar et 
al., 2005; Ranchor et al., 2002; Schou et al., 2004; Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006; Tjemsland et 
al., 1998) explored various personality factors.  Optimism /pessimism was assessed in four 
studies using the Life Orientation Test (LOT).  In newly diagnosed breast cancer patients 
(Schou et al., 2004) after controlling for baseline distress, pessimism predicted cases of 
anxiety or depression (HADS) 12 months later.  The authors claim that pessimism was the 
strongest individual predictor for both outcomes at 12 months and that the effects of 
pessimism were mediated by fatalism and helpless/hopeless coping respectively.  However, 
the basis for drawing the former conclusion is not clear from the data presented. Furthermore, 
in contrast to this study, three other studies - one which investigated pre-treatment optimism 
amongst prostate cancer patients (Steginga & Occhipinti, 2006) and two that investigated 
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post-operative optimism in breast cancer (Bleiker et al., 2000; Lebel et al., 2008) - found no 
effect on distress outcomes after controlling for baseline distress.  
In contrast, all four of the studies that assessed baseline neuroticism (using either the 
Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness-Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFT) or the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory –Neuroticism (EPI-N)) found that it predicted 12-month outcomes after 
controlling for baseline distress including: emotional distress (GHQ) (Millar et al., 2005; 
Ranchor et al., 2002); depression (CES-D) (Den Oudsten et al., 2009); and trauma (IES) 
(Tjemsland et al., 1998).  In addition, a study of patients with newly diagnosed head and neck 
cancer (Aarstad et al., 2005) reported that controlling for neuroticism reduced to non-
significant the correlation between baseline depression and depression (BDI) at six years 
while it considerably strengthened the positive correlation between baseline humour (defined 
as a sensitivity to humorous messages and tendency to enjoy comical situations) and long-
term depression.  Unfortunately the independent contribution of neuroticism as a predictor of 
depression at six years was not reported.  
These findings indicate that some aspects of personality are more reliable predictors of 
persistent distress than others.  There is currently no evidence to support the role of optimism 
in predicting persistent distress, although there is some consistent support for the role of 
neuroticism.  
 
2.3.3.5 Perceived control 
Three studies (Bárez et al., 2009; de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001; Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 
2007) examined patients’ perceived control as a potential predictor of distress at follow-up.  
In one study of early breast cancer patients (Bárez et al., 2009), perceived control was a latent 
variable constructed from the mean scores of scales assessing: fighting spirit and 
helplessness; self–efficacy to overcome breast cancer related concerns; and personal 
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competence in interacting effectively with the environment.  In this study, higher perceived 
control one week after surgery predicted faster improvement in emotional distress (latent 
variable derived from the combined scores of the POMS and the HADS) over the subsequent 
year, and change in perceived control over time was also associated with a corresponding 
change in emotional distress.  In another study (Gustavsson-Lilius et al., 2007), this time of 
mixed diagnosis patients, a similar construct - sense of sense of coherence (SOC: see 
definition on page 27), assessed at diagnosis was negatively associated with anxiety and 
depression 14 months later even after controlling for baseline distress.  Finally, a study in 
head and neck cancer patients (de Leeuw et al., 2000, 2001) investigated whether cancer 
locus of control (defined as a sense of internal control about the cause and course of cancer) 
predicted long term depression (CES-D) one to three years after treatment (19/21) but found 
no effect.  These findings once again are difficult to interpret as the construct of ‘perceived 
control’ is operationalised and assessed quite differently across studies.  Nonetheless there is 
little evidence to support the view that perceived control is a reliable predictor of persistent 
distress. 
 
2.3.3.6 Illness appraisal 
A final psychological predictor that has been explored across several studies is the 
individual’s appraisal of their illness.  Two studies assessed patients’ appraisal of their cancer 
using the Illness Perception Questionnaire-Revised (IPQ-R)  (Millar et al., 2005; Scharloo et 
al., 2010), and two used single items to assess patients’ appraisal of cancer as a challenge, 
threat or loss (Lebel et al., 2008; Schou et al., 2004).  Only one study (Millar et al., 2005) 
using the IPQ-R found any effect of appraisal on distress at follow-up, reporting that greater 
perceived symptom burden (as measured by the IPQ-R  illness identity scale) in the days after 
surgery predicted worse emotional distress (GHQ-28) 12 months later.  In contrast, a study of 
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head and neck cancer patients found that none of the illness perception subscales (IPQ-R) at 
diagnosis were able to predict emotional distress two years later (QLQ-C30 – EF) (Scharloo 
et al., 2010), although several, including ‘illness identity’, ‘consequences’ and ‘behavioural 
attributions’ predicted other aspects of health-related quality of life (including physical, role 
and social functioning and global health).  Once again, as with the section above, the 
differences between studies in how appraisal was assessed makes it difficult to compare 
across studies.  However, this aside, as it stands it must be concluded that there is currently 
no evidence to support the view that patients’ baseline appraisal of their cancer predicts 
persistent distress.  
 
2.3.3.7 Summary of psychological predictors. 
In summary, it can be seen that of the psychological variables assessed, only baseline 
distress and neuroticism were consistently found to predict persistent emotional distress 
across studies.  For the other psychological variables, particularly those where the findings 
were inconsistent across studies (i.e. coping), it is difficult to draw conclusions.  However, 
based on the current evidence it seems unlikely that these are important predictors. 
The finding that distress around, or within three months of, diagnosis predicts follow-up 
distress when using the same measure merely tells us that, for most of the patients 
experiencing longer-term distress, this is a problem that has been maintained from the start of 
their cancer journey.  This lends support to guidelines recommending psychological 
assessment and appropriate intervention at the earliest stages of the cancer journey.  It does 
not, however, provide any insight into how or why distress is maintained in some patients and 
not others.  The finding by Aarstad et al (Aarstad et al., 2005) that neuroticism reduced to 
non-significant the effect of depression at diagnosis on depression at six years in head and 
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neck cancer patients is intriguing and may imply that it is the enduring characteristics of the 
individual that are key, rather than more transient emotional responses to the cancer.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Identifying baseline ‘risk’ or ‘vulnerability’ factors that predict persistent emotional distress 
after cancer has been largely unsuccessful.  There is no consistent evidence to support any 
demographic, medical or social variables as potential predictors.  The only psychological 
variable for which there is substantial supportive evidence - baseline emotional distress - is of 
limited clinical utility as it remains unclear why some people who are distressed at baseline 
experience persistent problems and others do not.  There is clearly still a need for greater 
understanding of the causal mechanisms that underlie the development and maintenance of 
emotional distress after cancer.  If we could identify the psychological processes that give 
rise to and maintain distress after diagnosis of cancer, we could better detect those who may 
have problems adjusting with usual care alone (Lynch, Steginga, Hawkes, Pakenham, & 
Dunn, 2008) and could develop interventions that target these processes in order to reduce 
vulnerability to persistent distress.  
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Table 2.3: Outcome measures (DV) used in included studies_ 
Measure Abbreviation Outcome assessed 
Present State Examination PSE Anxiety/ Depression Cases 
Structured Clinical Interview SCID Major Depressive Disorder/ 
Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder 
The Psychological Screen for Cancer  PSSCAN Anxiety / Depression Cases 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale  HADS Anxiety / Depression / 
Emotional Distress 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies  Depression 
Scale 
CES-D Depression 
Beck Depression Inventory BDI Depression 
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale HDRS Depression 
The Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale Zung - SDS Depression 
Brief Symtom Inventory BSI  Anxiety / Depression 
Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scales EMAS-State Anxiety 
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist – Civilian 
version 
PCL-C Trauma Symptoms 
Impact of Events Scale IES Trauma Symptoms 
Harvard Trauma Questionnaire HTQ Trauma Symptoms 
Profile of Mood State POMS Emotional Distress 
General Health Questionnaire GHQ- 28 / GHQ 12 Emotional Distress 
The European Organization for Research and 
Treatment of Cancer (EORTC) Core Quality of Life 
Questionnaire – Emotional Functioning Scale 
QLQ-C30 – EF Emotional Functioning 
Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy-General – 
Emotional Functioning Scale 
FACT-G - EF Emotional Functioning 
Affects Balance Scale  ABS Emotional Distress 
Decisional Conflict Scale DCS Decisional Distress 
Fear of Recurrence Scale FCR Fear of Cancer Recurrence 
Fear of Recurrence Scale FOR Fear of Cancer Recurrence 
 
  
 48 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Current theoretical approaches to understanding emotional distress after cancer: 
An overview 
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Current views and models of adjustment in cancer have developed from ideas derived 
from both clinically orientated research and health psychology theory. As a result, several 
different models are evident in the literature.  However, they are all based on the central tenet 
of the cognitive paradigm; that is, it is our interpretation of an event, rather than the objective 
consequences of it, that is central to our emotional and behavioral response. The most well-
known models include: the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey & Greer, 2002) 
and the Common-Sense Model of illness representations (Leventhal et al., 1980; Leventhal et 
al., 1984).   
 
3.1 Cognitive model of adjustment to cancer  
The cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (see Figure 3.1 below) is a clinically 
derived model. It was developed more than 20 years ago but has been influential in guiding 
psychological treatment for emotional distress in cancer ever since, particularly by providing 
the theoretical basis for the most well known adaptation of CBT in oncology - Adjuvant 
Psychological Therapy (APT). 
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Figure 3.1: Cognitive model of adjustment to cancer (Moorey & Greer, 2002) 
 
The model itself is not specified in detail beyond the schematic shown above.  Instead 
the authors draw heavily on coping theory and Beck’s schema theory in order to explain and 
understand emotional distress after cancer.  
 
3.1.1 Coping theory 
Lazarus and Folkman’s work on stress and coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)  is cited 
as a major influence on the cognitive model of adjustment as it contributes greatly to our 
understanding of the role of appraisal in mobilising coping behaviours (Moorey & Greer, 
2002).  In this work, Lazarus and Folkman defined psychological stress (or distress) as ‘a 
particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the 
person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-being' 
Survival Schema 
View of the disease, degree of control 
and the prognosis 
Self Schema 
View of the self, the world and other 
people 
Cognition 
(Negative automatic thoughts and Images; 
cognitive biases) 
Emotion and 
physiology 
Confirmation Behaviour 
(coping, interpersonal 
interactions avoidance) 
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((Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) p. 19).  They identified two distinct forms of appraisal which 
together determine the individual’s response to an event or stressor: primary appraisal of the 
stressor itself; and secondary appraisal of the individual’s resources to manage it. Therefore, 
in the case of receiving a diagnosis of cancer when the disease is appraised as a challenge that 
can be met, individuals may feel positive and optimistic about their future.  However, if it is 
appraised as a foregone conclusion or defeat that they can do anything about, they may feel 
that the prognosis is hopeless and the future bleak. 
In cancer, the resulting patterns of thoughts feelings and behaviours have been 
categorised into five adjustment or coping styles (M. Watson et al., 1988), which are assumed 
to represent relatively stable attitudes and ways of behaving, similar to personality traits 
(Brennan, 2001) 
 
 Fighting spirit – the individual sees cancer as a challenge over which they can exert 
some control, they take an active role in recovery 
 Avoidance or denial – the individual denies the impact of the cancer, whether or not 
they can manage the diseases is irrelevant, they engage in behaviour to minimize its 
impact 
 Fatalism – the individual interprets cancer as a threat over which they have no control, 
they adopt a coping style of passive acceptance  
 Helpless/Hopeless  - the individual appraises cancer as a threat with impending loss 
over which they have no control, they behave as if the negative outcome has already 
occurred 
 Anxious preoccupation – the individual perceives cancer as a major threat causing an 
unpredictable future, they are unsure of their ability to manage the situation and 
engage in worry and reassurance seeking. 
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3.1.2 Schema theory 
As in Beck’s Schema theory, appraisal within the cognitive model of adjustment to 
cancer is seen as being influenced by early experience and prior knowledge, as this shapes an 
individual’s beliefs and perceptions about cancer, its implications and their ability to cope. 
This theory emphasises that cancer is appraised in two areas; as a potential threat to the 
individual’s schemata (i.e. cognitive structures that guide the screening, encoding, 
organizing, storing and retrieving of information (Beck & Clark, 1988)) about survival and 
mortality and also to their self-schema.  
It is suggested that, for individuals who become distressed, core positive beliefs about 
survival, the self and the world around are challenged or even shattered by a diagnosis of 
cancer and core negative beliefs activated, resulting in an overall negative appraisal of the 
situation and thus a negative emotional response.  Schema theory asserts that once such a 
negative view is established it then has the potential to become self-perpetuating due to the 
tendency for negative schemata to bias information processing in order to preserve the 
negative view.  This bias occurs via systematic logical errors in thinking or cognitive 
distortions, such as: all-or-nothing thinking, selective abstraction, arbitrary inference, 
overgeneralization, labelling and magnification/minimisation (Beck et al 1979).  Negative 
automatic thoughts (NATS) are generated that, seeming accurate and realistic to the 
individual at the time, influence their emotional responses both directly and indirectly as part 
of a complex interplay between thoughts, feelings, behaviour and physiological responses 
(see Figure 3.1).  Although not necessarily always at the forefront of the individual’s 
attention, such NATS are available to consciousness and it is these, together with the 
associated emotions and maladaptive coping styles (described above), that are the focus of 
Adjuvant Psychological Therapy (APT) (Moorey & Greer, 2002). 
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3.1.3 Evidence supporting the cognitive model of adjustment to cancer 
As stated above, the cognitive model of adjustment in cancer was developed 
predominantly to describe and guide the clinical application of CBT to people with cancer 
(Moorey & Greer, 2002).  As such, the model itself has not been formally tested.  Instead, 
support for the model is usually derived from research conducted into the effectiveness of 
CBT in oncology settings.  However, as noted in Chapter 1, the results of this research are 
inconclusive.  
Researchers have also sought support for the model through conducting research aimed 
at identifying specific ‘coping strategies’ that, in the cognitive model (see Figure 3.1), are 
thought to mediate the relationship between NATS and emotional distress.  However, as 
described in Chapter 2. there is currently scarce evidence to support the role of any specific 
coping style as a reliable predictor of persistent distress after cancer.  Indeed, it is argued that 
as cancer involves many different and changing challenges across its course, it is unlikely 
that just one type of coping style is helpful in all contexts and for all people (Brennan, 2001).   
Consequently, more recent research has moved away from focussing solely on coping 
towards understanding more about the individual’s appraisal of their cancer and how this 
guides selection of coping strategies.  In particular, research has concentrated on whether the 
nature of the relationship between specific illness perceptions, coping and emotional well-
being can add to our understanding of what causes emotional distress, and why it is 
maintained.  Much of this work has been conducted using the framework of Leventhal’s 
Common Sense Model of self-regulation in health and illness (CSM (Leventhal et al., 1984)).  
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3.2 Common Sense Model of self-regulation in health and illness 
Leventhal’s Common Sense Model (CSM) of self-regulation in health and illness 
((Leventhal et al., 1980; Leventhal et al., 1984)) is a well-established and tested theoretical 
model (see (Hagger & Orbell, 2010) for a review) derived from health psychology research 
(see Figure 3.2).  It focuses specifically on how individuals appraise their illness and how this 
influences their coping and subsequent emotional response.  Consequently, it may be argued 
that it complements, rather than contradicts, the cognitive model of adjustment described 
above by specifically exploring how the variation in patients’ perception of their illness 
relates to coping style, and how this relates to emotional outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Common Sense Model (CSM) of health and illness (Hagger & Orbell, 2010) 
 
First outlined by Leventhal and colleagues in the 1980s, (Leventhal et al., 1980; 
Leventhal et al., 1984) the CSM is conceptualised as a self-regulatory model whereby 
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individuals attempt to minimise the impact of ill-health and return to a state of ‘normality’.  It 
is particularly attractive to health professionals because it views patients as active problem 
solvers, who may be helped to achieve better outcomes by facilitating a more adaptive 
understanding of their condition (Wearden & Peters, 2008).  The CSM is organised into three 
stages: initially, it is suggested that an individual faced with ill-health develops two sets of 
mental representations, a cognitive representation or interpretation of the nature of the health 
threat (similar to the primary appraisal described above) and an emotional representation (i.e. 
fear).  These representations then act in parallel to guide coping responses aimed at regulating 
both the threat itself and the individual’s emotional response to it.  In the third stage, the 
success or failure of these coping strategies is continually monitored and the resulting 
appraisal (similar to secondary appraisal described above) modifies the initial representations 
and/or the individual’s selection of coping strategies.  
Leventhal suggested that individuals develop cognitive representations in response to 
both abstract and concrete sources of information (Leventhal et al., 1980).  In terms of the 
content of these representations, it is suggested that patients organise their thinking about 
illness around five key dimensions (Hagger & Orbell, 2010; Weinman, Petrie, & Horne, 
1996): Illness identity (knowledge and beliefs about symptoms attributed to the illness); 
Consequences (perceived effects and outcomes of the illness); Timeline (beliefs about the 
likely duration of the illness); Control/Cure (beliefs about the ability to control /cure the 
illness); and Causes (beliefs about aetiology).  A sixth dimension – coherence (perceived 
understanding of the illness and its implications) was added later (Moss-Morris et al., 2002).  
A meta-analytic review (Hagger & Orbell, 2010) of studies examining the stability of the 
original dimensions and their association with emotional distress outcomes across 23 diseases 
found that, as would be predicted, consequences, timeline and identity were positively related 
to distress, while control/cure was negatively related. 
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3.2.1 Evidence supporting the Common Sense Model in cancer. 
Cross-sectional studies have confirmed associations in the expected directions between 
various illness perception dimensions and psychological outcomes in cancer (Dempster et al., 
2012; Millar et al., 2005; Rozema, Vollink, & Lechner, 2009; Scharloo et al., 2010; Traeger 
et al., 2009).  For example, studies have shown that the more symptoms an individual 
attributes to their illness (Millar et al., 2005; Scharloo et al., 2010) and the poorer their 
understanding of their condition (Dempster et al., 2012; Gould, Brown, & Bramwell, 2010; 
Traeger et al., 2009), the more likely they are to be distressed.  In addition, the stronger the 
perception that cancer will have negative consequences (Dempster et al., 2012; Gould et al., 
2010; Traeger et al., 2009), last a long time or be cyclical in nature (Gould et al., 2010; 
Rabin, Leventhal, & Goodin, 2004) and the weaker the belief in its controllability (Dempster 
et al., 2012; Gould et al., 2010; Rozema et al., 2009; Traeger et al., 2009), the greater the 
emotional distress.  In addition, two of these studies found evidence to support the view that 
illness perceptions are stronger correlates of adaptive outcomes than are coping styles 
(Dempster et al., 2012; Rozema et al., 2009).  However, as such studies only provide limited 
information about concurrent relationships, they are of little use in establishing whether 
illness perceptions play a causal role in activating or maintaining emotional distress after 
cancer. 
Only three studies have been able to show prospective relationships between illness 
perceptions and emotional distress in cancer, and these differ in the dimensions that were 
found to predict subsequent distress.  A study of newly diagnosed head and neck cancer 
patients (Llewellyn, McGurk, & Weinman, 2007) found that a stronger perception that cancer 
would last a long time, and a stronger sense of self-blame, predicted 26% and 21% 
(respectively) of the variance in depression six-eight months later.  In contrast, a study in 
breast cancer  (Millar et al., 2005), found no association between patients’ post-operative 
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perceptions of the duration or cause of their cancer and emotional distress 12-months later.  
However, they did find a positive association between post-operative illness identity and later 
emotional distress.  Finally, a  recent study among survivors of oesophageal cancer 
(Dempster et al., 2012) looked at the relationship between change in variables, rather than 
point prevalence, and found a relationship between change in illness perceptions over a one 
year period and changes in emotional distress.  Specifically, a reduction in the perception of 
personal and/or treatment control over this period was associated with a corresponding 
increase in distress after controlling for medical, demographic and coping variables.  
However, it is important to note from this study that although both illness perceptions and 
coping added significantly to the variance in change on distress, the total amount of variance 
explained by the model as a whole was relatively small (7% and 10% for anxiety and 
depression respectively).  Therefore, it is apparent that a lot of the variance in change in 
distress still remains unexplained after accounting for these variables.  
The inconsistency in these results is perhaps not surprising.  The CSM was developed 
to explain the relationship between an individual’s cognitions, coping behaviours and 
outcomes ‘at that time’, rather than how such cognitions might influence behaviour and 
outcomes in the future (Llewellyn et al., 2007).  Therefore, while the CSM may be a useful 
approach for understanding concurrent distress, its utility for predicting persistent emotional 
distress from cognitions elicited around diagnosis is questionable.  That is, a causal role for 
illness perceptions in maintaining distress has yet to be demonstrated.  
 
3.3 Limitations of current theoretical approaches 
Consequently, it can be seen that neither of the models described above (the cognitive 
model of adjustment to cancer and the CSM) have substantially advanced our understanding 
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of ‘why’ and ‘how’ distress is maintained after diagnosis of cancer.  The fact that illness 
perceptions and negative illness-related thoughts are not clearly implicated is understandable, 
when one considers that most, if not all, individuals receiving a diagnosis of cancer will 
experience some thoughts related to negative perceptions of the illness, yet not everyone will 
experience persistent distress.  Negative thoughts are generally fleeting, and an individual’s 
perceptions about their cancer in the early stages are likely to be unstable as they are assailed 
with new information and experiences.  It has been suggested that negative thoughts only 
become a problem if the individual responds to them by engaging in excessive worry and/or 
rumination (Wells, 2009).  On this basis, it may be argued that it is not the illness-perceptions 
per se, but the selection and use of worry in response to the negative thoughts that they 
trigger that leads to persistent emotional distress.  Worry is prevalent in cancer and, while a 
certain level is considered normal and adaptive, individuals who experience high levels of 
generalised worry are more likely to develop a helpless/hopeless coping style in response to 
their concerns (Parle, Jones, & Maguire, 1996), and to develop more negative illness 
perceptions (Lehto & Cimprich, 2009).  However, cognitive models such as the CSM and the 
cognitive model of emotional disorder do not attempt to explain the causes of such persistent 
worry and rumination.  
. 
3.4 A new theoretical approach - Metacognitive model of emotional disorder  
The metacognitive model of emotional disorder was developed in response to the 
question of why some people are able to dismiss negative thoughts while others cannot and 
experience recurrent or prolonged distress: ‘Everyone has negative thoughts and everyone 
believes their negative thoughts sometimes. But not everyone develops sustained anxiety, 
depression , or emotional suffering’, page 1 (Wells, 2009). 
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In this model, as in traditional cognitive theories, dysfunctional beliefs have a central 
role in causing and maintaining distress.  However, in contrast to those theories, in the 
metacognitive model it is the individual’s beliefs about their thinking (metacognitive beliefs) 
rather than the specific content of their thoughts, and their use of inflexible and recurrent 
thinking styles in response to negative thoughts, that underlies persistent emotional distress. 
 
3.4.1 The S-REF Model 
The basic theoretical underpinning of the metacognitive model of emotional disorder is 
the Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF: (Wells & Mathews, 1994)), see 
Figure 3.3 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The S-REF model of psychological disorder ((Wells, 2009), p.9) 
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The S-REF model was derived from prospective and experimental research into information 
processing models and is the first model to offer an account of the cognitive and 
metacognitve processes involved in the top-down control and maintenance of emotional 
disorder (Wells, 2009).  It is based on multi-level cognitive architecture comprising three 
levels of interacting cognitive processing, including: a low-level of automatic and reflexive 
processing (i.e. negative automatic thoughts), a level of conscious processing of such 
thoughts and behaviours (cognitive style), and a level of stored metacognitive knowledge 
and/or beliefs (meta system) that guide the lower levels of ordinary cognitive processing 
towards a self-relevant goal.  For most people, periods of emotional distress in response to an 
event are transitory, as the goal is reached and processing operations terminated.  However, 
S-REF theory proposes that, for some people, activation of a particular toxic style of thinking 
called the cognitive attentional syndrome (CAS) occurs, and it is this that is central to the 
development and maintenance of emotional disorder.  The CAS consists of cognitive 
processes such as persistent worry and rumination, focussing of attention on threat, and 
maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. avoidance or thought suppression).  The model proposes 
that positive metacognitive beliefs about the benefits of, or need to engage in, such processes 
activate this style of responding, while negative metacognitive beliefs (i.e. about the danger 
or uncontrollability of worry and rumination) exacerbate and maintain it.  This continuation 
of CAS processes ultimately ‘backfires’, by sustaining negative thinking and the sense of 
threat, rather than allowing such experiences to fade naturally. 
 
3.4.2. Generic formulation for the metacognitive model of emotional disorder 
Consequently, it can be seen that the S-REF, and hence metacognitive model of 
emotional disorder, looks beyond dysfunctional content of ordinary cognition (i.e. negative 
thoughts about cancer) to the generic processes that sustain it.  Therefore, rather than being 
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disorder-specific, it allows for a universal case formulation of emotional disorder as shown in 
Figure 3.4 below: 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Universal case formulation diagram ((Wells, 2009), p252) 
 
Central to this formulation is the CAS, which represents a cognitive style of sustained 
and inflexible responding to thoughts, including processes such as: perseverative thinking 
(e.g. worry and rumination), focussing of attention on threat, and maladaptive coping 
strategies (e.g. avoidance or thought suppression).  These CAS processes fail to modify 
dysfunctional beliefs, instead increasing the accessibility of negative information to support 
them (Wells, 2009), thus prolonging and intensifying distress.  The cyclical relationship 
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between appraisal and the CAS signifies that negative thoughts or appraisals may trigger, be 
maintained by, or be the output of CAS processes but do not drive them. 
The CAS is activated and driven by metacognitive beliefs.  Two types of metacognitive 
belief are of particular importance: positive beliefs about the benefits of, and need to engage 
in aspects of the CAS (e.g.’ if I worry about recurrence, I’ll detect early signs or symptoms’) 
that activate it, and negative beliefs about the danger or uncontrollability of CAS processes 
(e.g.: ‘worrying will make my cancer worse’; ‘I can’t stop worrying about recurrence’) that 
maintain or exacerbate it by causing worry about worry.  The bidirectional arrow linking the 
CAS to metacognitive beliefs indicates that while these metacognitive beliefs activate the 
CAS, at the same time activity of the CAS strengthens or modifies these beliefs.  In addition, 
negative metacognitive beliefs may also cause a direct emotional response, thereby 
exacerbating distress directly. 
A further bidirectional arrow links the CAS to emotion in Figure 3.4, indicating that 
unpleasant emotions activate self-regulatory processing with the aim of reducing distress but, 
in the case of emotional disorder, activity of the CAS instead maintains or exacerbates this 
distress. 
Finally, on the periphery of the formulation the self-world view is also linked by a bi-
directional arrow.  This represents other influences such as prior experiences or learning, 
which may shape the content of appraisals or be shaped by them, but do not drive the 
underlying mental processes that maintain distress.  
 
3.4.3 Evidence for metacognitive model of emotional disorder. 
The metacognitive model of emotional disorder was developed for use in mental health. 
Consequently, the vast majority of studies that have provided empirical support for the model 
have done so in mental health populations (see Wells, 2008, 2009 for a review) rather than 
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physical health or, more specifically, cancer.  However, evidence of the model’s utility for 
understanding emotional distress in physical health is beginning to emerge.  Metacognitive 
beliefs have been associated with heightened emotional distress in physical health 
populations including:  Parkinson’s disease (Allott, Wells, Morrison, & Walker, 2005), 
chronic fatigue (Maher-Edwards, Fernie, Murphy, Nikcevic, & Spada, 2011), teenage and 
young adult (TYA) cancer survivors (Fisher, McNicol, Young, Smith, & Salmon, 2015; McNicol, 
Salmon, Young, & Fisher, 2013) and breast cancer (Thewes, Bell, & Butow, 2013). 
 
3.5 Summary 
In summary, it can be seen that the two predominant theoretical approaches currently 
applied to understanding emotional distress in cancer fail to explain why some people are 
vulnerable to persistent emotional distress after diagnosis and treatment, while others are not.  
In contrast, the metacognitive model of emotional disorder clearly indicates the psychological 
processes that underlie maintenance of emotional distress, and thereby offers several potential 
benefits over these more traditional models.  Firstly, it allows patients vulnerable to 
emotional distress to be identified from the presence of modifiable causal factors, thus 
improving the potential effectiveness of intervention.  Secondly, as intervention is focussed 
on modifying metacognitive beliefs and process, rather than the content of negative thoughts, 
it  is easier to reconcile with the clinical reality of an often uncertain future and any objective 
physical changes, limitations and / or role changes imposed by the illness.  Finally, because it 
doesn’t focus on the content of thoughts, it also offers potential for a trans-diagnostic 
intervention, which may be more appropriate to cancer patients who often present with mixed 
symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma. 
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The remainder of this thesis is devoted to testing the utility of this model for 
understanding persistent emotional distress in cancer using a series of linked empirical 
studies.  However, first it is necessary to establish that the available measurement tools are 
valid for assessing metacognitive beliefs and processes in cancer.  Therefore, the first 
empirical chapter, Chapter 4, describes a study conducted to validate the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire (MCQ-30; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) for use in a cancer population.   
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Chapter Four 
Study one 
Measuring metacognition in cancer: Validation of the Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 
(MCQ-30). 
(for Published article see Appendix B) 
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4.1. Introduction 
The Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) was developed by Cartwright-Hatton and 
Wells (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) to explore the metacognitive dimensions that are 
central in the metacognitive model of emotional disorder.  Factor analyses derived five 
subscales from the initial 65-item questionnaire (MCQ-65), three of which assess beliefs, 
including: ‘Positive beliefs about worry’; ‘Negative beliefs about the danger and 
uncontrollability of worry’; and negative beliefs about thoughts in general.  The remaining 
two subscales assess the tendency to focus on cognitive events, ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’; and confidence in cognitive abilities, particularly memory and attention, 
‘Cognitive confidence’.  The MCQ-65 uses a four-point Likert response scale: 1 (do not 
agree); 2 (agree slightly); 3 (agree moderately); 4 (agree very much). 
However, despite excellent psychometric properties (see Wells (Wells, 2009) for a 
review), the usefulness of the MCQ-65 was compromised by its length; consequently a 
shorter 30-item version was developed (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  This MCQ-30 
retained the factor structure and the response scale of the longer measure, with six items 
selected to represent each metacognitive dimension on the basis of highest factor loading and 
item clarity in previous studies. 
Initial psychometric properties of the MCQ-30 were found, in a sample of 182 student 
and community participants, to be broadly similar to those of the longer measure (Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  Internal consistency of the subscales ranged from an adequate 
0.72 to an excellent 0.93 with adequate test-retest reliability for four out of five subscales 
(ranging from r = 0.59 ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ to r = 0.87 ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’).  Confirmatory and exploratory factor analysis confirmed an acceptable fit of 
the original five-factor model with most items loading on their predicted factors, except in the 
 67 
 
case of ‘Need to control thoughts’ where only three out of six items loaded significantly.  In 
addition, all five subscales were significantly and positively correlated with measures of 
worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990)) and Trait anxiety (State - Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983)) with the subscale ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ showing 
the strongest associations.  Further studies have since assessed the psychometric properties of 
the MCQ-30 in mixed student and community samples in the UK (Spada, Mohiyeddini, & 
Wells, 2008) and Turkey (Yilmaz, Gencoz, & Wells, 2008).  In both cases, the original five 
factor structure was replicated and positive correlations demonstrated with theoretically 
appropriate measures of worry (PSWQ), anxiety and depression. 
Recently, interest has grown in applying the metacognitive model to understanding 
emotional distress in cancer (McNicol et al., 2013; Thewes, Bell, & Butow, 2013).  Thewes 
et al (Thewes, Bell, & Butow, 2013) used the MCQ-30 to explore for the first time the 
association of metacognitive beliefs with Fear of Cancer Recurrence (FCR) among young 
women with early stage breast cancer.  They found that the subscale ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ was the most highly correlated with FCR, and that the MCQ-30 total score accounted 
for 36% of the variance in this outcome, leading them to conclude that  maladaptive  
metacognitions play an important role in FCR.  However, caution is warranted in the 
interpretation of such findings, because without formal psychometric testing we do not yet 
know how the MCQ-30 operates in a cancer population.  In order to have confidence in 
research conducted to test metacognitive theory and therapy in oncology settings (such as 
this), we first need measurement procedures that are valid for use in this population. 
Consequently, the current study aims to explore, for the first time, the validity of the 
MCQ-30 in cancer.  The primary aim is to explore whether the established five factor 
structure of the MCQ-30 is valid in this population, and to investigate the internal consistency 
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of its subscales.  A second aim is to explore whether the theoretically expected associations 
between specific subscales of the MCQ-30 and anxiety and depression demonstrated in 
previous research (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Spada et al, 2008; Yilmaz et al, 2008 ) 
are replicated, thus providing evidence of concurrent validity in this population. 
 
 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1 Ethics statement 
This study was conducted within the context of a larger prospective cohort study 
exploring the association of metacognitive beliefs with emotional distress after cancer which 
was approved according to UK guidelines, by the NHS North West 5 Research Ethics 
Committee (reference: 09/H1010/70).  There are no conflicts of interest to be declared. 
 
4.2.2. Participants 
A priori sample size calculations indicated a total sample size of 226 patients would 
provide 80% power to detect R
2
 of maladaptive metacognition (MCQ-30) as low as .05, i.e. a 
small-medium effect size. The significance criterion was set at p<.01 to allow for multiple 
testing (3 outcomes).  
Participants were recruited from patients at least 18 years old attending routine pre-
treatment clinics at a National Health Service (NHS) teaching hospital, after receiving a 
diagnosis of primary non-metastatic breast or prostate cancer.  Patients were excluded if they 
had recurrent or metastatic disease, or were considered by the clinical team or researcher to 
be too distressed or confused to give informed consent.   
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4.2.3. Measures 
The Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30)(Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) 
assesses metacognitive  beliefs and processes.  It comprises five subscales: ‘Positive beliefs 
about worry’; ‘Negative beliefs about worry’; ‘Cognitive confidence’; ‘Need to control 
thoughts’; and ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’.  For each subscale, six items are scored 1-4, 
yielding total scores of 6 to 24.  Participants are asked to indicate how much they generally 
agree with statements such as ‘Worrying helps me cope’ (Positive beliefs about worry); ‘My 
worrying is dangerous for me’ (Negative beliefs about worry); ‘I do not trust my memory’ 
(Cognitive confidence); ‘Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness’ (Need 
to control thoughts); and ‘I constantly examine my thoughts’ (Cognitive self-consciousness).  
High scores indicate, respectively, more positive and negative beliefs about worry, reduced 
confidence in memory, greater belief in the need to control thoughts and an increased 
tendency towards self-focussed attention.  The MCQ-30 has excellent internal consistency 
and good convergent and predictive validity in normal populations (Spada et al., 2008; Wells 
& Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Yilmaz et al., 2008).  
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) was 
used to assess anxiety and depression.  The HADS is a well-established measure of emotional 
distress specifically developed for use in physically ill populations.  Fourteen items are 
scored on a four-point scale yielding two subscale scores of 0-21 with high scores indicating 
great anxiety or depression. A cut-off score of eight or more on each subscale indicates 
clinically significant levels of symptoms.  The HADS has been extensively validated for use 
in cancer (Moorey et al., 1991; Vodermaier & Millman, 2011), and is one of the most widely 
employed measures of anxiety and depression symptoms in this population.  In the current 
sample, both subscales had good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α: .84/.88 for T1/T2 
depression; .88/.89 for T1/T2 anxiety). 
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The MOS social support survey (MOS; (Sherbourne & Stewart, 1991) was used to  
check for differences between groups (completed T1 only vs. completed T1&T2) in 
perceived emotional support.  This 19-item self-report measure was designed to assess four 
separate dimensions of perceived support among patients with chronic conditions.  However, 
for this study, only the subscales concerning emotional support (‘emotional/informational 
support’, ‘positive social interaction’ and ‘affectionate support’) were used to produce a total 
score for ‘perceived emotional support’.  As in a previous study in breast cancer (Hill et al., 
2011), this score was dichotomised by designating the patients in the lowest third as having 
low emotional support. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
From February 2010 to May 2011, participants were consecutively recruited through 
two pre-treatment cancer clinics at a National Health Service (NHS) teaching hospital in 
North-West England.  Suitable participants were identified by clinic staff, who gave them 
recruitment letters and information sheets for the study along with their appointment letters 
for routine pre-treatment consultations, and explained that participation in the research was 
entirely voluntary.  When patients attended the clinic, those willing to see the researcher were 
given further information and asked for written consent.  Participants were asked to complete 
study questionnaires in clinic (T1 – pre-treatment) and were given the choice of electronic 
(hand-held PC) or paper formats.  Those unable to complete the questionnaires in clinic took 
a copy (paper version) home and returned them by post.  Twelve months later, participants 
were mailed a second questionnaire pack (T2 – 12 months later), which they completed and 
returned by post. 
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4.2.5 Data analysis 
The data were analysed using SPSS Version 20 and Mplus v6.12.  Nonparametric 
statistics (Mann-Whitney or Kruskal-Wallis) were used for group comparisons between 
consenting patients who returned completed questionnaires at T1 and those that did not, and 
between participants who completed both assessments (completers) and those who completed 
T1 only (non-completers).  In both cases, groups were compared on age group (divided above 
and below the median age), gender, and in the latter comparison also on educational level, 
perceived emotional social support, stage of disease, T1 HADS and IES.   
To explore the validity of the MCQ-30 over time and under different circumstances, the 
data were analysed separately for both time points (pre-treatment & 12 months later).   
Construct validity of the MCQ-30 was first assessed using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) to test the published five-factor measurement model.  As the primary aim of 
this study was to assess validity, rather than achieve the best possible model fit, the decision 
was taken not to make minor modifications to the model based on the data (unless strongly 
supported by theory) as such modifications often just reflect idiosyncratic characteristics of 
the sample (MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992).  Instead, Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) was used to explore whether an alternative model would be more appropriate 
for this sample. Both sets of analyses (CFA and EFA), were performed in Mplus version 6.12 
(L. K. Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010), using the robust weighted least squares estimator 
(WLSMV(B. Muthen, 1984; B. Muthen, du Toit, & Spisic, 1997)) recommended for ordinal 
categorical data (Brown, 2006).  The EFA tested models up to and including a five-factor 
structure without dictating where items should load.  As previous studies identified MCQ-30 
subscales as inter-correlated, an oblique rotation (Geomin) was used to establish the optimum 
pattern of item loadings.  For both analyses (CFA & EFA), adequacy of model fit was 
 72 
 
assessed based on two  incremental fit indices: the Comparative Fit Index (CFI); and the 
Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI), with values close to 0.95 indicating a well-fitting model (Hu 
& Bentler, 1999), and two absolute misfit indices: the Root mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) with values <.05 indicating good fit and  0.5 - .08 adequate fit 
(Browne & Cudeck, 1993); and the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) with 
values less than .95 indicating good fit (Yu, 2002).  For the EFA, the Standardised Root mean 
Square (SRMR) was used, instead of the WRMR, with values <.05 indicating good fit.  Inter-
correlations amongst the five latent factors of the published model were examined and the 
internal consistency of each subscale assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. 
Concurrent validity of the MCQ-30 was then assessed (at each time point) by fitting the 
data to a structural model in which latent variables for anxiety and depression (each indicated 
by their seven constituent HADS items), were regressed onto the MCQ-30 factors.  Adequacy 
of model fit was again assessed using the fit indices described above.   As the MCQ-30 and 
HADS subscales were not normally distributed and the study sample relatively small, 
bootstrapping techniques were used to test the robustness of study findings. 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1 Sample 
Of 370 patients who were invited to participate, 258 (70%) consented and 229 (62% of 
those approached, 89% of consenters) returned completed questionnaires at T1.  There were 
no significant differences in age, gender and tumour stage between consenting patients who 
returned completed questionnaires and those that did not.  
Of the 229 participants who completed T1 questionnaires, 206 (90%) also completed 
the assessment 12 months later.  No significant differences between those who completed 
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both time points (completers) and those that completed T1 only (non-completers) were 
apparent on T1 HADS, IES, age, gender, education, or tumour grade.  However, non-
completers were more likely than completers to report low levels of perceived emotional 
support at T1 (52% vs. 31% p=.034). 
Sample characteristics for the participants at each time point are shown in Table 4:1. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
 Pre-treatment 
sample 
12 months follow-
sample 
Total N 229 206 
Age    
Mean (SD) 61.3 (8.9) 61.5 (9.0) 
Range 38 – 85 39-85 
   
 n (% of total N) n (% of total N) 
Gender   
Female 150 (66) 133 
Male 79 (34) 73 
Marital status    
Married  /  co-habiting 151 (66) 139 
Live alone  46 (20%) 37 
Education    
None  88 (38) 76 
School qualifications or higher 132 (58) 121 
Employment    
Employed (full/part-time) 88 (38) 79 
Retired 99 (43) 92 
Retired (health) 16 (7) 14 
Homemaker 13 (6) 9 
Unemployed  10 (4) 9 
Cancer diagnosis   
Breast  150 (66) 133 
Prostate 79 (34) 73 
Tumour grade    
Low 56  (24) 54 
Intermediate 107 (47) 97 
High 62 (27) 52 
Distress outcomes Distress at T1 Distress at T2 
Anxiety (HADS-A >7) 117 (51) 70 (34) 
Depression (HADS-D  >7) 28 (12) 44 (21) 
PTSD symptoms (IES total ≥27) 136 (59) 77 (37) 
 
N.B. Missing data T1 (T2): Marital Status n=5(5); Live alone n=3(2); Education n=9 (9); Employment n=3(3); 
Tumour grade n=4(3). 
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4.3.2. Factorial Structure 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the MCQ-30 five-factor model showed overall a 
marginally adequate fit of the model to the data at the pre-treatment assessment: χ2 (395) = 
787.448. p<. 01, RMSEA =.066 (90% CI=.059-.073), CFI = .91, TLI =.90, WRMR =1.218.   
Exploratory Factor analysis which, unlike CFA, does not dictate where items should 
load, confirmed that a five-factor solution nevertheless provided the best model.  Moreover, 
the fit indices (χ2 (295) = 439.692. P<.001, RMSEA =.046 (90% CI=.037-.055), CFI = .97, 
TLI =.95, SRMR =0.046) together indicate a good fit of the model to this data.  As shown in 
Table 4:2, all items loaded >0.4 on their expected factors (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  
However, as the items were allowed to load freely across any factors, minor discrepancies 
were observed between the EFA–derived solution and the published five factor model.  
Specifically, two items, MCQ3 and MCQ13, had their highest loadings on factors other than 
the expected ones. Item MCQ3 loaded higher on ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ (F1) than on 
its expected factor - ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’ (F4).  Item MCQ13 had equivalent 
loadings on both its expected factors - ‘Need for control over thoughts’ (F5) - and ‘Cognitive 
self-consciousness’ (F4).  Two further items (MCQ5 & MCQ29) also demonstrated 
significant (>.4) cross-loadings although for both the highest loading remained consistent 
with the published factor structure. 
At the 12-month follow-up, CFA indicated an adequate fit of the data to the published 
five-factor model: χ2 (395) = 684.184. p<. 01, RMSEA =.060 (90% CI=.053-.068, (p 
RMSEA<.05 )), CFI = .95, TLI =.95, WRMR =1.048,  therefore no Exploratory Factor 
Analysis was performed. 
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Table 4.2: Published scale structure and rotated (Geomin) factor loadings from EFA of 
the Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 at pre-treatment. 
MCQ-30 PUBLISHED SCALE STRUCTURE  
& ITEMS 
EFA FACTOR LOADINGS 
F1  F2 F3 F4 F5 
Subscale: Positive beliefs about worry 
MCQ-1  Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the 
future 
0.08 0.66 0.15 -0.19 0.05 
MCQ-7 I need to worry in order to remain organized 0.09 0.85 -0.17 -0.03 0.05 
MCQ-10 Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in 
my mind  
0.05 0.88 -0.05 0.10 -0.14 
MCQ-19 Worrying helps me cope -0.04 0.85 0.03 0.12 0.03 
MCQ-23 Worrying helps me to solve problems -0.10 0.85 0.05 0.09 0.04 
MCQ-28 I need to worry in order to work well -0.04 0.79 0.05 0.10 0.18 
Subscale: Negative beliefs about worry 
MCQ-2 My worrying is dangerous for me 0.58 -0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.14 
MCQ-4 I could make myself sick with worrying 0.65 -0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.03 
MCQ-9 My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how 
I try to stop them 
0.70 0.27 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 
MCQ-11 I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts  0.69 0.39 -0.02 0,01 -0.12 
MCQ-15 My worrying could make me go mad 0.62 -0.14 0.28 0.20 0.18 
MCQ-21 When I start worrying, I cannot stop 0.76 0.19 0.08 -0.07 0.09 
Subscale: Cognitive confidence 
MCQ-8 I have little confidence in my memory for 
words and names  
0.04 0.07 0.81 -0.06 -0.03 
MCQ-14 My memory can mislead me at times 0.19 -0.03 0.60 0.24 -0.07 
MCQ-17 I have a poor memory 0.05 0.02 0.88 -0.03 -0.05 
MCQ-24 I have little confidence in my memory for 
places 
-0.10 0.05 0.82 0.04 0.10 
MCQ-26 I do not trust my memory -0.07 -0.03 0.77 -0.03 0.30 
MCQ-29 I have little confidence in my memory for 
actions 
0.04 0.06 0.57 -0.09 0.47 
Subscale: Need for control over thoughts 
MCQ-6 If I did not control a worrying thought, and 
then it happened, it would be my fault. 
0.39 0.17 -0.14 -0.10 0.52 
MCQ-13 I should be in control of my thoughts all of 
the time 
-0.04 -0.11 -0.01 0.41 0.41 
MCQ-20 Not being able to control my thoughts is a 
sign of weakness 
0.32 0.06 -0.06 0.03 0.64 
MCQ-22 I will be punished for not controlling certain 
thoughts 
0.15 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.72 
MCQ-25 It is bad to thinks certain thoughts 0.13 -0.02 0.11 0.18 0.50 
MCQ-27 If I could not control my thoughts, I would 
not be able to function 
-0.07 -0.00 -0.05 0.27 0.64 
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Subscale: Cognitive self-consciousness 
MCQ-3 I think a lot about my thoughts 0.56 0.01 -0.01 0.43 -0.06 
MCQ-5 I am aware of the way my mind works when I 
am thinking through a problem 
0.14 0.17 -0.07 0.49 -0.42 
MCQ-12 I monitor my thoughts -0.03 0.08 -0.12 0.66 0.02 
MCQ-16 I am constantly aware of my thinking 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.66 0.05 
MCQ-18 I pay close attention to the way my mind 
works 
-0.02 0.08 0.03 0.83 0.02 
MCQ-30 I constantly examine my thoughts 0.31 0.05 0.01 0.55 0.27 
 
N.B. F1 ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ F2 ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ F3 ‘Cognitive confidence’ F4 ‘Need 
for control over thoughts’ F5 ‘Cognitive Self-conciousness’ ; Black= loading >.4; Underline = highest loading 
where item loads >.4 on more than one factor.  
 
The mean and SDs of the five MCQ-30 subscales and the correlations amongst the five 
latent variables (CFA standardised solution) at both time points are presented in Table 4:3.  
The internal consistency of the subscales was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 4:3) 
and ranged from 0.73 to 0.89 pre-treatment and from .79 to .91 at 12 month follow-up, 
indicating adequate to excellent internal consistency.  At both time points the subscale with 
the lowest alpha coefficient was ‘Need for Control’. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive data, internal consistency and inter correlations among the five 
latent MCQ-30 factors (CFA standardised solution) 
N.B. MCQ-30 subscales: ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ (POS); ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ (NEG); 
‘Cognitive Confidence’ (CC); ‘Need for control over thoughts’ (NC);’Cognitive Self Consciousness’ (CSC) 
*p<.05; **p<.001 
 
Pre-treatment 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) POS NEG CC NC CSC Alpha 
POS 9.2 (3.95) 8 (8.7-9.7) 1 .57** .29** .59** .55** .89 
NEG 11.2 (4.17) 11 (10.6-11.7)  1 .42** .58** .64** .80 
CC 10.0 (4.10) 9 (9.5-10.6)   1 .46** .18* .85 
NC 10.1 (3.68) 9.0 (9.6-10.6)    1 .64** .73 
CSC 13.3 (4.39) 13 (12.7-13.9)     1 .79 
12 month follow-up 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) POS NEG CC NC CSC Alpha 
POS 9.02 (3.97) 7.0(6-11) 1 .71** .45** .68** .62** .91 
NEG 10.8 (4.48)  10.0 (7-14)  1 .68** .65** .73** .85 
CC 11.21 (5.01) 10.0 (7-14)   1 .43** .37* .91 
NC 9.82 (3.89) 9.0 (7-11)    1 .72** .79 
CSC 12.41 (4.63) 12.0 (8.9-16)     1 .85 
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4.3.3. Convergent validity 
The hypothesised model of the relationship between metacognitive beliefs (using the 
MCQ-30’s published factor structure) and concurrent anxiety and depression is shown in 
Figure 4.1.  Overall, the fit indices for this latent variable SEM (see Table 4:4) indicated an 
acceptable fit of the model.  At both time points, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ explained 
significant variance in both anxiety and depression and, as hypothesised, was the strongest of 
all the predictors.  ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ also explained variance in anxiety at both 
time points but not depression.  At the pre-treatment time-point, ‘Need for control over 
thoughts’ was associated with fewer symptoms of anxiety and this association fell just short 
of significant (p=.057) at the 12-month follow-up.  There was no significant relationship 
between ‘Cognitive confidence’ or ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’ and anxiety or depression 
at either time-point.  
 
Table 4:4: Fit indices for the pre-treatment and 12-month follow-up SEMs of the  
relationship between latent factors for the MCQ-30 and HADS anxiety and depression. 
 
Fit Statistics Pre-treatment 12-month follow-up 
Chi Square Test of Model Fit   
Value 1354.58 1245.78 
Degrees of Freedom 881 881 
p-value <.001 <.001 
CFI/TLI   
CFI .93 .96 
TLI .93 .95 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)   
Estimate (C.I) .048 (.043-.053) .045 (.039-.050) 
Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR)   
Value 1.147 1.009 
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Figure 4.1: Structural equation model of the relationship between latent factors for the 
dimensions of the MCQ-30 and HADS anxiety and HADS depression.  
 
N.B. Rectangles indicate observed variables on MCQ-30 (MCQ) or HADS (H); ellipses indicate latent factors. 
Latent factors:  Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry (NEG); Cognitive Confidence 
(CC); Need to control thoughts (NC); Cognitive Self-consciousness (CSC); HADS Anxiety (HADS-A); HADS 
Depression (HADS-D). Figure shows standardized path coefficients and their significance. Solid line – 
significant at both time points; dotted line – non-significant; Brackets indicate coefficient at 12-month follow-
up; Errors not shown; 
*** 
p<.001
 ** 
p<.01
 * 
p<.05 
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4.4. Discussion 
The present study provides the first evidence to support the published five-factor 
structure of the MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) as valid and replicable in a 
cancer population.  Although at the pre-treatment time point CFA showed only a marginal fit, 
subsequent EFA confirmed that a five-factor solution still provided the best solution.  The 
improved fit observed for the EFA over the CFA was the result of items being allowed to 
load freely across any of the factors.  However, all items still loaded on their expected factors 
with only minor discrepancies between the two models.  At 12-month follow-up, fit was 
acceptable and comparable to that reported by the measure’s developers (Wells & 
Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).  It is not clear why the fit should be slightly better at the 12-month 
follow-up.  The mode of administration differed between the two time points with pre-
treatment assessments largely being carried out on hand-held PCs while 12-month follow-ups 
were completed on paper.  It is possible that this has some bearing on the improved fit 
observed at follow-up, as the latter assessment is closer to how the questionnaires have been 
administered during previous validation studies.  Equally, the observed improvement in fit 
could be partly due to the timing of assessments in that the pre-treatment assessment was 
conducted relatively soon after diagnosis, during a period that is clinically busy and often 
emotionally turbulent.  In contrast, the 12-month follow-up for most patients is likely to be a 
more settled time, at least clinically.  However, taken together, these CFA and EFA results 
suggest that the established five-factor structure of the MCQ-30 is valid for use in a cancer 
population and that it remains valid across one year post-diagnosis and changing illness / 
treatment circumstances.  In addition, the results indicate that the subscales possess good 
internal consistency comparable to those found in previous studies (Spada et al., 2008; Wells 
& Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Yilmaz et al., 2008). 
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Two items (MCQ3 & MCQ13) also loaded on a factor different from that expected. 
However, only one of these loaded higher on that factor; Item MCQ3 (‘I think a lot about my 
thoughts’) had its highest loading on ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ rather than the expected 
factor ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’.  Both of these items have also been found to cross-load 
on different factors previously (Yilmaz et al., 2008) although, in that study, item MCQ3 
loaded >0.4 on ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ not on ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ as in the 
present study. 
Preliminary evidence of the measure’s convergent validity is provided by the structural 
equation model of the relationship of the MCQ-30 latent factors with anxiety and depression.  
As hypothesised, and as shown previously in mental health, physical health, student and 
community populations, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ was the strongest predictor of both 
anxiety ((Allott et al., 2005; Spada et al., 2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Yilmaz et 
al., 2008) and depression (Spada et al., 2008; Yilmaz et al., 2008).  In addition, ‘Positive 
beliefs about worry’ predicted anxiety at both time points.  However, in contrast, ‘Need for 
control over thoughts’ was negatively related to anxiety at pre-treatment although this 
relationship was marginally non-significant at 12 month follow-up.  This suggests that 
participants with lower conviction about the need to control their thinking experience greater 
anxiety.  Such findings are unexpected, as previous studies in mental health, student and 
community samples have indicated that greater belief in the need to control thoughts predicts 
higher, rather than lower, levels of anxiety.  This result may indicate a difference between 
this and previously studied mental health, student and community populations.  However, 
further work would be required to establish whether this is a true population difference or just 
an artefact of the present data. 
It is important to note that, by structural equation modelling standards, the study 
employed a small sample size, which may reduce the stability of the findings.  Consequently, 
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further work is required to establish whether the apparent differences in item functioning and 
observed patterns of associations represent real differences in how the measure operates in 
mental health and cancer populations or are idiosyncratic to this data set.  In addition, as only 
breast and prostate cancer patients were included in the study, it remains important to explore 
whether study findings can be replicated across different cancer diagnoses. 
In summary, the current study provides initial evidence that the established five factor 
structure of the MCQ-30 is valid for use in a cancer population and that the subscales possess 
good internal consistency.  Positive and negative beliefs about worry were associated with 
concurrent anxiety and depression as expected, although the negative relationship of anxiety 
with both ‘Need for control over thoughts’ is unexpected and therefore intriguing.  Despite 
the limitations discussed above, we conclude from this study that the MCQ-30 is a 
sufficiently valid measure for assessing metacognitive beliefs and processes in breast or 
prostate cancer populations in the first year after diagnosis. 
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Chapter Five 
Study two 
The association of metacognitive beliefs with emotional distress after diagnosis of cancer. 
(for Published article see Appendix C) 
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5.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 highlighted that the two predominant theoretical models (both based on the 
cognitive paradigm) used to understand emotional distress in cancer are unable to explain 
why emotional distress persists for some people, but not for others.  An alternative model – 
the metacognitive model of emotional disorder – was suggested on the basis that it indicates 
psychological processes that underlie maintenance of emotional distress.  All three theoretical 
approaches predict that content of negative thoughts (i.e. negative illness perceptions) will be 
associated with increased emotional distress.  However, due to the putative causal role of 
metacognitive beliefs about worry in activating and exacerbating the CAS in response to such 
cognitions, the metacognitive model also makes two new predictions.  Firstly, it predicts that 
metacognitive beliefs will be able to explain additional variance in emotional distress, over 
and above that explained by negative illness perceptions.  Secondly, it predicts that the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress will be mediated by CAS 
processes such as worry.  Specifically, as described in Chapter 3, positive metacognitive 
beliefs will cause emotional distress by activating the CAS (i.e worry), while negative 
metacognitive beliefs will maintain emotional distress by causing both a direct emotional 
response and through exacerbating the CAS (i.e. causing worry about worrying (meta-
worry)). 
This study aims to test these predictions by examining, for the first time, the relative 
contribution of negative illness-perceptions and metacognitive beliefs to emotional distress 
after diagnosis of cancer, and by testing the mediational role of worry. 
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5.2. Method 
A cross-sectional cohort design was used.  Study participants were 299 patients 
recruited from routine pre-treatment clinics as part of the larger prospective cohort study.  
See Chapter 4 for a full account of the prospective study including; study inclusion criteria, 
recruitment and procedure. 
 
5.2.1 Measures 
Emotional distress was measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS; (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)) and the Impact of Events Scale (IES; (Horowitz, Wilner, 
& Alvarez, 1979)).  The HADS has been described in detail in Chapter 4.  The IES is a 15 
item, self-report scale developed to assess the subjective impact of any specific event (e.g. 
diagnosis of cancer in this study).  Individual items are scored on a four-point scale yielding a 
total score of 0-75, with high scores indicating more PTSD symptoms.  In the current study 
this single factor model showed acceptable fit, supporting the validity of using the total score.  
No consensus exists on cut-off scores for clinically significant levels of PTSD symptoms.  
However, a total score of 27 or more provided an overall correct classification rate, for 
traumatic stress, of .80 in a large sample of motor vehicle accident survivors comprising both 
genders (Coffey, Gudmundsdottir, Beck, Palyo, & Miller, 2006), and has previously been 
used in cancer (Purnell et al., 2011).  Internal consistency of the IES was excellent at both 
time points (pre-treatment & 12 months later) in the current sample (Cronbach’s α: .90/.94). 
The Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R; (Moss-Morris et al., 2002)) was 
used to assess negative illness perceptions.  This comprises three parts, the first of which 
(‘Identity’) asks participants to indicate whether they have experienced any of 15 common 
symptoms (an additional item of particular relevance to prostate patients - ‘urinary problems’ 
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- was added for this study) since diagnosis and, if so, whether they attribute them to cancer.  
Items endorsed as having been both experienced and attributed to cancer are counted, 
providing a total score of 0-15.  As most patients with early stage prostate and breast cancer 
experience few symptoms, this scale was dichotomised (no symptoms vs. 1 or more 
symptoms).  The second part of the IPQ-R comprises seven cognitive and emotional 
representation subscales.  Items are scored 1-5, with high scores on the ‘Chronic timeline’, 
‘Consequences’, and ‘Cyclical timeline’ subscales indicating a stronger belief that the illness 
will last a long time, have negative consequences and be cyclical in nature, respectively, and 
high scores on the ‘Personal control’, ‘Treatment control’ and ‘Illness coherence’ subscales 
indicating a stronger belief in the controllability of the illness and a greater personal 
understanding of it, respectively.  As the IPQ-R was included to assess the relative 
importance of patients’ illness appraisal in predicting emotional response, the emotional 
representation subscale was disregarded.  The final part, in which items are also scored 1-5, 
measures patients’ causal attributions about their illness.  These items are typically not 
summed as a single scale, but may be analysed as separate items or as groups devised on the 
basis of theory ((Moss-Morris et al., 2002)).  Previously, only psychological and/or 
behavioural attributions have contributed to the variance explained in quality of life (Scharloo 
et al., 2010) or emotional distress (Kulik & Kronfeld, 2005; Traeger et al., 2009) after 
diagnosis of cancer.  Therefore, for this study, the seven items which reflect these attributions 
(i.e. ‘my own behaviour’, ‘my mental attitude’, ‘stress or worry’, ‘my emotional state’, and 
‘my personality’ ‘family problems or worries’ and ‘overwork’) were used to generate a single 
causal subscale (‘Psychological cause’) and the rest discarded. 
Metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognitions Questionnaire 30- 
(MCQ-30; (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004)) which has been described previously in 
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Chapter 4.  However, as the focus of this study was on testing specific predictions about the 
relationship of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about worry with emotional 
distress only two (‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and ‘Negative beliefs about worry’) of the 
five subscales were included.  These subscales ask participants to indicate how much they 
generally agree with statements such as ‘Worrying helps me cope’ (‘Positive beliefs about 
worry’); and ‘My worrying is dangerous for me’ (‘Negative beliefs about worry’).  High 
scores indicate more positive and negative beliefs about worry, respectively.   
Worry was measured using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; (Meyer et al., 
1990)).  The PSWQ is a well-established measure developed to assess the level of worry 
independent of worry content.  Participants are asked to rate to what extent statements, such 
as ‘When I am under pressure I worry a lot’, are ‘typical of me’.  Sixteen items are scored 1-
5, yielding a total score of 16 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater worry.  However, a 
single factor model fitted the study data poorly.  Some previous studies have indicated a two-
factor model (Fresco, Heimberg, Mennin, & Turk, 2002; Yilmaz et al., 2008), with positively 
(PSWQ+ve) and negatively (PSWQ-ve), phrased items loading on separate factors.  This 
model (with the exception of item 10 ‘I never worry about anything’, which loaded on both 
factors) provided the best fit to the study data and was therefore used in the present study, 
with Item 10 allowed to cross load.  
The CAS-I (Wells, 2009) was included as an additional measure of the CAS.  
Developed primarily as a clinical tool, it is a state measure comprising two distinct parts.  The 
first eight items, scored on a 0-8 scale, assess CAS processes and the extent to which 
individuals have been using maladaptive strategies to cope with negative thoughts or feelings.  
The remaining eight items assess metacognitive beliefs about the CAS and were redundant in 
this study due to the inclusion of the MCQ-30.  Good internal consistency and significant 
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positive correlations with measures of depression, anxiety and stress have been reported for 
the CAS-I scale as a whole (Fergus, Bardeen, & Orcutt, 2012).  For the present study, 
preliminary exploratory factor analysis of the first eight items indicated that a 3 factor model 
provided the best fit.  Items 1 ‘How much time in the last week have you found yourself 
dwelling on or worrying about your problems?’ and 2 ‘How much time in the last week have 
you been focussing attention on the things you find threatening (e.g. symptoms, thoughts, 
danger)?’ loaded on the first factor and were summed to provide an alternative measure of 
the frequency of worry, the remaining items being disregarded.  
 
5.2.2. Data Analysis 
The data were analysed using SPSS Version 20, Stata 9 and Mplus v6.12.  As fewer 
than 2% were missing at the scale level, and these data were confirmed to be missing 
completely at random, missing scales scores were imputed using the SPSS Expectation-
Maximisation algorithm (Little & Rubin, 1987).  As not all scales were normally distributed, 
this study used nonparametric statistics or bootstrapping techniques to ensure findings were 
robust.   
Nonparametric statistics (Mann-Whitney or Kruskal-Wallis) were used to compare pre-
treatment levels of emotional distress by age group (dichotomised at the median), gender, 
educational level, perceived emotional social support and stage of disease.  Where significant 
differences were found these variables were entered as covariates in the subsequent analyses.  
Preliminary regression analyses were used to identify the illness perceptions associated 
with each outcome (anxiety, depression and PTSD symptoms) after controlling for 
covariates.  
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To test the first prediction from the metacognitive model, separate hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses first tested the association of each outcome with metacognitive beliefs 
after controlling for identified covariates.  Then these analyses were repeated, also controlling 
for the illness perceptions found in preliminary regression analysis to be associated with that 
outcome.  To control for non-normality, final regression models were robustly assessed using 
bootstrapped sampling in Stata 9.  To test the second prediction from the metacognitive 
model, the data were fitted to the hypothesised model (Figure 5.1) using structural equation 
modelling (SEM) in Mplus version 6.12 (L. K. Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2010). 
Figure 5.1: Hypothesised path model of the relationship between metacognitive beliefs 
and emotional distress.  
 
N.B: Solid lines predicted to be significant; Dotted lines not significant; + indicates positive direction of effect 
 
Because visual inspection suggests there are similarities between some items on the 
PSWQ and the MCQ-30 subscale ‘Negative beliefs about worry’, a second model 
substituting the CAS-I for the PSWQ was included as an additional test to guard against bias 
due to common method variance.  Fit was assessed using the robust weighted least squares 
estimator (WLSMV; (B. Muthen, 1984; B. Muthen et al., 1997)) recommended for ordinal 
categorical data (Brown, 2006).  Analyses controlled for identified covariates and were 
conducted initially using the PSWQ, then repeated using the CAS-I.  Adequacy of model fit 
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was assessed based on two incremental fit indices: the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the 
Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI), with values close to.95 indicating a well-fitting model (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), and two absolute misfit indices: the Root mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) with values <.05 indicating good fit and  0.5 - .08 indicating 
adequate fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993) and the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual 
(WRMR) with a cut-off value  of .95 indicating good fit (Yu, 2002).  For each model, we first 
confirmed the fit of the measurement component by simultaneously fitting the CFA 
measurement models for all the included latent variables, allowing them to correlate.  The 
data were then fitted to the structural component of each model to assess the direct and 
indirect paths linking positive and negative metacognitive beliefs to emotional distress.   
 
5.3. Results 
T1 sample characteristics are summarised in Chapter 4, Table 4:1.  A large proportion 
of the sample exceeded cut-off scores for clinically significant anxiety (51%) or PTSD 
symptoms (59%).  Women with breast cancer were more anxious (U=3722, p<.001, r=-0.31), 
and reported more PTSD symptoms (U=4105.5, p<.001, r=-0.25) than men with prostate 
cancer.  Younger patients also reported more anxiety (U=5117, p=.004, r=-0.19), depression 
(U=5370, p=.017, r=-0.16) and PTSD symptoms (U=5238, p=.009, r=-0.17).  However, no 
outcome was related to education, perceived emotional support or tumour grade.  Therefore, 
age and gender were the only covariates entered in subsequent analyses. 
Results of the preliminary regression analyses are summarised in Table 5:1.  For 
anxiety and depression, the final model accounted for 32% and 19% of the variance, 
respectively.  After controlling for age and gender, illness perceptions - specifically higher 
 90 
 
scores on ‘Identity’, ‘Chronic timeline’, ‘Consequences’ (for anxiety & depression) and 
‘Psychological causes’ (for anxiety) - explained an additional 20% and 18% of the variance, 
respectively.  In the analysis of PTSD symptoms, the final model accounted for 34% of the 
variance.  Higher scores on the same four illness perception scales, together with higher 
scores on ‘Treatment control’ and lower scores on ‘Illness coherence’, explained an 
additional 22% of the variance in PTSD symptoms after controlling for age and gender.  
These findings were confirmed as robust using bootstrapped sampling.  
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Table 5:1: Final models of the variance in anxiety, depression and trauma explained by illness perceptions,  
after controlling for age & gender. 
 Anxiety Model  Depression Model  PTSD symptoms Model 
 R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig  R
2
 
change 
Beta T Sig  R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig 
Constant   -.56 .582    -.79 .428    -.75 .453 
Gender .12* -.33 -5.49 <.001  .01 -.15 -2.21 .028  .12* -.27 -4.44 <.001 
Age  -.06 -.98 .326   .02 .28 .778   -.15 -2.45 .015 
IPQ-R .20*     .18*     .22*    
Identity (0/1)  .14 2.34 .020   .14 2.10 .037   .18 3.03 .003 
Chronic timeline  .17 2.20 .029   .18 2.11 .036   .16 2.11 .036 
Cyclical timeline  .12 1.82 .070   .10 1.46 .15   .02 .27 .786 
Consequences  .14 2.05 .041   .15 2.00 .046   .17 2.41 .017 
Personal Control  -.07 -1.25 .212   -.13 -1.96 .051   -.03 -.53 .600 
Treatment Control  .13 1.71 .088   .07 .82 .412   .19 2.63 .009 
Illness coherence  -.00 -.06 .951   -.01 -.17 .865   -.20 -3.16 .002 
Psychological cause  .22 3.45 .001   .10 1.42 .156   .16 2.61 .010 
Model Summary               
R
2
 .32     .19     .34    
Adj R
2
 .28     .15     .31    
*p<.001 
 92 
 
 
5.3.1 The association of metacognitive beliefs and distress 
Results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 5:2.  After controlling for age and 
gender, metacognitive beliefs explained 34% of additional variance in anxiety and 19% in 
depression.  Even after controlling also for illness perceptions, metacognitive beliefs added a 
further 23% and 9% in each outcome, respectively.  The final model for anxiety accounted 
for 52% of the variance.  Both ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ made significant individual contributions, with negative beliefs making the largest 
contribution of all the predictors entered.  The final model for depression accounted for 25% 
of the variance, with negative beliefs making the largest contribution.  Analysis of PTSD 
symptoms showed a similar pattern (Table 5:2).  Metacognitive beliefs explained 29% of 
additional variance after controlling for age and gender, and 17% after controlling also for 
illness perceptions.  The final model explained 51% of the variance, with ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ again making the biggest contribution. 
These findings, confirmed as robust using bootstrapped sampling, support the first 
prediction from the metacognitive model that metacognitive beliefs add to the variance 
explained in distress and trauma after controlling for illness perceptions, with ‘Negative 
beliefs about worry’ making the biggest contribution to the variance in each outcome. 
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Table 5:2: Final models of the variance in anxiety, depression and PTSD symptoms 
explained by metacognitive beliefs after controlling for; age & gender (Model 1),  
and age, gender & illness perceptions (Model 2). 
 Anxiety Model 1  Anxiety Model 2 
 R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig  R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig 
Constant   1.20 .233    -1.19 .235 
Gender .12
*
 -.22 -4.38 <.001  .12
*
 -.27 -5.34 <.001 
Age  -.05 -1.01 .312   -.02 -.48 .629 
IPQ-R      .17
*
    
Identity (0/1)       .14 2.86 .005 
Chronic timeline       .10 1.85 .065 
Consequences       .07 1.24 .216 
Psychological cause       .10 2.09 .038 
MCQ-30 .34
*
     .23
*
    
POS  .15 2.70 .007   .15 2.75 .006 
NEG  .52 9.13 ,.001   .44 7.92 <.001 
Model Summary     R
2
 .46     .52    
Adj R
2
 .45     .51    
          
 Depression Model 1  Depression  Model 2 
 R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig  R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig 
Constant   -.12 .903    -2.31 .022 
Gender .02 -.05 -.81 .417  .02 -.12 -1.87 .064 
Age  .00 .02 .983   .05 .74 .458 
IPQ-R      .14
*
    
Identity (0/1)       .14 2.25 .026 
Chronic timeline       .17 2.54 .012 
Consequences       .11 1.59 .113 
MCQ-30 .14
*
     .09
*
    
POS  .06 .82 .411   .06 .86 .391 
NEG  .36 5.09 <.001   .29 .421 <.001 
Model Summary     R
2
 .16     .25    
Adj R
2
 .14     .22    
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 PTSD symptoms Model 1  PTSD symptoms  Model 2 
 R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig  R
2
 
change 
Beta t Sig 
Constant   3.07 .002    .33 .740 
Gender .12* -.15 -2.90 .004  .12* -.20 -3.77 <.001 
Age  -.15 -2.77 .006   -.11 -2.05 .041 
IPQ-R      .22*    
Identity (0/1)       .17 3.28 .001 
Chronic timeline       .09 1.30 .194 
Consequences       .12 2.02 .045 
Treatment control       .10 1.56 .122 
Illness coherence       -.16 -2.95 .004 
Psychological cause       .05 .99 .322 
MCQ-30 .29*     .17*    
POS . .12 2.09 .037   .09 1.58 .115 
NEG  .49 8.25 <.001   .41 7.14 <.001 
Model Summary     R
2
 .41     .51    
Adj R
2
 .40     .48    
N.B. MCQ-30 subscales: Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about the danger and 
uncontrollability of worry (NEG)  
*p<.001 
 
5.3.2. SEM - relationship between metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress  
CFA confirmed an excellent fit of the data to the measurement model.  The data were 
then fitted to the full latent variable model, initially using the PSWQ to indicate the putative 
mediating variable.  Age and gender were controlled for within the model (being correlated 
with the independent variable(s) by default, and having specified causal effects on the 
putative mediator(s) and final outcome(s)).  The final path model for anxiety, depression, and 
PTSD symptoms is shown in Figure 5.2.  The model was a good fit (χ2 (df=1617) =1922, 
p<.001, RMSEA = .029 (90% CI =.02-.03), CFI/TLI =.98/.98, WRMR = .89).  As predicted, 
significant direct effects were apparent from ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ to anxiety 
(Beta=.50, p<.001) and PTSD symptoms (Beta=.70, p<.001) but not from ‘Positive beliefs 
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about worry’.  In addition, there was a significant indirect path from ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ to anxiety (Beta =. 16, p =.025) mediated by PSWQ+ve, as predicted.  However, there 
were no significant direct or indirect paths from ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ to depression 
and no indirect path mediated by worry to PTSD symptoms.  In addition, the paths from 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ to both PSWQ+ve and PSWQ-ve were not significant.   
The model testing was then repeated using the CAS-1 subscale as the mediating 
variable instead of the PSWQ.  The final path model is shown in Figure 5.3.  The model was 
a good fit (χ2 (df=919) =1189, p<.001, RMSEA = .037 (90% CI =.03-.04), CFI/TLI =.98/.97, 
WRMR = .91).  The pattern of significant direct paths seen above was replicated; there were 
significant direct effects of ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ on anxiety (Beta = .43, p<.001) 
and PTSD symptoms (Beta = .36, p<.001).  In addition, there was also a significant indirect 
effect via the CAS-I on all three outcomes (Indirect Effects: anxiety Beta = .24, P<.001; 
depression Beta = .22, P=.017; PTSD symptoms Beta = .32 P<.001).  There was no effect of 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ on either the CAS-1 or any of the outcomes. 
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Figure 5.2: Final path model of relationship of positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs with anxiety, depression and PTSD symptoms, including mediation by worry 
(PSWQ) 
N.B:Solid lines p<.05 with standardised coefficients; Dotted lines not significant. Measurement model 
component of full SEM and pathways for covariates (Age & Gender) not shown but available on request from 
corresponding author. MCQ-30 subscales: Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry 
(NEG). PSWQ subscales: Positively phrased items (PSWQ+ve); negatively phrased (PSWQ-ve). 
Figure 5.3: Final path model of relationship between positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs and anxiety, depression and trauma mediated by the CAS-I  
 
N.B.: Solid lines p<.05 with standardised coefficients; Dotted lines not significant. Measurement model 
component of full SEM and pathways for covariates (Age & Gender) not shown but available on request from 
corresponding author. MCQ-30 subscales: Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry 
(NEG). 
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5.4. Discussion 
This is the first study to explore the utility of the metacognitive model of emotional 
disorder in an adult cancer population and, although only cross-sectional, findings are largely 
consistent with the theory that metacognitive beliefs and perseverative thinking (worry), 
rather than specific illness perceptions, cause and maintain emotional distress. 
  
5.4.1 The relationship between metacognitive beliefs and distress 
Negative illness perceptions were associated with distress after cancer diagnosis, 
consistent with both the CSM and S-REF models.  However, after controlling for age and 
gender, metacognitive beliefs could explain more of the remaining variance than could illness 
perceptions for two of the three study outcomes (anxiety: 34 % versus 20%; PTSD 
symptoms: 29% versus 22%).  In addition, after controlling for age, gender and illness 
perceptions, metacognitive beliefs added significantly to the variance in anxiety, depression 
and PTSD symptoms while, in each case, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ made the biggest 
individual contribution to the variance out of all of the predictors.  These latter findings are 
consistent with the metacognitive model, and with results of previous studies in mental health 
populations (see (Wells, 2009) for a review), the general population (Spada et al., 2008) and 
Parkinson’s disease patients (Allott et al., 2005) where ‘negative beliefs about worry’ was the 
predominant contributor to the variance in anxiety and depression. 
The regression analysis also indicated that a second set of metacognitive beliefs, 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’, made a unique contribution to the variance in anxiety.  This 
finding is consistent with the metacognitive model of generalised anxiety disorder (Wells & 
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Mathews, 1994) in which positive metacognitive beliefs guide the selection of worry as an 
effective coping strategy which, in turn, increases emotional distress.   
 
5.4.2 Mediation of the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and distress  
by the CAS 
The metacognitive model proposes that the causal link between metacognitive beliefs 
and distress is the CAS and, in this respect, the findings partially support predictions from the 
model.  Specifically, the relationship of anxiety with ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ was 
partially mediated, as predicted, by the PSWQ and the relationship of all three emotional 
distress outcomes with ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ was partially mediated by the CAS-1.  
That is, the findings are broadly consistent with the theory that negative metacognitive 
beliefs, (e.g. ‘worry is uncontrollable and dangerous’) cause a direct emotional response 
(anxiety and trauma symptoms) while also further increasing distress by exacerbating worry 
and activating meta-worry (e.g.  ‘I worry too much about worrying’). The absence of any 
direct effect of ‘negative beliefs about worry’ on depression may reflect the wording of this 
measure which focuses specifically on beliefs about worry as opposed to other forms of 
persistent thinking (i.e. rumination) that are more closely associated with depression.  
The hypothesis of full mediation between positive metacognitive beliefs and emotional 
distress - that is that ‘Positive beliefs about worry’, such as ‘worrying will help me notice if 
my cancer recurs’, causes emotional distress by driving worry about recurrence and self-
focussed attention - was not supported.  However, metacognitive theory would predict that, 
although positive metacognitive beliefs initially guide an individual towards the selection of 
CAS processes (i.e. worry) in response to negative thoughts or feelings, it is the negative 
metacognitive beliefs that ‘turbo charge’ distress by then exacerbating and maintaining these 
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processes.  Thus it is possible that in a SEM which simultaneously tests all the pathways 
between metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress, the indirect pathway from ‘positive 
beliefs about worry’ to emotional distress via the CAS is masked by the inclusion of 
‘negative beliefs about worry’. 
 
5.4.3 Study implications, limitations and conclusions 
In summary, the findings support predictions from the metacognitive model that 
negative metacognitive beliefs cause and maintain distress by activating the CAS.  However, 
because the study was cross-sectional, causality cannot be assumed; maladaptive 
metacognition may be a consequence of emotional distress, not a cause and, as these two 
opposing models would be mathematically equivalent, SEM would be unable to distinguish 
between them.  Therefore a prospective test of the model is necessary, in order to establish 
the temporal precedence of maladaptive metacognition to persistent distress as more 
compelling evidence of causation.  Furthermore, as the SEM was based on the assumption of 
no hidden confounders, the potential influence of unmeasured common causes cannot be 
eliminated.  In particular, the information available from patients at the time of assessment 
did not include their history of anxiety, depression or PTSD symptoms.  Consequently it is 
possible that, rather than maladaptive metacognitions causing elevated emotional distress, 
both are consequences of a pre-morbid psychiatric history.  Another limitation is the sample.  
To balance the competing demands of maximising recruitment and generalizability, while 
minimising prognostic variability, sampling was restricted to the largest tumour groups in 
each gender - breast and prostate cancer; it cannot be assumed that findings would generalise 
to other cancers, particularly those with poorer prognosis.  Although we controlled for gender 
(and therefore type of tumour) in the analyses, the study was insufficiently powered for 
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subgroup analyses.  Further studies will be needed to test the stability of association of 
metacognitive beliefs with emotional distress across different tumour populations.  
Despite these limitations, this study does provide first evidence of the applicability of 
the Metacognitive model to understanding emotional distress and trauma after diagnosis of 
cancer.  Therefore, we suggest that there is potential to reduce vulnerability to emotional 
distress and trauma by modifying metacognitive beliefs and processes rather than using more 
traditional cognitive therapies.  In a cancer context, an important potential advantage of this 
metacognitive approach to therapy is that it does not require engagement with the content of 
negative thoughts about cancer, which many individuals can find difficult or distressing 
(Baker et al., 2012).  However, in order to explore this potential more fully, further study, 
both prospective and experimental, is warranted.  
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Chapter Six 
Study three 
A prospective study of the association of metacognitive beliefs and processes with persistent 
emotional distress after diagnosis of cancer. 
(for Published article see Appendix D) 
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6.1 Introduction 
The previous studies (Chapters 4 & 5) indicated that metacognitive beliefs (specifically 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ & ‘Negative beliefs about worry’) were associated with 
concurrent symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma among patients recently diagnosed 
with breast or prostate cancer, and that they explained additional variance in these outcomes 
after controlling for age, gender and negative content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. negative 
illness perceptions).  Structural equation modelling (Chapter 5) found evidence consistent 
with the central predictions of the metacognitive model that these beliefs cause and maintain 
distress directly, but also indirectly by driving worry.  These findings provide the first 
evidence consistent with the theory that metacognitive beliefs underlie emotional distress 
experienced by cancer patients.  However, in order to provide more compelling evidence of a 
causal role for metacognitive beliefs in maintaining emotional distress after cancer, 
prospective research is needed to demonstrate a temporal relationship.  Consequently, the aim 
of this study is to explore whether metacognitive beliefs measured at the pre-treatment 
assessment (T1) predict symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma twelve months later 
(T2), and to explore whether they add to the variance explained over and above previously 
implicated variables, including T1 distress and negative content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. 
T1 illness perceptions).  Specifically it is hypothesised that: 
(1) Metacognitive beliefs assessed around the time of diagnosis will prospectively 
predict variance in anxiety, depression and trauma 12 months later. 
(2) Metacognitive beliefs assessed around the time of diagnosis will add to the variance 
explained in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma symptoms over and above demographic 
variables, T1 symptoms and T1 illness perceptions. 
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6.2 Method 
This study used a prospective cohort design with a pre-treatment baseline (T1) and 
twelve month follow-up.  See Chapter 4 for a full account of the prospective study including; 
study inclusion criteria, recruitment and procedure. 
 
6.2.1 Measures 
Anxiety and depression were measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
scale (HADS, (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)), and trauma symptoms using the Impact of Events 
Scale (IES; (Horowitz et al., 1979)).  The revised Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R 
(Moss-Morris et al., 2002)) was used to assess the content of thoughts (i.e illness perceptions) 
about cancer, while metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004)).  For full details of these 
measures see Chapter 5. 
All measures were assessed both at T1 and T2.  
 
6.2.2 Analysis 
The data were analysed using SPSS Version 20.   
Nonparametric statistics (Mann-Whitney or Kruskal-Wallis) were used to compare T2 
levels of each emotional distress outcome by age group (dichotomised at the median), gender, 
educational level, perceived emotional social support and stage of disease.  Where significant 
differences in T2 outcomes were found (p<.05), the relevant variables were entered as 
demographic covariates in the first step of subsequent regression analyses.  
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In order to control for negative content of thoughts about cancer at T1 (i.e. illness 
perceptions), it is first necessary to establish the  T1 illness perceptions that contribute to 
variance in T2 distress after controlling for baseline emotional distress.  Therefore, the IPQ-R 
and MCQ-30 were analysed in parallel to identify which subscales within each measure 
independently predicted each T2 outcome.  For the IPQ-R, hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses were first used to identify the T1 subscales associated with each T2 outcome 
(anxiety, depression and trauma) after controlling for demographic variables (Analysis 1 for 
each outcome).  These analyses were then repeated, using just the significant IPQ-R 
subscales from Analysis 1, and also controlling for T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression or 
trauma (Analysis 2 for each outcome).  As we had no a priori theory about which subscales 
would independently predict T2 outcomes, the IPQ-R subscales were included in each 
analysis using stepwise rather than forced entry.  The subscales identified as independent 
predictors in Analysis 2 for each outcome were then entered as control variables in Analysis 
3 for that outcome (see below).   
This sequence of analyses was also used for the MCQ-30, thereby testing hypothesis 1. 
We first identified the T1 MCQ-30 subscales that independently predicted T2 outcomes after 
controlling for demographic variables (Analysis 1 for each outcome), and then entered these 
in a further analysis also controlling for T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression or trauma 
(Analysis 2 for each outcome).  As with the IPQ-R analyses, as we had no a priori theory 
about which subscales would independently predict T2 outcomes, MCQ-30 subscales were 
included in each analysis using stepwise rather than forced entry.  The subscales identified as 
independent predictors in Analysis 2 for each outcome were then entered as variables in 
Analysis 3 for that outcome (see below), which tested hypothesis 2. 
Final hierarchical multiple regression analyses (Analysis 3 for each outcome) assessed 
whether the T1 MCQ-30 subscales which had been identified as significant predictors in 
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Analysis 2 (see above) were able to predict variance in T2 outcomes over and above that 
explained by demographic variables, T1 symptoms and the negative content of thoughts 
about cancer at T1 (i.e. IPQ-R subscales identified as significant predictors in Analysis 2).  
This final analysis used forced entry and bootstrapped sampling to ensure findings were 
robust.   
 
6.3 Results 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the final sample (N=206) are shown in 
Table 4:1(Chapter 4).  Women with breast cancer and younger patients were more anxious at 
T2 (U=-3269.5, p<.001, r=-0.27; U=-3721, p<.001. r=0.26), and reported more trauma 
symptoms (U=3636, p=.003, r=-0.21; U=3638, p<.001, r=0.27) than did men with prostate 
cancer or older patients.  Women with breast cancer also reported more symptoms of 
depression at T2 than did men with prostate cancer (U= 3857.5, p=.014, r=0.17).  No 
outcome was related to education, perceived emotional support or tumour grade.  Therefore, 
just age and gender were used as demographic covariates in subsequent analyses.  The levels 
of anxiety, depression and trauma symptoms at both time points are shown in Table 6.1.  
Both anxiety and trauma symptoms significantly declined over time, whereas depressive 
symptoms significantly increased. 
Table 6.1: Distribution of anxiety, depression and trauma scores at both time-points  
 Time 1  Time 2 T1-T2 Difference 
 Mean (SD) Median (IQR) Mean (SD) Median (IQR)  
Anxiety 7.6 (4.4) 7.5 (4-11) 6.2 (4.5) 5 (3-9) Z=-4.6; r=-0.23; p=.000 
Depression 3.3 (3.3) 2 (1-5) 4.1 (3.9) 3 (1-6.6) Z=3.1; r=.015; p=.002 
Trauma 29.4 (16.9) 31 (14-42.3) 21.2 (18.9) 17 (3.3-35) Z=-6.5; r=-0.32; p=.000 
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6.3.1 Association of T1 illness perceptions with T2 anxiety, depression and trauma 
Regression of emotional distress on the IPQ-R subscales (Table 6.2) indicated that 
illness perceptions predicted between 10% (trauma) and 12% (anxiety) of the variance in T2 
outcomes after controlling for age and gender (Analysis 1) and between 2% (trauma) and 3% 
(anxiety and depression) after also controlling for T1 symptoms (Analysis 2).  The final 
models from Analysis 2 indicated that perceived lack of personal control and negative 
perception of the consequences of cancer predicted T2 anxiety (1% and 2% respectively), 
while poor understanding of the illness (‘Illness coherence’) predicted T2 depression and 
trauma.  These IPQ- R subscales were therefore used to control for content of thoughts about 
cancer in the final hierarchical multiple regression analyses.   
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Table 6.2 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 illness perceptions after controlling for age 
and gender (Analysis 1) and age, gender & T1 levels of symptoms (Analysis 2). R
2
 change shows increment in variance explained when 
each set of variables was entered sequentially; beta, T and p are from the final model containing variables from all steps. 
ANALYSIS 1 T2 Anxiety  T2 Depression  T2 Trauma 
R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p 
Constant   3.05 .003    3.13 .002    4.74 .000 
STEP 1 - Demographics .13
***
     .05
**
     .14
***
    
Gender  -.19 -3.04 .003   -.13 -1.94 ..054   -.14 -2.28 ..023 
Age  -.21 -3.28 .001   -.11 -1.62 .106   -.27 -4.19 .000 
STEP 2 - IPQ-R 
#
 .12
***
     .11
**
     .10
***
    
Identity  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
Cyclical timeline  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
Chronic timeline  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
Consequences  .22 3.41 .001   .19 2,75 .006   .19 2.92 .004 
Illness coherence  ns ns ns   -.18 -2.73 .007   -.24 -3.76 .000 
Psychological attributions  .19 2.97 .003   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
Personal control  -.14 -2.18 .030   -.13 -2.02 .045   ns ns ns 
Treatment control  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
R
2
 .25     .16     .24    
Adj R
2
 .23     .13     .23    
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ANALYSIS 2 T2 Anxiety  T2 Depression  T2 Trauma 
R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p 
Constant   2.79 .006    4.61 .000    4.23 .000 
STEP 1 - Demographics .13
***
     .05
**
     .14
***
    
Gender  -.03 -0.42 .675   -.08 -1.36 .177   -.04 -0.65 .516 
Age  -.17 -2.99 .003   -.15 -2.41 .017   -.22 -3.69 .000 
STEP 2 – T1 Symptoms .25
***
     .21
***
     .23
***
    
T1 Anxiety  .49 8.03 .000           
T1 Depression       .44 7.25 .000      
T1 Trauma               
STEP 2 - IPQ-R
##
 .03
*
     .03
**
     .02
*
 .46 7.40 .000 
Consequences  .13 2.17 .032   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
Illness coherence       -.16 -2.65 .009   -.13 -2.23 .025 
Psychological attributions  ns ns ns           
Personal Control  -.11 -2.08 .039   ns ns ns      
R
2
 .41     .29     .39    
Adj R
2
 .39     .27     .37    
N.B. IPQ-R subscales entered using stepwise method.
. #
 All eight IPQ-R subscales were included but only those found to be significant predictors for one or more outcome 
are shown.. 
*
p<.05 **p<.01, *** p<.001, ns - non significant, data not available using stepwise methods. ## Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 1 were 
entered. Shaded cells indicate that variable was not included. 
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6.3.2. Association of T1 metacognitive beliefs with T2 anxiety, depression and trauma 
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test hypothesis 1 are 
shown in Table 6.3.  After controlling for age and gender (Analysis 1), metacognitive beliefs 
explained an additional 19% of the variance in T2 anxiety, 15% of the variance in T2 
depression and 14% of the variance in T2 trauma.  In all cases ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ 
made the largest individual contribution of all the predictors, with ‘Cognitive confidence’ 
also making a significant individual contribution.  For anxiety, ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ 
was a further significant individual predictor of T2 symptoms.  After controlling for T1 
symptoms as well as demographic variables (Analysis 2), metacognitive beliefs continued to 
predict a small but significant proportion of variance in each outcome.  It added a significant 
2% to the variance in T2 anxiety, 5% to the variance in T2 depression and 1% to the variance 
in T2 trauma.  In each case, ‘Cognitive confidence’ was the only MCQ-30 subscale that 
continued to make a significant individual contribution to the variance explained, and 
consequently this variable was the only metacognitive variable entered into the final set of 
analyses (Analysis 3). 
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Table 6.3 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 metacognitive beliefs after controlling for 
age and gender (Analysis 1) and age, gender & T1 levels of symptoms (Analysis 2). R
2
 change shows increment in variance explained 
when each set of variables was entered sequentially; beta, T and p are from the final model containing variables from all steps. 
ANALYSIS 1 T2 Anxiety  T2 Depression  T2 Trauma 
R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p 
Constant   2.98 .003    1.19 .236    3.64 .000 
STEP 1 - Demographics .13
***
     .05
**
     .14
***
    
Gender  -.16 -2.67 .008   -.10 -1.60 .112   -.11 -1.70 .091 
Age  -20 -3.39 .001   -.10 -1.62 .107   -.26 -4.24 .000 
STEP 2 - MCQ-30 .19
**
     .15
***
     .14
***
    
POS  .17 2.58 .011   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
NEG   ,28 3.90 .000   .25 3.64 .000   .28 4.31 .000 
CC  .12 2.00 .047   .22 3.34 .001   .17 2.66 .008 
NC  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
CSC  ns ns ns   ns ns ns   ns ns ns 
R
2
 .32     .20     .27    
Adj R
2
 .30     .18     26.    
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ANALYSIS 2 T2 Anxiety  T2 Depression  T2 Trauma 
R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p 
Constant   3.70 .000    2.34 .020    3.19 .002 
STEP 1 - Demographics .13
***
     .05
**
     .14
***
    
Gender  -.03 -0.54 .590   -.09 -1.42 .158   -.04 -0.62 .537 
Age  -.20 -3.62 .000   -.13 -2.18 .030   -.21 -3.51 .001 
STEP 2 – T1 Symptoms .25
***
     .21
***
     .23
***
    
T1 Anxiety  .50 8.22 .000           
T1 Depression       .42 7.06 .000      
T1 Trauma            .47 7.44 .000 
STEP 3 - MCQ-30
##
 .02
*
     .05
***
     .01
*
    
POS  ns ns ns           
NEG   ns ns ns   ns ns ns  ns ns ns ns 
CC  .14 2.53 .012   .23 3.85 .000   .13 2.16 .032 
R
2
 .40     .31     .38    
Adj R
2
 .39     .30     .36    
N.B. MCQ-30 subscales entered using stepwise method.
 
MCQ-30 subscales: Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about the danger and uncontrollability of 
worry (NEG); Cognitive confidence (CC); Need for control (NC); Cognitive self-consciousness (CSC). 
*
p<.05 **p<.01, *** p<.001, ns - non significant, data not available 
using stepwise methods. 
## 
Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 1 were entered. Shaded –not included. 
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6.3.3. Predictive ability of T1 metacognitive beliefs over and above demographic 
variables, T1 symptoms and content of thoughts about cancer 
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test the second hypothesis 
(Analysis 3) are shown in Table 6.4.  For anxiety and depression, ‘Cognitive confidence’ 
added a significant 2 % and 4% respectively to the variance in T2 symptoms over and above 
demographic variables, T1 symptoms and content of thoughts about cancer (i.e. relevant T1 
illness perceptions).  For anxiety, younger age, baseline symptoms, perceived lack of 
personal control and low cognitive confidence each made a significant individual 
contribution to the final model, which accounted for 42% of the variance in T2 symptoms.  
For depression, just younger age, baseline symptoms and low cognitive confidence made 
significant independent contributions to the final model, which accounted for 33% of the 
variance in T2 symptoms. 
In the case of trauma, ‘Cognitive confidence’ did not make any significant  contribution 
to the variance explained in T2 symptoms after controlling for demographic variables, T1 
symptoms and T1 illness perceptions (‘Illness coherence’).  In fact, younger age and T1 
symptoms were the only variables to make a significant individual contribution to the final 
model, which accounted for 39% of the variance.  
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Table 6.4 Final models of the variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma predicted by T1 metacognitive beliefs after controlling for 
age, gender, T1 level of symptoms and T1 illness perceptions (Analysis 3). R
2
 change shows increment in variance explained by each 
step; beta, T and p are from the final model containing variables from all steps. 
ANALYSIS 3 T2 Anxiety   T2 Depression   T2 Trauma  
R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p  R
2
 
change 
Beta T p 
Constant   2.50 .013    2.98 .003    3.66 .000 
STEP 1 - Demographics .13
***
     .05
**
     .14
***
    
Gender  -.04 -0.63 .527   -.09 -1.50 .136   -.05 -0.79 .430 
Age  -.18 -3.06 .003   -.14 -2.29 .023   -.22 -3.73  
STEP 2 – T1 Symptoms .25
***
     .21
***
     .23
***
    
T1 Anxiety  .46 7.49 .000           
T1 Depression       .41 6.86 .000      
T1 Trauma            .44 6.77 .000 
STEP 3 – IPQ-R## .03**     .03
**
     .02
*
    
Consequences  .12 1.94 .054           
Illness coherence       -.11 -1.83 .068   -.11 -1.90 .058 
Personal control  -.11 -2.09 .038           
STEP 4 – MCQ-30## .02*     .04
**
 .    .01
ns
    
CC  .13 2.32 .02   .20 3.31 .001   .11 1.78 .076 
Model Summary  R
2
 .42     .33     .39    
Adj R
2
 .41     .31     .37    
N.B. All variables entered using forced entry method. MCQ-30 subscales: Cognitive confidence (CC).  
## 
Only subscales found to be significant predictors in Analysis 2 were 
entered. Shaded –not included.  
*
p<.05 **p<.01, *** p<.001 
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6.4. Discussion 
This is the first study to explore whether metacognitive beliefs soon after cancer 
diagnosis, and before active treatment (T1), predict emotional distress 12 months later (T2).  
T1 metacognitive beliefs predicted T2 anxiety, depression, and trauma after controlling for 
age, gender and T1 symptoms, thus supporting hypothesis 1.  This finding builds on previous 
research in non-clinical populations in which metacognitive beliefs prospectively predicted 
levels of anxiety and depression two (Weber & Exner, 2013), three (Hjemdal, Stiles, & 
Wells, 2013) and six months (Yilmaz, Gencoz, & Wells, 2011) later, after controlling for age, 
gender and T1 levels of symptoms. 
Before controlling for T1 symptoms, metacognitive beliefs explained a greater 
proportion of variance in T2 anxiety, depression and trauma than did illness perceptions.  
Furthermore the illness perception subscales that were predictive (‘Consequences’, ‘Personal 
control’, ‘Psychological attributions’, ‘Illness coherence’) could be considered to be markers 
for worry or rumination in that they may be the outcome of these processes.  Of the five 
MCQ-30 subscales included in Analysis 1, two  (‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and 
‘Cognitive confidence’) independently predicted T2 anxiety, depression and trauma, with a 
third (‘Positive beliefs about worry’) also significantly contributing to the variance in anxiety.  
In all three cases, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ made the largest individual contribution, as 
would be predicted by the metacognitive model of emotional disorder (Wells, 2009).  These 
findings are also consistent with those of Yilmaz et al (Yilmaz et al., 2011) who reported that, 
in their non-clinical sample, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ predicted levels of anxiety and 
depression six months later.  However, in the current study when T1 levels of distress were 
controlled, the relationship of ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ with anxiety and depression 
was no longer significant.  Instead, ‘Cognitive confidence’ was the only metacognitive 
variable to contribute to variance.  The reasons for this are not clear.   
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One possibility is that this finding is due to the limitations of using hierarchical 
regression in a prospective study design, where baseline emotional distress inevitably 
predominates in predicting future distress.  In Chapter 5 a strong cross-sectional association 
of T1 symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma with metacognitive beliefs and processes 
was demonstrated.  Consequently, as the metacognitive beliefs and processes measured to 
predict T2 distress also (according to theory) cause T1 distress, there is likely to be 
considerable overlap in the variance in T2 distress explained by T1 symptoms and 
metacognitive beliefs, leading to underestimation of the importance of the putative causal 
variables.  That is, by controlling for baseline symptoms we may be masking the effect of the 
beliefs and processes that underlie its maintenance.  To resolve this dilemma, approaches to 
analysis are required that can distinguish putatively causal effects arising from metacognitive 
beliefs and processes (causing symptoms of distress to be maintained) from the confounding 
effect resulting from symptom maintenance.  Such differentiation is not feasible using 
standard hierarchical regression, but may be possible using structural equation modelling 
techniques to model the effect of change in metacognitive beliefs on change in emotional 
distress.  This is addressed in Chapter 7. 
As well as being able to explain more of the variance in T2 distress than did illness 
perceptions in Analysis 1, metacognitive beliefs (‘Cognitive confidence’) were also able to 
explain additional variance in anxiety and depression over and above age, gender, T1 
symptoms, and T1 illness perceptions (Analysis 3).  This supports hypothesis 2 for these two 
outcomes.  However, for trauma, metacognitive beliefs (‘Cognitive confidence’) no longer 
significantly predicted T2 symptoms after including T1 illness perceptions (‘illness 
coherence’) in the analysis (Analysis 3).  However, it should be noted that the proportion of 
variance in T2 trauma explained by ‘Cognitive confidence’ is unchanged between Analysis 2 
(controlling for T1 trauma) and Analysis 3 (controlling for T1 trauma and T1 ‘illness 
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coherence’).  Furthermore, there is little difference in the variance explained by ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ in trauma (1%) and in anxiety (2%).  Therefore, this apparent discrepancy (i.e. 
metacognitive beliefs explaining additional variance over and above illness perceptions for 
T2 anxiety and T2 depression but notT2 trauma) may be an artefact of the present data.  To 
our knowledge this is the first study to explore the prospective relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs (as measured by the MCQ-30) and trauma symptoms, making it 
difficult to judge the reliability of this finding.   
One limitation of the study is the restriction of the sample to breast and prostate cancer 
patients.  These populations were selected because they represent the largest tumour groups 
in each gender and have a broadly similar prognosis.  However, this means it is not possible, 
in this sample, to separate out any effects that may be due to tumour group or gender.  
Furthermore, we cannot assume that the predictive effects found in this study would 
generalise to other cancer populations.  Further studies will be needed to test the stability of 
the observed predictive effect of metacognitive beliefs on persistent emotional distress across 
genders and different tumour and prognostic groups.  In addition, despite the prospective 
design, it should be noted that causality can still not be assumed as the influence of 
unmeasured confounders cannot be ruled out.  In order to provide more compelling evidence 
of a causal role for metacognitive beliefs, further studies are necessary that adopt different 
approaches to design, such as experimental manipulation. 
In summary, the findings of the current study provide promising first evidence that 
metacognitive beliefs can help to predict anxiety, depression and trauma one year after 
diagnosis of breast and prostate cancer.  Furthermore, they support the hypothesis that 
metacognitive beliefs add to the variance explained in persistent anxiety and depression over 
and above that explained by negative content of thoughts about cancer.  Consequently, 
therapeutic approaches targeting metacognitive beliefs and processes - rather than the content 
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of negative thoughts about cancer - may prove beneficial for preventing persistent emotional 
distress in these populations.   
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Chapter Seven 
Study four 
Identifying causal predictors of emotional distress 12 months after cancer diagnosis: A Latent 
Growth Curve Analysis 
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7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 6) metacognitive beliefs around the time of diagnosis 
(T1) of breast or prostate cancer were shown to prospectively predict variation in the 
symptoms of anxiety, depression and trauma 12 months later (T2).  However, the amount of 
additional variance explained after controlling for the level of symptoms at T1 was small.  It 
was suggested that this finding may be partly because prospective regression analysis is 
limited in its ability to advance our understanding of the underlying causal processes and that 
alternative approaches are needed that can disentangle effects arising from causal processes 
from the confounding effects of enduring symptoms.   
One such approach is structural equation modelling (SEM).  For theory testing, SEM 
has several advantages over regression analysis (Musil, Jones, & Warner, 1998).  Firstly, 
rather than just testing individual relationships between predictor variables and a single 
outcome, as in multiple regression analysis, SEM permits simultaneous representation of 
multiple associations and causal paths by a series of structural equations determined by 
theory, which is then tested  to determine how well a hypothesised model fits the data (Byrne, 
2012; Musil et al., 1998).  Thus it becomes possible to test the model in its entirety.  In 
addition, whereas regression analysis uses observed variables and is unable to assess or 
correct for error, SEM uses latent variables with multiple indicators and provides explicit 
estimates of the associated error variance parameters (Byrne, 2012).  In cross-sectional 
analyses, SEM has provided preliminary evidence supporting a key predictions from the 
metacognitive model (Chapter 5).  That is, that negative metacognitive beliefs (i.e. belief in 
the danger and uncontrollability of worry) cause both a direct emotional response, and also 
exacerbate distress indirectly by activating worry about worry (meta-worry).  Prospective 
SEM enables us to build on this work because, as well as making comparisons between 
subjects at one point in time, it also makes comparisons within subjects (over time) providing 
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a clearer assessment of temporal relations between metacognitive beliefs, cognitive processes 
and emotional distress.  Furthermore, by using latent growth curve (LGC) modelling it is 
possible to separate out the enduring component of T1 emotional distress (i.e. that portion of 
T1 distress that is maintained across time points) from the change components (i.e. change in 
symptoms over time), that is: to test whether change in metacognitive beliefs affects change 
in worry which in turn affects change in distress.  
The current study explores the clinical utility of the metacognitive model in cancer by 
conducting the first prospective test of its key theoretical predictions using LGC modelling.  
Specific predictions are that: 
(1) Increase in metacognitive beliefs (‘Negative beliefs about worry’, ‘Positive beliefs 
about worry’, ‘Cognitive confidence’) over 12 months will be associated with an 
increase in emotional distress (anxiety; depression; trauma). 
(2)  The relationship between increase in positive metacognitive beliefs (i.e. ‘Positive 
beliefs about worry’) and increase in emotional distress will be fully mediated by 
increase in CAS processes (i.e. worry and threat-focussed attention).   
(3) The relationship between increase in negative metacognitive beliefs (i.e. ‘Negative 
beliefs about worry’, ‘Cognitive confidence’) and increase in emotional distress will 
be partially mediated by increase in CAS processes (i.e. worry and threat-focussed 
attention.  
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7.2 Method 
7.2.1. Design 
This study used data from the prospective cohort which has been described previously 
(Chapters 4 & 6). 
 
7.2.2 Measures 
All measures were administered at both time points.  
Emotional distress was assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS, (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)) to measure symptoms of anxiety and depression and the 
Impact of Events Scale (IES; (Horowitz et al., 1979)) to measure symptoms of trauma.  
Metacognitive beliefs were measured using the Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30, 
(Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004)).  As previous prospective regression analyses (Chapter 
7) indicated that only three components of metacognitive belief (‘Positive beliefs about 
worry’, ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and ‘Cognitive confidence’) independently predict 
variance in emotional distress, these were the only MCQ-30 subscales used in the present 
study.  The CAS was assessed using two different measures.  Firstly, the Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire (PSWQ, (Meyer et al., 1990)) was used to assess worry; a key component of 
the CAS.  Secondly, in a separate set of analyses, the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome Scale 
(CAS-I, (Wells, 2009)) was used to (a) guard against possible bias in the conclusions drawn, 
due to common method variance between the ‘Negative beliefs about worry subscale’ of the 
MCQ-30 and the PSWQ (as described previously in Chapter 5); and (b) provide a broader 
assessment of the key CAS processes (i.e. worry and threat focussed attention).  For full 
details of these measures see Chapter 5. 
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7.2.3 Analysis 
The data were analysed using Mplus v6.12. As not all scales were normally distributed, 
bootstrapping techniques were used to ensure findings were robust to non-normality (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993). 
Latent Growth Curve Model (LGC) modelling tested predictions that change in 
metacognitive beliefs is associated with change in emotional distress and that this relationship 
is mediated by change in key CAS processes (i.e. worry & threat focussed attention).  LGC 
models generally comprise two parts (Byrne, 2012; MacKinnon, 2008), each represented by 
latent factors: the ‘intercept’ – which represents  the starting point for each variable (T1) and 
an enduring component that is maintained over time; and the ‘slope’ which represent the 
growth in each variable over time.  This allows the relationship between change in variables 
over time (i.e. the slope latent variables) to be assessed separately, but alongside the 
relationship between the baseline levels of each variable (i.e. the intercept latent variables). 
The data were fitted to the hypothesised LGC model (Figure 7.1) using the robust 
weighted least squares estimator (WLSMV, (B. Muthen, 1984; B. Muthen et al., 1997)) 
recommended for ordinal categorical data (Brown, 2006).  Data were fitted, initially using the 
PSWQ (i.e. worry) as mediator and then repeated using the CAS-1 (i.e. worry and threat-
focused attention).  Analyses controlled for covariates (age and gender) identified in previous 
analysis (Chapter 6).  Adequacy of model fit was assessed by two  incremental fit indices: the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI), with values close to .95 
indicating a well-fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and two absolute misfit indices: the 
Root mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) with values <.05 indicating good fit 
and  0.5 - .08 indicating adequate fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), and the Weighted Root 
Mean Square Residual (WRMR) with a cut-off value of .95 indicating good fit (Yu, 2002).  
In each case the hypothesised model (Figure 7.1) was initially tested for each outcome, 
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including all direct and indirect paths with latent factors for the MCQ-30 subscales, the 
PSWQ/CAS-1 and emotional distress (i.e. anxiety, depression, trauma).  Relationships 
modelled between intercept latent variables and slope latent variables were constrained to be 
equal (i.e. it was assumed that they were reflections of the same processes).  In addition, to  
achieve the most parsimonious model a backward elimination approach was used whereby 
the least significant path was deleted from the initial model and the analyses rerun until all 
remaining paths significantly contributed to a final model.  Final models were then re-run to 
obtain bootstrapped standard errors and 95% confidence intervals to establish that findings 
were robust to non-normality. 
Figure 7.1 Hypothesised LGC model of the relationship between change in 
metacognitive beliefs and change in emotional distress, mediated by change in worry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B :Time 1 (t1) &Time 2 (t2) latent variables:   Metacognitive beliefs (M); CAS (C); Emotional distress 
outcomes (E);  Metacognitive Beliefs (MCB): 
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intercept 
MCB 
slope 
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7.3 Results 
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample (N=206) are reported in Chapter 
5 (Figure 4.1).  
The final LGC models for anxiety, depression, and trauma, first using the PSWQ (i.e. 
worry) as indicator of the CAS and then using the CAS-1 (worry and threat focussed 
attention), are shown in Figures 7.2-7.4.  All paths found to be significant in each final model 
are shown.  Paths that were not robust to non-normality (as indicated by bootstrapped 
analysis) are shown as dashed lines.  
The results testing hypotheses 1-3 are presented separately below for each emotional 
distress outcome in turn. 
  
7.3.1 Anxiety 
The final LGC model for anxiety using the PSWQ as mediator (Figure 7.2a) was a 
good fit to the data (χ2 (df=2734) =3264, p<.001, CFI/TLI =.97/.97, RMSEA = .031 (90% CI 
=.03-.04), WRMR = .95).  In this model, change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ were either directly (‘Negative beliefs about worry’) and/or 
indirectly (‘Negative beliefs about worry’; Positive beliefs about worry’) associated with a 
change in anxiety.  There was no significant association between change in ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ and change in anxiety.  Therefore, hypothesis 1 was supported for 2/3 
metacognitive beliefs. 
After bootstrapping, robust effects were found indicating that change in ‘Negative 
beliefs about worry’ directly affected change in ‘Worry’ (b = 1.28, bootstrapped SE (95% 
C.I) = 0.33 (0.66-2.00), p<.0001) and change in anxiety (b = 0.95, bootstrapped SE (95% 
C.I.) =.0.45 (0.32-2.24), p<.035)’.  However, previous paths indicating that change in 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ affected change in ‘Worry’ (b = 0.17; bootstrapped SE (95% 
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CI) = 0.14 (-0.10 – 0.37); p=.213), and that change in ‘Worry’ affected change in anxiety (b = 
0.25; bootstrapped SE (95% CI) = 0.20 (-0.18 – 0.64); p=.216) were not robust.  
Thus, although both hypotheses 2 and 3 were supported in the final model, neither 
finding was robust to non-normality.  
The final LGC model for anxiety using the CAS-1 as the mediating variable (Figure 
7.2b) demonstrated a good fit χ2(df=1441) =1828, p<.001, CFI/TLI =.97/.96, RMSEA = .036 
(90% CI =.03-.04), WRMR = .95) to the data.  In this model, change in ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ was both directly and indirectly associated, and change in ‘Positive beliefs 
about worry’ indirectly associated, with change in anxiety, supporting hypothesis 1.  
However, once again there was no significant association between change in ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ and change in anxiety.  
Bootstrapped analysis indicated that the path between change in ‘Positive beliefs about 
worry’ and change in ‘CAS’ was not robust (b = 0.27; bootstrapped SE (95% CI) = 0.16 (-.12 
– 0.49).  However, robust effects were found indicating that change in ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ directly affected growth in anxiety (b = 0.78; bootstrapped SE (95% CI) = 0.41 
(0.36 – 0.55); p=.058), and affected change in the ‘CAS’ (b = 1.12; bootstrapped SE (95% 
CI) = 0.36 (0.73 – 1.98); p=.002), which in turn affected change in anxiety ((b = 0.36; 
bootstrapped SE (95% CI) = 0.16 (0.13 – 0.59); p=.001). 
Thus, while hypothesis 2 was supported in the final model, this finding was again not 
robust.  However, hypothesis 3 was robustly supported for the subscale ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’.  
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Figure 7.2a: Final LGC path model of relationship of change in metacognitive  
beliefs with change in anxiety symptoms, mediated by change in worry (PSWQ)  
over 12 months 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wt2 
POS 
intercept 
POS 
slope 
Pt1 Pt2 
NEG 
intercept 
NEG 
slope 
 
Nt2 Nt1 
WORRY 
slope 
WORRY 
intercept 
Wt1 
ANXIETY 
slope 
ANXIETY 
intercept 
At2 At1 
.52 p=.035 .54 
P=.035 
.70 p=.000 .79 p=.000 
.15 p=.213 
.15 p=.213 
.23 p=.216 
.25 
p=.216 
 127 
 
Figure 7.2b: Final LGC path model of relationship of growth in metacognitive  
beliefs with growth in anxiety symptoms, mediated by growth in worry (CAS-I)  
over 12 months 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B  Solid  lines with standardised coefficients shown for paths between metacognitive beliefs, worry and 
anxiety ; Measurement model component for T1 and T2 latent variables and  for covariates (Age & Gender) not 
shown. T1 & T2 latent variables:   Positive beliefs about worry (P); Negative beliefs about worry (N); CAS (C); 
Worry (W); Anxiety (A). Growth Curve latent variables: intercept (i); slope (s).  MCQ-30 subscales: Positive 
beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry (NEG 
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Figure 7.3a: Final LGC path model of relationship of growth in metacognitive  
beliefs with growth in depression symptoms, mediated by growth in worry (PSWQ) 
over 12 months 
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Figure 7.3b: Final LGC path model of relationship of growth in metacognitive  
beliefs with growth in depression symptoms, mediated by growth in worry (CAS-I)  
over 12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B  Solid  lines with standardised coefficients shown for paths between metacognitive beliefs, worry and 
depression ; Measurement model component for T1 and T2 latent variables and  for covariates (Age & Gender) 
not shown. T1 & T2 latent variables:   Positive beliefs about worry (P); Negative beliefs about worry (N); 
Cognitive confidence (C); Worry (W); CAS (C); Anxiety (A). Growth Curve latent variables: intercept (i); slope 
(s).  MCQ-30 subscales: Positive beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry (NEG) Cognitive 
Confidence (CC). 
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Figure 7.4a: Final trimmed LGC path model of relationship of growth in  
metacognitive beliefs with growth in trauma symptoms, mediated by growth  
in worry (PSWQ) over 12 months 
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Figure 7.4b: Final trimmed LGC path model of relationship of growth in  
metacognitive beliefs with growth in trauma symptoms, mediated by growth  
in worry (CAS-I) over 12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B.  Solid lines p<.05 with standardised coefficients shown for paths between metacognitive beliefs, worry and 
trauma; Measurement model component for T1 and T2 latent variables and for covariates (Age & Gender) not 
shown. T1 & T2 latent variables:   Positive beliefs about worry (P); Negative beliefs about worry (N); Worry 
(W); CAS (C); Trauma (T). Growth Curve latent variables: intercept (i); slope (s).  MCQ-30 subscales: Positive 
beliefs about worry (POS); Negative beliefs about worry (NEG)  
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7.3.2 Depression 
The final LGC model for depression using the PSWQ (figure 7.3a) was a good fit to the 
data (χ2 (df=2730) =3248.35 p<.001, CFI/TLI =.97/.97, RMSEA = .030(90% CI =.03-.03), 
WRMR = .97).  In this model, change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ were both directly associated with change in depression.  In addition, changes in 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ were associated with 
change in worry.  However, as change in worry was not associated with a change in 
depression, there were no significant indirect paths between metacognitive beliefs and 
depression.  Consequently, hypothesis 1 was supported for ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ 
and ‘Cognitive confidence’ only. 
Bootstrapped analysis indicated that both the path between change in ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ and change in ‘worry’ (b=1.21; SE (95% CI) = 0.35 (0.53-1.89) p=.001); and 
the path between change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and change in depression (b=0.74; 
SE (95% CI) = 0.34 (.07-1.40) p=.029) were robust.  However, the path between change in 
‘Cognitive confidence’ and change in depression was not robust.  Thus, neither hypothesis 2 
nor hypothesis 3 were supported.   
The final LGC model for depression using the CAS-1 as mediator (Figure 7.3b) was a 
good fit to the data (χ2 (df=1444) =1827.2, p<.001, CFI/TLI =.96/.96, RMSEA = .036 (90% 
CI =.03-.04), WRMR = .99).  In this model, all three metacognitive belief subscales were 
either directly (‘Cognitive confidence’) or indirectly (‘Negative beliefs about worry’, 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’) associated with change in depression, supporting hypothesis 1. 
Bootstrapped analysis indicated a robust indirect effect of ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ on depression.  Change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ affected a change in the 
‘CAS’ (b=1.19; SE (95% CI) = .36 (0.80 – 1.96) p=.001), which in turn affected change in 
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depression (b=.41; SE (955 CI) =0.16 (0.14-0.79) p=.009).  No other paths in the final model 
were robust to non-normality. 
Thus, while hypothesis 2 was supported in the final model, this finding was not 
robust.  Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
 
7.3.3 Trauma  
The LGC model for trauma using the PSWQ (figure 7.4a) was a good fit to the data 
(χ2 (df=4063) =4586.50, p<.001, CFI/TLI =.97/.97, RMSEA = .025 (90% CI =.02-.03), 
WRMR = .98).  However, in this final model although change in both ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ and ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ affected change in worry, only  ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ affected growth in trauma.  Consequently, the predicted indirect paths between 
metacognitive beliefs and trauma were not supported, and hypothesis 1 was supported for 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’ only. 
Bootstrapped analysis indicated that the direct path between change in ‘Negative 
beliefs about worry’ and change in trauma was robust (b=1.14; SE (95% CI) = 0.17 (0.80-
1.48) p<.0001), as was the path between change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and change 
in worry (b=1.30; SE (95% CI) = 0.23 (0.85-1.75) p<.0001).  The path between change in 
‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and change in worry was not robust.  Thus, neither hypothesis 
2 nor hypothesis 3 was supported.   
The fit of the final model for trauma using the CAS-1 as mediator (Figure 7.4b) was 
also good (χ2 (df=2444) =2793.63, p<.001, CFI/TLI =.98/.97, RMSEA = .026 (90% CI =.02-
.03), WRMR = .92).  Changes in all three metacognitive beliefs subscales were either directly 
(‘Cognitive confidence’) or indirectly associated (‘Negative beliefs about worry’; ‘Positive 
beliefs about worry’) with change trauma.  Thus, hypothesis 1 was broadly supported.  
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However, there was no direct path between change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and 
change in trauma in this model, which is surprising. 
Bootstrapped analysis indicated that there was a robust indirect effect of change in 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’ on change in trauma, with change in ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ predicting change in ‘CAS’ (b=1.25; SE (95% CI) = .39 (0.69 – 2.38) p=.002), which 
in turn predicted change in trauma (b=.61; SE (95% CI) =0.08 (0.42-0.74) p=.014).  
However, the path between growth in ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and growth in ‘CAS’ 
was not robust to non-normality, and the direct effect of growth in ‘Cognitive confidence’ on 
growth in trauma was just borderline (b=0.13; SE (95% CI) = .05 (-.02 – 0.21), p=.014).  
Consequently, while hypothesis 2 was supported in the final model this finding was 
not robust.  Hypothesis 3 was not supported  
 
7.4 Discussion  
The aim of this study was to expand on evidence supporting the value of the metacognitive 
model of emotional disorder for understanding the causal process underlying persistent 
emotional distress.  In Chapter 6 it was suggested that controlling for baseline distress might 
mask the effects of underlying causal variables.  Consequently the current study used an LGC 
modelling approach to test causal effects arising from a change in metacognitive beliefs and 
processes, while controlling for the confounding effects resulting from maintenance of 
symptoms.  
 
7.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Change in metacognitive beliefs over 12 months will be associated 
with change in emotional distress 
After controlling for the relationship between the starting levels / enduring component 
(i.e. intercept) of metacognitive beliefs and distress, change in metacognitive beliefs over 
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time was associated with change in emotional distress (i.e. anxiety, depression, trauma) in 
most cases, thus broadly supporting hypothesis 1.  Specifically, change in ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ was directly and/or indirectly associated with a change in emotional distress for 
all three outcomes (anxiety, depression, trauma), although the exact relationship differed 
according to the mediating variable used.  Change in ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ was also 
associated with change in anxiety, depression and trauma when the CAS-1 was used as the 
mediating variable, although these findings were not robust.  Finally, change in ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ was directly associated with change in depression, and also with change in 
trauma (when the CAS-1 was used).  However, this variable had no association with anxiety 
suggesting that ‘Cognitive confidence’ does not play a role in predicting future anxiety when 
other metacognitive beliefs are accounted for.  These findings, taken together, give a different 
picture of the relative importance of these three metacognitive subscales in predicting 
emotional distress than that implied in Chapter 6.  However, they are more in line with 
theoretical predictions from the metacognitive model of emotional disorder  - suggesting that 
while all three types of metacognitive belief are associated with persistent emotional distress, 
it is ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ that has the strongest causal relationship.  This is also 
consistent with previous prospective research which found that ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ was the strongest prospective predictor of both anxiety and depression in a non-
clinical sample (Yilmaz et al, 2011). 
 
7.4.2 Hypothesis 2: The association between change in positive metacognitive beliefs 
and change in emotional distress is fully mediated by change in the CAS 
The metacognitive model of emotional disorder predicts that positive metacognitive 
beliefs maintain distress insofar as they guide individuals towards use of CAS processes such 
as worry, rumination and threat-focussed attention, in response to negative thoughts and 
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feelings.  This hypothesis of full mediation is supported in the final models for anxiety (2a & 
2b) and in the models using the CAS-1 as mediator for depression (3b) and trauma (4b).  
However, in all of the models the paths between change in ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and 
change in ‘Worry’ or the ‘CAS’ were not robust to non-normality.  Thus, while a change in 
‘Positive belief about worry’ does appear to cause a corresponding change in CAS processes  
as would be predicted,  this effect is small when other factors (i.e. ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’) are included in the model and hence not robust to non-normality.  The finding that 
indirect and direct paths between ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and emotional distress are 
non-significant when ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ are included in the model is consistent 
with previous cross-sectional mediation analysis (Chapter 5), and also fits with metacognitive 
theory which suggests that, while positive metacognitive beliefs are important for initial 
activation of the CAS, it is the negative metacognitive beliefs that are most influential in 
maintaining the CAS, and thus exacerbating distress.  
 
7.4.3 Hypothesis 3: The association between change in negative metacognitive beliefs 
and change in emotional distress is partially mediated by change in the CAS. 
Hypothesis 3, predicting that the relationship between change in ‘Negative beliefs 
about worry’ and change in emotional distress would be partially mediated by CAS 
processes, was supported in both of the final models for anxiety (2a & 2b).  However, the 
indirect path was robust only for the model which used the CAS-1 as indicator (Figure 2b).  
For depression and trauma, this hypothesis was not supported.  For both of these outcomes, 
change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ had a direct effect on change in outcomes when the 
PSWQ was used as the mediator variable (Figure 3a & 4A), but an indirect effect when the 
CAS-1 was used (Figure 3b & 4b).  The lack of indirect effect observed in models 3a & 4a is 
clearly due to the lack of association between change in ‘Worry’ (as measured by the PSWQ) 
 137 
 
and change depression and trauma, as for both models change in ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ was strongly predictive of change in ‘Worry’.  The reason behind the lack of a direct 
effect in models 3b &4b however is less obvious.  It may be due to the wording of the 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’ subscale,  which focuses entirely on worry as opposed to other 
aspects of repetitive thinking (i.e. rumination & threat focused attention), which are of more 
relevance to depression and trauma and are included in the CAS-1.  These findings are 
consistent with the previous cross-sectional analyses (Chapter 5), in that partial mediation of 
the relationship between this subscale and emotional distress is supported for anxiety, but not 
for depression.  However, it differed in the findings related to trauma.  In this case, the 
hypothesis of partial mediation was not supported in the current study, but was in cross-
sectional analysis when the CAS-1 was used as the mediator variable.  It is not immediately 
clear why such a discrepancy should arise.  It may be due to the inclusion of ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ in the prospective model, which was not included in the cross-sectional analysis.  
Change in ‘Cognitive confidence’ did not have an effect on change in CAS processes as 
measured by either the PSWQ or the CAS-1.  Hence the hypothesis of partial mediation was 
not supported for this subscale in any of the models tested.  This is perhaps not surprising as 
both of the measures used to indicate the CAS are predominantly focussed on worry (i.e. a 
form of future orientated repetitive thinking) and on future threat, whereas the subscale 
‘Cognitive confidence’ assesses lack of confidence in memory.  These kinds of metacognitive 
beliefs are more likely to activate rumination (i.e past orientated repetitive thinking) in an 
attempt at gap filling or a search for meaning. 
 
7.4.4 Study implications, limitations and conclusion  
In summary, this study provides further evidence supporting predictions from the 
metacognitive model that change in metacognitive beliefs is associated with change in 
 138 
 
emotional distress.  The evidence supporting predictions about mediation of this relationship 
by change in the CAS is, however, less clear-cut.  Results partially support theoretical 
predictions that change in positive metacognitive beliefs cause a change in emotional distress 
by activating change in CAS processes.  The relatively small (and non-robust) effect found is 
consistent with the metacognitive model’s assertion that it is negative metacognitive beliefs 
rather than positive metacognitive beliefs that are the key to understanding persistent 
emotional distress.   The prediction of partial mediation of the relationship between change in 
negative metacognitive beliefs and change in emotional distress was not supported for 
‘Cognitive confidence’ and was only supported for ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ with 
respect to predicting change in anxiety. 
It should be noted, as alluded to above, that the findings of this study are limited by the 
measures used, a view which is supported by inconsistent findings between LGC models 
using different measures of the CAS (PSWQ vs CAS-1).  In particular, the MCQ-30 and the 
PSWQ are predominantly or entirely focussed on worry, and as such are more relevant to 
exploring the relationship of metacognitive beliefs and processes with anxiety than with 
depression or trauma.  This view is supported by the lack of association between change in 
worry as measured by the PSWQ and change in depression and trauma.  In contrast, the CAS-
1 items used in this study provide a broader measure of the CAS, asking about current use of 
worry or rumination (Item 1) and threat focussed attention (Item 2).  Consequently, this 
measure is more likely to be of relevance to, and therefore associated with, all three 
outcomes.  Another explanation, which may also contribute to the lack of association 
between change in worry (as measured by the PSWQ) and change in distress, is the issue of 
common method variance.  It has previously been noted that there is a degree of item overlap 
between the ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ subscale of the MCQ-30 and the PSWQ (Chapter 
6).  Indeed, this was the main reason for including an additional measure of the CAS in the 
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current study.  Consequently,  it is possible that when both scales are included in the model 
change in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ is the stronger predictor of distress, therefore 
reducing the effect of change in the PSWQ on change in distress. 
In addition to problems associated with the measures used, it is also important to note 
that the study employed, by structural equation modelling standards, a relatively small sample 
size.  This may be a further factor contributing to the null and/or non-robust findings.  
Finally, while LGC modelling has the potential to test theoretical predictions about causal 
processes, it may be argued that with just two waves of data, it is impossible to demonstrate 
that prior change in the independent variable is related to change in the mediator or the 
outcome (MacKinnon, 2008).  Consequently, as this study provides little more than 
correlation between change in variables over time, it falls short of providing conclusive 
evidence of causation. 
Despite these limitations it can be concluded that the current study does provide 
additional evidence supporting the clinical utility of the metacognitive model for persistent 
emotional distress in cancer.  It is clear that further studies are required to provide stronger 
evidence of causality, and that these need to adopt different approaches to design such as 
prospective studies with three or more waves of data, and experimental studies of 
interventions designed to manipulate key metacognitive and/or CAS variables.  However, the 
consistent finding that change in metacognitive beliefs affects a change in the CAS (as 
measured by the CAS-1), which in turn affects a change in emotional distress, is encouraging. 
It lends further weight to the view that intervention aimed at modifying metacognitive beliefs 
(in particular ‘Negative beliefs about worry’) and interrupting CAS processes (incl. worry 
and threat focussed attention) has the potential to reduce vulnerability in persistent emotional 
distress in this population, and suggests that further research is warranted. 
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Chapter Eight 
Study five 
Exploring the utility of Attention Training Technique (ATT) to reduce emotional distress in 
cancer patients: A case series  
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8.1. Introduction 
Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) is the most common psychological approach used to 
treat emotional distress in cancer patients.  However, CBT has its limitations as described 
previously (Chapter 1), and its suitability and acceptability in cancer, where negative 
thoughts often reflect clinical reality, is questionable.  An alternative theory on which to base 
psychological intervention is the Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF, (Wells 
& Mathews, 1994), which underpins the metacognitive model of emotional disorder as 
described in Chapter 3.  The intervention based on this model, metacognitive therapy (MCT), 
does not focus on modifying negative content of thoughts, but on modifying the 
metacognitive beliefs and processes that maintain them.  It assumes that emotional disorder 
develops when flexible control of attention is lost because it is bound up with perseverative, 
worry-based processing and monitoring for threat – the cognitive attentional syndrome 
(CAS).  The aim of MCT is to enable the person not to engage in worry, rumination, or other 
coping strategies when negative thoughts and feelings occur.  Chapters 4-7 provided evidence 
supporting the theory that underlies this view.  In particular, Chapter 5 reports that around the 
time of diagnosis, the association between metacognitive beliefs about the danger and 
uncontrollability of worry and emotional distress was partially mediated by worry and threat-
focused attention.  Furthermore, in Chapter 7, change in worry and threat-focused attention 
mediated the relationship of change in both positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about 
worry with change in anxiety and depression.  Such findings support the view that an 
intervention targeting the CAS has the potential to reduce emotional distress.  
Attention Training Technique (ATT), a component of metacognitive therapy, was 
developed specifically to modify the CAS and increase metacognitive awareness.  It is an 
auditory attention task.  Although not originally intended for use as a treatment in its own 
right, preliminary evidence from mental health research has shown large treatment effects 
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(Wells, 2009).  Studies using single case experimental designs have shown significant clinical 
benefits of ATT across different emotional disorders, including recurrent major depressive 
disorder (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000), panic and social phobia (Wells, White, & Carter, 
1997), and hypochondriasis (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998).  Furthermore, in hypochondriasis 
a randomized controlled trial of ATT versus no treatment (Cavanagh & Franklin, 2000) 
reported significant improvements in a range of health anxiety outcomes (including degree of 
health worry, disease conviction and of behavioural indices).  These treatment gains were 
achieved after just six sessions, and maintained at 18-month follow-up. 
ATT may have considerable clinical utility in cancer patients as it is does not require 
them to address their negative thoughts or feelings.  In addition, as it has the potential to be 
delivered through guided self-practice, ATT may be particularly useful where engagement 
with face-to-face interventions is not practical (e.g. for patients who: are engaged in active 
treatment; have difficulty taking time out from usual commitments; or are geographically 
distant from treatment centres).  In the current study, in order to explore this potential, ATT 
was modified to be delivered via a single face-to-face session with all remaining sessions 
conducted over the telephone.  This represents a significant departure from how ATT has 
been used previously. 
The aim of this study was to explore the utility of ATT for patients experiencing 
emotional distress after diagnosis and primary (i.e. surgical) treatment of cancer.  
Specifically, to:  
(1) provide an initial test of efficacy of ATT in this population. 
(2) explore participant experience of the intervention to assess acceptability and 
practicality, and to provide information to guide further development and 
modification of ATT for this population. 
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8.2. Method 
8.2.1 Design  
A non-concurrent multiple baseline case series (P. J. Watson & Workman, 1981) with 
three-month follow-up was used.  Replication across patients begins to establish proof-of-
principal for treatment efficacy across participants who may have differing emotional 
symptom presentations.  This is particularly useful in cancer populations as emotional 
distress is often heterogeneous in presentation, comprising symptoms of anxiety, depression, 
trauma and / or fear of recurrence.  In a multiple baseline design, the dependent variable is 
assessed across a no-treatment baseline for a minimum of three data-points (Smith, 2012).  
Patients in the current study were allocated to a four- or five-week baseline after which ATT 
began.  
 
8.2.2 Participants  
Five patients who attended a large NHS University Hospital for routine oncology 
outpatient appointments or for assessment by the psycho-oncology team were included in the 
study.  Patients were eligible if they met the following criteria: (1) diagnosis of primary 
breast cancer, prostate cancer, or choroidal melanoma at least six months previously, (2) a 
clinically significant level of emotional distress as assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS total <14), (3) aged 18 years or above, (4) not in receipt of 
concurrent psychological treatment, (5) not in the palliative phase of care, (6) free from, or 
stable on, psychotropic medication, (7) no evidence of psychotic illness, current alcohol or 
substance abuse.  These diagnostic groups were chosen for several reasons: (1) all three are 
similar in that they have a relatively good prognosis for survival, (2) breast and prostate 
cancer are the largest diagnostic groups in each gender, while choroidal melanoma (although 
 144 
 
rare) can occur in either gender, and (3) links between clinicians and researchers within these 
clinical populations were already established. 
Participant 1 was a 57 year old woman who had been diagnosed with Grade 2 breast 
cancer one year before recruitment into the study.  Initial treatment was by wide local 
excision (WLE) proceeding to mastectomy with auxiliary node clearance (ANC) two months 
later.  This was followed by adjuvant hormonal therapy for five years.  The participant 
reported a previous episode of anxiety (two and a half years earlier), and a series of difficult 
life events since, which meant that her diagnosis was experienced as just one more in a long 
line of stressors.  She reported that she initially approached her diagnosis with a positive 
attitude, but that now she was worrying not just about the possibility of cancer recurrence, but 
also feeling generally vulnerable and anxious about ‘what will happen next?’ 
Participant 2 was a 62 year old woman who had been diagnosed with Grade 1 breast 
cancer 16 months previously.  Initial treatment was by mastectomy followed by five years 
adjuvant hormonal treatment.  Three months before diagnosis, this participant suffered a 
stroke which left her with mild left side muscle weakness; she also had ongoing health 
problems including acute pancreatitis and chronic pain.  Participant 2 reported a considerable 
family history of cancer, including: both parents, a sister who died of breast cancer and a 
niece who carries the BRCA gene.  She reported a childhood onset of anxiety, for which she 
had previously received counselling and had been on antidepressant medication (diazepam) 
for the past three years.  She also reported periodically experiencing PTSD symptoms 
(including: intrusive thoughts, avoidance, physical symptoms and feeling ‘on guard’ or 
‘jumpy’) following a traumatic incident when she was twenty-five.  At the time of inclusion 
in the study, Participant 2 described feeling anxious and depressed, very alone, frightened 
about possible recurrence and ashamed about her difficulty coping. 
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Participant 3 was a 56 year old woman who had been diagnosed with Grade 3 breast 
cancer three and a half years before inclusion in the study. Initial medical treatment was by 
WLE, followed by chemotherapy, radiotherapy and adjuvant hormonal treatment.  One year 
previously, Participant 3 was seen by a Clinical Psychologist as part of the assessment for 
risk-reducing mastectomy.  During this assessment she explained that she wanted surgery 
because she was experiencing severe anxiety about the possibility of cancer recurrence.  
However, she had not received this surgery by the time of inclusion in the study.  Both her 
parents had been diagnosed with cancer; she had also in the last five years lost both her 
husband and sister-in-law to cancer.  Currently, she reported that fear of cancer recurrence 
was severely disrupting her life.  She reported thinking about it every minute of every day 
and constantly checking herself in response to the thought ‘it (the cancer) is still there’.  She 
also reported that she found it impossible to look to, and plan for, the future; was resentful of 
other people’s relationships and felt socially isolated. 
Participant 4 was a 61 year old woman who had been diagnosed with Grade 3 Ductal 
Carcinoma in Situ (DCIS) one year prior to inclusion in the study. Primary treatment was by 
mastectomy followed by chemotherapy, radiotherapy and five years adjuvant hormonal 
therapy.  This participant reported a prior history of depression and anxiety from age 23 years 
although she had received no intervention until three months before cancer diagnosis when 
she experienced low mood following a leg fracture.  Participant 4 reported no family history 
of cancer.  At the time of inclusion in the study, she reported feeling very low and spending a 
lot of time worrying, including worrying about the possibility of cancer recurrence and how 
she would cope.  She also reported that she lacked motivation, was still experiencing 
considerable pain and felt physically exhausted. 
Participant 5 was a 57 year old woman who had been diagnosed with choroidal 
melanoma eight months previously.  Primary treatment was by plaque radiotherapy followed 
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by six-monthly liver screening arranged by her GP.  Patients diagnosed with choroidal 
melanoma are usually offered biopsy for prognostic testing.  However, in Participant 5’s case 
this was not possible due to the size and position of the tumour.  Aside from cancer, this 
participant also reported physical comorbidities and a prior history of depression and anxiety 
related to multiple traumatic events experienced during and since childhood.  She had 
previously seen a psychiatrist during one of her episodes of depression but had always been 
reluctant to take medication.  In addition to her own problems, Participant 5 described 
supporting other family members with both mental health and profound disability issues.  
Currently she described feeling irritable, tearful and generally exhausted.  Because of her low 
mood, she said that she often felt as though she wanted to lock herself away, which in turn 
made her feel guilty and selfish because of responsibilities in caring for family. 
 
8.2.3 Outcome measures 
8.2.3.1 Weekly 
Participants completed two self-report measures at weekly intervals during the baseline 
and intervention phases.  The total score of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS, (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)) was used to monitor levels of distress and individual 
scores from two items from the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome Scale (CAS-1, (Wells, 
2009)) were used to monitor use of worry (Item 1: ‘How much time in the last week have you 
found yourself dwelling on or worrying about your problems?’) and threat-focussed attention 
(Item 2:‘How much time in the last week have you been focussing attention on the things you 
find threatening (e.g. symptoms, thoughts, danger?).  These measures were also used at the 
subsequent post-treatment and follow-up assessment.  For full details of the HADS and the 
CAS-1 see Chapter’s 4 & 5 respectively. 
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8.2.3.2 Pre-treatment, Post-treatment and Follow-up 
Two additional self-report measures were used for pre-treatment, post treatment and 
follow-up assessments. The Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30,(Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004)) was used to assess changes in metacognitive beliefs (see Chapter 4 for full 
details), while one subscale from the Fear of Cancer Recurrence Inventory (FCRI, (Simard & 
Savard, 2009)) was used as a measure of cancer-specific distress (i.e. fear of cancer 
recurrence - FCR).  The FCRI comprises 42 items across 7 subscales including: ‘FCR 
triggers ’, ‘FCR severity ’,‘ psychological distresses, ‘functional impairment’, ‘reassurance 
and coping strategies’.  Respondents indicate the frequency of symptoms within each 
subscale on a 5-point Likert-scale with higher scores indicating higher FCR.  The subscale 
‘FCR severity’ specifically assesses presence and severity of thoughts and images related to 
FCR, and as such has been recommended as a screening tool for a clinically significant FCR 
(cut-off score 13; (Simard & Savard, 2008)).  The FCR severity subscale has previously been 
used for this purpose in a study of breast cancer survivors (Thewes, Bell, & Butow, 2013; 
Thewes, Bell, Butow, et al., 2013; Thewes et al., 2012).   
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (SCID-I/NP, (First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002) relating to Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Major 
Depressive Disorder (MDD) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was used to provide 
an independent clinician-rated assessment of current and past history of anxiety and mood 
disorders.  
 
8.2.4 Intervention  
ATT is introduced to patients as a way to reduce worry, rumination and self-focused 
attention.  It comprises an externally focused auditory attention task which is given to the 
participant on CD.  The task has three components: (1) selective attention; (2) rapid attention 
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switching; and (3) divided attention.  Participants are asked to practice allocating their 
attention as directed, while treating any negative thoughts or feelings that arise as background 
noise, without any attempt to suppress, analyse or remove them from the mind.  Each 
component is practiced sequentially during a 12 minute period.  In the selective attention 
task, practiced for approximately five minutes, the patient is asked to focus attention on 
specific sounds among a competing array on the CD and at different spatial locations within 
the environment.  They are asked to focus on each sound as guided, while not being 
distracted by others.  The rapid attention switching task follows, and is practiced for five 
minutes, during which the patient is asked to shift attention rapidly between different sounds 
and spatial locations.  Initially, about ten seconds is devoted to each sound, with this 
gradually reducing to one every five seconds.  Finally, in the divided attention task, practiced 
for approximately two minutes, the patient is asked to try and listen to all of the sounds 
simultaneously. 
 
8.2.5 Procedure 
Patients who consented to the study were sent a pre-treatment questionnaire pack and 
contacted by telephone to participate in a SCID interview.  Following this, they were 
allocated to a no-treatment baseline ranging from 3-5 weeks.  No therapeutic input was 
provided during this time, although participants were offered short weekly phone calls 
(approx. ten minutes) to monitor symptoms.  No participants took up this offer. 
On completion of baseline, each participant was invited to participate in a single face-
to-face session with the therapist either in the patient’s home or at the hospital.  The rationale 
for ATT was explained, the patient practised ATT, and any difficulties or concerns relating to 
how to use it and how to fit it into daily life were discussed. 
 149 
 
At the start of the session, each participant was asked to describe their current 
emotional problems and an idiosyncratic case formulation was developed and presented.  
This helped the participant become socialised to the aims of ATT.  ATT was then practiced in 
session.  Before practicing ATT, each participant was asked to rate their balance of attention 
on a 7-point scale ranging from ‘-3’ (entirely externally focused on the environment around 
me) to ‘+3’ (entirely internally focused on my thoughts, feelings or body).  This was then 
repeated immediately after ATT practice.  After practicing ATT for the first time a two-point 
reduction in self-focused attention is typical (Wells, 2009).  If this did not occur, the therapist 
explored with the participant possible reasons for the lack of positive change and corrected 
any misunderstandings regarding how to practice ATT.  
At the end of the session, participants were asked to take the CD home and practice 
ATT twice a day, every day, for eight weeks.  A plan for when and how they might achieve 
this and any potential barriers were discussed and agreed.  Finally, each participant was 
provided with a diary containing a guide to using ATT / Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), 
a ‘record of practice’ sheet, eight weekly study questionnaires (HADS/CAS-1) and reply-paid 
envelopes for their return.  
Weekly pre-arranged telephone calls were used to monitor and support each 
participant’s guided practice of ATT, including discussion and resolution of any problems, 
and a reminder to complete and return study questionnaires.  At the end of the eight week 
intervention period, participants were advised that they were no longer required to practice 
ATT.  Within one week of completing the intervention phase they were sent a post-treatment 
questionnaire pack and asked to participate in an exit interview (which included a repeat 
administration of the SCID) conducted by telephone.  Exit interviews were semi-structured 
according to an interview guide (see Appendix A).  Participants were prompted to talk about 
their understanding, and experiences of using ATT and asked to rate on a scale of 1-10 their 
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satisfaction with ATT in general, how it was introduced, the practice, the weekly phone calls 
and whether they thought it would remain useful to them in the future ( see Appendix A for 
full details). 
Participants who completed the intervention were followed up by post after three 
months and asked to complete the follow-up questionnaires (HADS/CAS-1/MCQ-30/FCRI).  
They were also asked to report any continued use of the ATT CD.  
 
8.2.6 Analysis plan 
The most commonly used method for determining an intervention effect in single case-
experimental design research is graphical representation and visual inspection (Smith, 2012).  
Weekly scores on the HADS and level of worry/rumination and threat-focussed attention on 
the CAS-1 (items 1 & 2) were therefore plotted.  In addition, pre-intervention, post 
intervention and three-month follow-up scores were plotted for the MCQ-30 subscales and 
the FCRI severity scale.  
Clinical significance of treatment effects on emotional distress (HADS total) were 
assessed as they have been previously in an open trial of metacognitive therapy in adolescent 
and young adult survivors of cancer (Fisher et al., 2015).  This used the Jacobson method 
“criterion c” (Jacobson, Roberts, Berns, & McGlinchey, 1999) to establish whether 
participants could be considered recovered as a result of treatment.  This method allocates 
each patient to one of four possible outcomes: (1) reliable deterioration; (2) no change; (3) 
reliable improvement; and (4) recovered.  The first three outcomes are derived solely from a 
reliable change index (RCI), which compares treatment outcomes to normative data from 
non-clinical samples to determine whether the magnitude of change is statistically significant.  
However, to be classified as ‘recovered’, patients need to demonstrate both a reliable change 
and a HADS score that falls below the established clinical cut-off (criterion c).  The RCI used 
 151 
 
previously (Fisher et al., 2015) and hence in this study was an 8-point change from baseline 
(mean) to end of treatment, with normative data having been drawn from a large non-clinical 
sample (Crawford, Henry, Crombie, & Taylor, 2001).  The cut-off point used was 13.    
A review of the notes taken during monitoring calls and exit interviews was used to 
explore the participants’ perspective on the ATT intervention.  Specifically, this review 
focussed on acceptability and feasibility including identifying any problems experienced and 
potential barriers to use. 
 
8.3 Results 
Only two of the five participants enrolled in the study completed the intervention as 
directed.  In addition, two completed the intervention phase, but had one (Participant 5) or 
more gaps (Participant 2) between sessions.  In the remainder of this chapter these four 
participants are collectively referred to as ‘treatment completers’ to distinguish them from the 
one participant (Participant 4) who dropped out completely.  Participant 4 could not be 
contacted from week 4.  After several unsuccessful attempts to contact and re-engage her by 
both telephone and post, she was considered lost to follow-up.  Of the four treatment 
completers, Participant 2 failed to return her post-treatment questionnaires and Participant 3 
failed to return her three-month follow-up questionnaires despite several reminder calls and 
letters. 
 
8.3.1. Session by session scores on outcome measures  
Figure 8.1 shows the HADS-distress, worry and threat-focussed attention scores across 
the baseline and intervention phases and at follow-up.  Baseline scores across all three 
measures were relatively stable for each participant.  After ATT was introduced, a reduction 
in HADS score was seen across the intervention phase for all four treatment completers.  
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Corresponding reductions were seen in worry and threat-focussed attention with the pattern 
of scores for both outcomes mirroring that seen for the HADS.  Three participants 
(Participants 1, 3 & 5) encountered one or more distressing situations during the course of the 
study.  In each case, the HADS score either stabilised or increased in line with the changes in 
worry and threat-focussed attention, although it did not return to pre-treatment levels.   
At three-month follow-up, Participants 1 and 2 showed further improvement across all 
three outcomes, albeit very minor improvements for Participant 2.  In contrast, Participant 5’s 
scores returned to baseline levels.  Participant 3 did not return her follow-up questionnaire. 
 
Figure 8.1: Emotional distress, worry and threat-focused attention scores across 
baseline, treatment and follow-up phases 
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Participant 3 
 
Participant 4 
~ 
Participant 5 
 
 
N.B. Distress – HADS total score; Worry  - CAS-1 Item 1; Attention – CAS-1 Item 2; B- baseline assessment; 
Trt – treatment assessment; Post – post-treatment assessment; 3 month – 3-month follow-up assessment  
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Figure 8.2 shows each participant’s pre-treatment, post treatment and follow-up scores 
on the MCQ-30 subscales and the FCRI-severity scale.  
Participant 1 had high pre-treatment scores on three of the five MCQ-30 subscales: 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’, ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’.   Small reductions were seen across all three of these subscales at post-
treatment with further reductions at follow-up for two: ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and 
‘Cognitive self-consciousness’.  The reduction in ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ from-
treatment to follow-up was negligible.  Fear of cancer recurrence (as indicated by the FCR-
severity scale) initially worsened between pre and post-treatment.  However, at the follow-up 
assessment it had reduced substantially (-15 points from pre-treatment) to below the level 
considered clinically significant.  
Participant 2 had extremely high pre-treatment scores across all five of the MCQ-30 
subscales.  This participant did not return her post-treatment questionnaire but did return her 
follow-up.  There was little change in her scores from pre-treatment to follow-up. Participant 
2 also had an extremely high FCR severity score at pre-treatment. Unfortunately, as she failed 
to complete this subscale at either post-treatment or follow-up, it is not known whether ATT 
was effective in reducing this. 
Participant 3 also had high pre-treatment scores on three out of five MCQ-30 subscales 
including: ‘Negative beliefs about worry’, ‘Need to control thoughts’ and ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’.  Substantial reductions (8-12 points) were seen across all three of these 
subscales between the pre and post-treatment assessments.  However, since this participant 
did not return her follow-up questionnaire it is not known whether these improvements were 
maintained at three-month follow-up.  Participant 3 also had an extremely high pre-treatment 
FCR-severity score.  This was almost halved by post-treatment. 
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Figure 8.2: MCQ-30 subscales & FCRI-Severity scale at pre-treatment,  
post-treatment and follow-up 
Participant 1 
 
Participant 2 
 
Participant 3 
 
15 14 
6 
10 
16 
26 
12 
10 
6 
9 
15 
28 
14 
8 
11 11 
9 
11 
NEG POS CC NC CSC FCR -
Severity
Pre Post 3 Mnth
23 22 23 
24 23 
31 
24 
19 
22 21 20 
NEG POS CC NC CSC FCR-Severity
Pre Post 3 Mnth
24 
6 6 
16 17 
34 
12 
7 6 6 
9 
19 
NEG POS CC NC CSC FCR-Severity
Pre Post 3 Mnth
 156 
 
 
Participant 4 
 
Participant 5 
 
 
N.B. POS – Positive beliefs about worry; NEG - Negative beliefs about worry; CC – Cognitive confidence; NC 
– Need for control over thoughts; CSC – Cognitive Self-Consciousness; FCR-Severity – Fear of Cancer 
Recurrence Inventory – Severity scale 
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Participant 5 had high pre-treatment scores on ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and 
‘Cognitive self-consciousness’.  Her scores on the ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ subscale 
reduced substantially between pre- and post-treatment but returned to the pre-treatment level 
at follow-up indicating that treatment gains in this area were not maintained.  Similarly, 
‘Cognitive self-consciousness’ improved between pre- and post-treatment but, deteriorated 
again by follow-up.  In contrast, the FCR-Severity score improved between pre and post- 
treatment and between post-treatment and follow-up.  At the three-month follow-up the FCR-
severity score was less than half the pre-treatment score and below the level indicating 
clinically significant FCR. 
 
8.3.2. Clinically significant change 
At post-treatment, two participants had made reliable improvement (Participant 1 & 5), 
and one met criteria for recovery (Participant 3). The remaining participant (Participant 2) did 
not return her post-treatment questionnaire but had showed ‘no change’ by the final week of 
the intervention.  
At three-month follow-up, another participant (Participant 1) also met criteria for 
recovery.  However, Participant 3, who was recovered at post-treatment, did not return her 
follow-up questionnaire so it is not known whether her status as ‘recovered’ was maintained. 
The remaining two participants (Participant 2 and 5) were unchanged at follow-up relative to 
baseline. 
 
8.3.3. Acceptability and feasibility of the intervention 
During exit interviews, the four treatment completers reported that they were glad that 
they had taken part in the study, and that they had benefitted from participation.  Although 
Participant 2’s scores on the outcome measures suggested no improvement she reported less 
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worry.  Satisfaction ratings for the intervention and confidence in its longer term 
effectiveness are shown in Table 8.1.  All treatment completers rated the overall intervention 
extremely highly, stating that it had significantly improved their mood: e.g. ‘been useful as 
it’s made me feel clear (…)2 my mood is generally better than 9 weeks ago, don’t feel as 
anxious, not as worried’ (Participant 1).  One participant also commented that her improved 
mood had been noticed by those around her: ‘friends noticed I am more relaxed, I am not 
saying stupid things like ‘I’m not going to be here’ (Participant 3).  In addition to this general 
improvement in mood, several treatment completers also reported that they felt better able to 
cope with new or ongoing stressors that they encountered during the course of the 
intervention: e.g. ‘even though difficult situations have continued, I have managed to not lie 
awake all night thinking about it.  Things have been really bad but I’ve not engaged with the 
worries’ (Participant 5).  Furthermore, all treatment completers felt confident that the 
intervention would be effective for them in the longer term: e.g. ‘It will be a useful tool to 
have in life for the future and I will use it’ (Participant 1). 
 
Table 8.1: Participants' exit interview ratings (0-10) of satisfaction with, and  
confidence in the intervention  
 Participant 
Question 1 2 3 4 5 
Satisfaction with ATT (overall) 9 10 - 9 10 
Satisfaction with first session 10 10 - 5 10 
Satisfaction with home practice 9 7 - 3  
Satisfaction with phone calls 10 10 - 10 10 
Confidence in ATT working in  
the future 
9 9 - 9 10 
 
 
By the end of the intervention phase, all four treatment completers stated clearly that 
they had recognised that the goal was not to eradicate thoughts but to respond to them 
                                                          
2
 (…) indicates a pause in participants’ talk 
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differently: e.g. ‘I still get thoughts (…) but they are diluted a little (…)I feel a difference (…) 
I’ve changed in the way I deal with them (negative thoughts)’ (Participant 1).  However, it is 
also interesting to note that the patients who were reliably improved as a result of the 
intervention all said that they had doubted it could work at the outset: e.g. ‘it wasn’t what I 
expected (…) I thought how is this going to help me, how can this work’ (Participant 3), and 
that it took time to understand the approach: e.g. ‘As time goes on you start to realise it’s not 
about getting rid of worries (…) taken me a while to realise it’s about how I respond to them’ 
(Participant 5).  Although it was apparent that none of the participants understood the goal at 
the outset, Participant 5 suggested that this might not be due to inadequacy of the initial 
introduction but because ‘No matter what you say at the outset, initially you do think they 
(negative thoughts) are going to go away because you can’t imagine anything else, can’t 
imagine a case where you still have them, but aren’t worrying about them’ (Participant 5).  In 
addition to this lack of understanding of the overall goal, initial misconceptions of how to do 
the task included that it was important to empty the mind or stop negative thoughts, and that 
it was important to be able to hear all the sounds as directed.  Frustration at not being able to 
‘do the task right’ discouraged several participants from practicing, and for two almost 
caused them to drop out completely:  ‘I couldn’t focus, the more I was trying (…) the more I 
couldn’t do it’ (Participant 2); ‘I just couldn’t do it ...was getting angry and frustrated, close 
to giving up, the whole left, right, behind you thing nearly stopped me from doing it’ 
(Participant 5).  For these reasons, all four treatment completers agreed that the phone calls 
were a vital part of the intervention:  ‘I wouldn't have got through without (therapist).  Being 
able to ask stupid questions was vital (…) if I had just been sent away with the CD (…).I 
wouldn’t have been able to do that’ (Participant 5) 
Despite the initial difficulties, treatment completers were in agreement that they liked 
the combination of home practice and weekly phone calls and preferred it to the idea of 
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attending for weekly face-to-face sessions.  Furthermore, it was acknowledged by all that 
’practice was key’, although they all found it problematic to maintain practicing twice a day 
every day.  Several participants (Participant 1, 3 & 5) suggested that this level of practice 
could be viewed as too time-consuming by some people.  However, rather than suggesting it 
should be reduced, Participant 1 suggested that it was merely important to stress that ‘you 
need to be committed to it and have to practice... to take the time to do it’ (Participant 1).  
Finally, participants were unanimous in saying that they would recommend ATT to others, 
and that they thought it should be further developed for use in cancer.  Given the importance 
of practice to the success of ATT, they were also in agreement that it would have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to engage while still on active treatment.  For this reason, all 
suggested the most appropriate time to be offered ATT would be at the end of treatment:  
‘I would say ‘yeah (…) go for it!’  (…)It is difficult to understand, feels so arty farty, not 
concrete enough. Can’t put it into words but it is not a solid enough explanation of what you 
can achieve ....it can change your life, teaches you a different way of thinking about thinking’ 
(Participant 5).  
 
8.4. Discussion 
8.4.1. Is ATT an effective intervention for reducing emotional distress after cancer? 
The primary aim of this study was to provide an initial test of the efficacy of ATT 
for reducing emotional distress in a cancer population.  These results suggest that ATT 
has the potential to reduce emotional distress.  Three of the four treatment completers 
were categorised as either ‘recovered’ or ‘reliably improved’ after treatment.  In 
addition, levels of worry and self-focussed attention decreased between pre- and post-
treatment for these participants and these outcomes co-varied with distress for all 
participants across baseline, intervention and follow-up.   
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In addition, pre- to post-treatment reductions were observed for these three 
participants on three of the five MCQ-30 subscales (‘Negative beliefs about worry’, 
‘Need for control over thoughts’ and ‘Cognitive self-consciousness’).  This pattern of 
reductions is consistent with a previous study in recurrent major depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000) and consistent with the expectation that ATT will reduce 
internally-focussed attention, while also reducing beliefs about the uncontrollability of 
worry and the need to engage with thoughts. 
However, it is important to note that not all of those who completed treatment 
improved in these outcomes (i.e. in distress, worry, threat-focussed attention, and 
metacognitive beliefs) after ATT, or maintained post-treatment improvements at three-
month follow-up.  Therefore, unlike previous case series studies testing the efficacy of 
ATT for reducing emotional disorder in mental health populations (Cavanagh & 
Franklin, 2000; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998, 2000; Wells et al., 1997), it is clear that 
ATT in the current study was not effective for all.  The most likely explanation for this 
comparatively poor success rate is differences in how ATT was implemented between 
studies.  All the previous mental health studies (Cavanagh & Franklin, 2000; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998, 2000; Wells et al., 1997) involved weekly face-to-face 
sessions, including in-session practice of ATT.  In contrast, the current study is the first 
to adopt a guided self-practice approach to delivering ATT.  It is apparent from the 
gaps in the data and feedback from patients that there was considerable difficulty in 
getting patients to implement ATT correctly using this approach.  All of the treatment 
completers in the current study reported: having had severe doubts at the outset that 
ATT could work, initial difficulty in understanding how to practice ATT, and that 
without the monitoring phone calls they would have likely given up.  Indeed, the one 
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patient who dropped out consistently reported difficulty in understanding how to 
practice ATT prior to leaving the study. 
It may be that ATT alone (delivered in this format) is insufficient to produce 
lasting change.  It is encouraging to note, however, that regardless of whether or not a 
clinically significant improvement in HADS score was achieved, all treatment 
completers did verbally report a change in the way they responded to negative thoughts 
about cancer that was broadly consistent with the expected effects of ATT.  
In contrast to the HADS distress score, FCR-severity scores improved for all 
three treatment completers who provided data at post-treatment, and improvements 
were maintained at follow-up for the two who provided complete data, irrespective of 
changes in the other outcome measures.  It is not clear why the results for this outcome 
measure should be different.  It may be that it is simply an effect of social desirability 
(i.e. participants enrolled in the study with the expectation of reducing cancer-related 
distress and wished to please the researcher).  However, the observed reductions in 
FCR are consistent with previous studies which found an effect of ATT on reducing 
dysfunctional illness related beliefs (Cavanagh & Franklin, 2000; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 1998, 2000; Wells et al., 1997); health worry, disease conviction (Cavanagh & 
Franklin, 2000), and negative illness-related behaviour (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1998).  
It is also consistent with the expectation that ATT alters participants’ balance of 
attention, so that that they become less internally and more externally focussed.  
Metacognitive theory would suggest that, as a result of this altered balance of attention, 
hypervigilance to internal cues (i.e. negative illness related thoughts, physical 
sensations) previously perceived as threatening is likely to be reduced (Sharpe et al., 
2010).  In addition, because of increased attentional flexibility, individuals become able 
to disrupt persistent worry-based processing, thus freeing-up cognitive resources for 
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more adaptive information processing (Wells & Mathews, 1994; Wells et al., 
1997)(Wells & Mathew 1994; Wells et al, 1997) of negative illness related thoughts or 
feelings.    
 
8.4.2. Is ATT a practical and acceptable intervention? 
The second aim of the study was to explore the participants’ perspective on 
acceptability and practicality of ATT to guide future development of the intervention.  
The intervention was well-received by the four treatment completers.  Only one 
participant dropped out and from the information obtained during the monitoring calls 
it seems likely this was due to difficulty in understanding how to do the task.  Other 
participants reported similar problems; in particular  Participant 2 found ATT so 
difficult and frustrating that she almost left the study, and Participant 5 reported that she 
would have left had it not been for the further explanation provided by the therapist 
phone calls.  However, all of the treatment completers reported a clear understanding of 
the goals of ATT by the end of the treatment as well as a perceived benefit of taking 
part and confidence that it would continue to work for them in the future.  In general, a 
self-guided format was welcomed although it was suggested that future developments 
should seek to increase therapist contact by having a face-to-face session at mid 
treatment in order to consolidate understanding of the task and increase compliance 
with practice.  These findings suggest that ATT is an acceptable intervention and that 
the therapist support component was vital to its success. 
As well as the importance of therapist contact, all participants stated that by the end of 
treatment they had recognised the importance of practice, but that this should be given greater 
emphasis at the outset.  This poses somewhat of a dilemma in how to ‘sell’ ATT to future 
participants, as it was also mentioned that the time commitment involved in practising ATT 
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(i.e. twice a day for 8 weeks) could be seen as onerous by some.  Indeed, several potential 
participants had cited this as the reason for not wanting to participate, and all four treatment 
completers admitted to reducing the frequency of practice as time progressed.  In addition, it 
became apparent that follow-up calls were insufficiently formalised leading to missed 
appointments on both sides, which undermined the professionalism of the intervention as 
well as increasing the likelihood of participants practising ATT incorrectly.  Consequently, it 
is clear that if ATT is to be successfully delivered in a guided self-practice format there is a 
need to formalise the way it is provided to ensure that participants complete the intervention 
as directed.  It is suggested that a formal schedule of practice and therapist appointments 
should be agreed with each participant during the initial session.  This should then be 
reviewed as part of each subsequent follow-up.  In addition, the importance of keeping 
telephone appointments should be stressed to ensure participants are fully aware that this as a 
key component of the treatment and not merely an optional extra.    
 
8.4.3. Limitations and conclusions 
Despite some positive findings, it is clear that caution is warranted in reaching a 
conclusion about the effectiveness of ATT in cancer as this is a small, uncontrolled study. 
Significant practical problems were encountered both in keeping telephone appointments and 
in obtaining participants self-report data, which are likely to have undermined intervention 
effectiveness.  Furthermore, the study is also limited by the characteristics of the sample in 
that all participants were female and all but one had been diagnosed with breast cancer.  
However, despite these issues, as a proof of principle test this study represents a 
promising start.  Patients who completed treatment were extremely positive.  Verbally they 
all reported a change in the way they were responding to negative thoughts about cancer and 
a relationship between change in worry, threat-focussed attention and emotional distress was 
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shown in the patient reported outcome data.  However, ATT delivered in the current guided 
self-help format clearly did not work for all and as such there is a need for substantial further 
development.  Based on the interview feedback this may include increasing therapist contact, 
developing a more structured program of practice and phone calls, including additional 
components of MCT (i.e. detached mindfulness) and including signposting for patients who 
require further intervention (i.e. full MCT).    
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Chapter Nine 
 
General Discussion & Conclusions 
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9.1. Re-orientation to thesis aims 
This thesis explored the utility of the metacognitive model of emotional disorder for 
understanding persistent emotional distress after cancer.  Because the metacognitive model 
was developed for use in mental health, its application in physical health research has 
previously been limited.  Several studies have explored the contribution of metacognitive 
beliefs to emotional distress in various physical health conditions and in cancer (e.g. Allott et 
al, 2005; Thewes, Bell & Butow, 2013), but none has formally tested the theory.  Therefore, 
this thesis represents the first attempt to formally test theoretical predictions from the 
metacognitive model in cancer, using the findings of several linked empirical studies - one 
cross–sectional (Study 2), two prospective (Studies 3 and 4) and a case series study (Study 5): 
 
9.2. Validity of the MCQ-30 
The starting point for this work was to test the validity of the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire (MCQ-30) for use in cancer.  Although this measure has been used in cancer 
before (Butow et al., 2013; Fisher et al., 2015; Thewes, Bell, & Butow, 2013), there has been 
no formal assessment of its psychometric properties in this population.  Therefore, before 
beginning to test predictions from the metacognitive model, it was necessary to establish the 
MCQ-30’s validity for use in cancer.  To this end, Study 1 used confirmatory and exploratory 
factor analysis techniques to confirm the validity of the published five-factor structure, and 
establish that no alternative pattern of loadings was a better fit to the data.  In addition, 
concurrent validity was assessed using structural equation modelling to test the expected 
relationship between the five MCQ-30 subscales and anxiety and depression.  The results of 
this study suggest that the MCQ-30 is valid for use with breast and prostate cancer within the 
first year after diagnosis.  However, it is acknowledged that from just one study it is 
premature to claim that the MCQ-30 is valid for use in other cancer diagnoses, or indeed 
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other time frames within the cancer journey. 
 
9.3. Testing theoretical predictions from the metacognitive model of emotional disorder 
Having established the validity of the MCQ-30, it was then used to test predictions 
from the metacognitive model, in a series of linked cross-sectional, prospective and 
experimental studies.  Three overarching predictions were tested: 
(1) Metacognitive beliefs will be associated with both current and future 
emotional distress, and negative metacognitive beliefs will be the largest predictor  
(2) Metacognitive beliefs will predict additional variance in current and future 
emotional distress over and above previously implicated factors including: ‘content 
of cognition’ (i.e. illness perceptions) & baseline symptoms of distress 
(3) CAS processes such as worry and threat–focussed attention will mediate the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs around diagnosis and current and future 
emotional distress 
 
The specific findings from each study have been discussed in the preceding chapters.  
In this final chapter the findings from each study are brought together and discussed under 
the heading of the particular prediction (1-3 above) addressed. 
 
9.3.1 Metacognitive beliefs will be associated with both current and future distress and 
negative beliefs will be the largest predictor  
The predicted association between metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress was 
initially tested cross-sectionally, around the time of diagnosis, in Study 1 & 2 (Chapter 4 & 
5) then again prospectively (at 12-month follow-up) in Study 3 & 4 (Chapter  6 &7).  Across 
all of these studies the subscale ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ was consistently associated 
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with current and future anxiety and depression (Studies 1-4) and future trauma (Studies 2-4).  
In addition, as predicted, it was the largest contributor to variance in emotional distress in 
each case.  In contrast, ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ was associated with current and future 
anxiety only, although again this was a consistent finding across studies.  The results 
regarding the remaining three MCQ-30 subscales were not consistent across the studies.  
Around the time of diagnosis, less belief in a ‘Need to control thoughts’ was associated with 
greater concurrent anxiety but not depression, whereas ’Cognitive confidence’ and 
‘Cognitive self-consciousness’ were not associated with either outcome (Study1).  In 
contrast, in the prospective studies multiple regression analysis indicated that ‘Cognitive 
confidence’ around diagnosis was associated with future anxiety, depression and trauma 
(Study 3), although not all of these associations were confirmed when tested using structural 
equation modelling (Study 4).  Neither ‘Need to control thoughts’ nor ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’ were prospectively associated with emotional distress. 
The findings related to positive and negative beliefs about worry are consistent with 
the metacognitive model which suggests that, while positive metacognitive beliefs activate 
the CAS, it is negative metacognitive beliefs that are primarily responsible for maintaining 
and exacerbating it.  The generic metacognitive model tested in this thesis refers to two 
broad categories of belief;  positive and negative metacognitive beliefs, and the MCQ-30 
subscales ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and ‘Positive beliefs about worry respectively’ are 
clearly defined in these terms.  The lack of consistency regarding the remaining three 
subscales (‘Cognitive confidence’, ‘Need to control thoughts’ and ‘Cognitive self-
consciousness’) is perhaps not surprising given that they refer to how one’s memory works, 
the need to control thoughts and the tendency to engage in monitoring one’s mind, domains 
of metacognition that are not considered to be universally relevant across all emotional 
disorders (Wells, 2009).  There is some evidence in in Study 3 and 4 that ‘Cognitive 
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confidence’ is associated with future emotional distress in cancer.  It is unclear why this 
subscale in particular should be associated with distress in this population, although the 
model suggests that low confidence in cognitive abilities may lead to a sense of uncertainty, 
of worry about how the mind is working (i.e.  whether it has been affected by cancer or 
treatment) and/or activate rumination in an attempt at gap filling or searching for meaning.  
In addition, previous studies have indicated an association between low confidence in 
cognitive abilities and obsessional thoughts and checking (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; 
Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003), which fits with the type of behaviour 
often seen in patients with high fear of recurrence. 
 
9.3.2 Metacognitive beliefs will predict additional variance in current and future 
emotional distress over and above previously implicated factors including; ‘content of 
cognition’ (i.e. Illness perceptions.) & baseline symptoms of distress 
In Study 2, a competitive test using hierarchical multiple regression assessed the 
relative contribution of illness perceptions and metacognitive beliefs around the time of 
diagnosis to concurrent emotional distress.  Positive and negative beliefs about worry were 
able to explain more of the variance in concurrent anxiety and trauma than illness 
perceptions, when controlling for just age and gender, but this was not the case for 
depression.  However, metacognitive beliefs were able to add significantly to the variance 
over and above inclusion of illness perceptions for all three emotional distress outcomes.  In 
prospective analyses, a similar picture was apparent with metacognitive beliefs able to 
explain more of the variance in future anxiety, depression and trauma than illness perceptions 
after controlling for just age and gender.  In addition, they were able to add a small but 
significant amount to the variance in future anxiety and depression, but not for trauma, after 
controlling for baseline symptoms of distress and illness perceptions.  These findings are 
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broadly consistent with the theoretical prediction that, due to their causal role in driving 
engagement with negative thoughts and feelings, metacognitive beliefs will contribute over 
and above content of cognition (i.e. illness perceptions) . 
It should be noted, however, that after controlling for baseline distress, the amount of 
additional variance explained by either set of predictors (illness perceptions or metacognitive 
beliefs) is small.  This suggests that as predictors per se, they offer little advantage over 
screening for distress at baseline.  However, as discussed previously (Chapter 2), while 
baseline distress is a consistent predictor of future distress, in reality this merely tells us that 
in most cases distress is maintained from baseline.  We still need to identify the factors that 
underlie this maintenance before we can reduce vulnerability to persistent distress.  
Consequently, further exploration of the data to test whether an interaction between baseline 
distress and metacognitive beliefs offers a more clinically useful prediction would be a 
valuable next step. 
 
9.3.3. CAS processes such as worry and threat–focussed attention will mediate the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs around diagnosis and current and future 
emotional distress 
Two studies within this thesis explicitly tested whether CAS processes mediated the 
relationship between metacognitive beliefs and current and/or future emotional distress.  In 
both cases the relationship between ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ and all three emotional 
distress outcomes was mediated by worry and threat focussed attention (as assessed using the 
CAS-1), although the hypothesis of partial rather than full mediation was only supported for 
concurrent anxiety and depression and change in anxiety over time.  In contrast, the 
prediction of full mediation of the relationship between ‘Positive beliefs about worry’ and 
emotional distress was not supported for any of the concurrent outcomes (Study 2) nor was it 
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robustly supported for the relationship between change in metacognitive beliefs and change 
in emotional distress over time (Study 4).  However, as discussed previously (Chapter 5 & 7), 
these findings are consistent with the metacognitive model’s assertion that while positive 
metacognitive beliefs  activate the CAS it is negative metacognitive beliefs that are the key to 
understanding persistent emotional distress and hence these will appear to be the stronger 
predictor of emotional outcomes when both are assessed simultaneously. 
Aside from these explicit tests of mediation, Study 5 tested whether an intervention 
designed to disrupt the CAS was able to reduce emotional distress among patients who were 
more than six months from diagnosis.  Although success of the intervention was variable 
between participants, in each case it was apparent that scores for worry and threat-focused 
attention co-varied with those for HADS-distress, reducing in parallel after introduction of 
Attention Training Technique (ATT) for those who were either reliably improved or 
recovered by the end of treatment.  While this is consistent with the model’s assertion that 
activation of the CAS underlies maintenance of distress, covariance cannot be considered 
strong evidence of support for the model as it does not indicate a direction of effect.  
Furthermore, findings from such a small uncontrolled study must always be interpreted with 
caution.  
In summary, the findings from the main body of this thesis indicate that the above 
theoretical predictions are broadly supported, but only with confidence in respect to 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’.  In addition, the null findings relating to ‘Positive beliefs 
about worry’ can be understood in the context of the metacognitive model where they are 
purported to activate the CAS but not be of primary importance in its maintenance.  
However, this thesis finds no substantial evidence to support any of the remaining three 
domains of metacognitive belief assessed by the MCQ-30, as being reliably associated with 
either current or future distress in this population once ‘Negative beliefs about worry’ is 
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accounted for.  These findings are generally consistent with previous research in mental 
health (see (Wells, 2009) for a review), general population samples (Spada et al., 2008) and 
Parkinson’s disease patients (Allott et al., 2005).  In these studies, the subscale ‘Negative 
beliefs about worry’ has consistently been identified as the predominant contributor to 
variance in both anxiety and depression, whereas the importance of the other domains of 
metacognitive belief measured by the MCQ-30 has varied across the different populations 
studied. 
 
9.3.4 Problems with testing theoretical models  
Although these findings provide promising first evidence to support the utility of the 
metacognitive model in cancer, there are several methodical limitations that deserve further 
attention.  
The first issue to note is that while this study controlled for baseline emotional 
distress (the predominant predictor identified in Chapter 2), it did not control for neuroticism, 
which was also found to be a consistent predictor of emotional distress.  The finding in one 
study (Aarstad et al., 2005), that neuroticism reduced to non-significant the effect of 
depression at diagnosis on depression at six years, suggested it is an important vulnerability 
factor underlying persistent emotional distress, although the mechansim of action is unclear.  
Cross-sectional studies have begun to find evidence that negative metacognitive beliefs 
mediate the relationship between neuroticism and anxiety in non-clinical (Dragan, Dragan, 
Kononowicz, & Wells, 2012) and student populations (Dragan & Dragan, 2014; van der 
Heiden et al., 2010), and between neuroticism and health anxiety in a student population 
(Bailey & Wells, 2013).  These findings suggest that while controlling for neuroticism in the 
current study may have impacted on the observed association between baseline and follow-up 
emotional distress, it would have been unlikely to have affected the relationship between 
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baseline metacognitive beliefs and persistent emotional distress.  Further prospective and 
developmental research is required to explore the relationship between such temperament 
traits and the development of metacognitive beliefs.     
A signifiant limitation to Chapter 5 is the cross-sectional nature of the study.  Cross-
sectional research can never be used to provide evidence of causality as the models and 
variables presented, although based upon theory, are only correlational in nature.  The data 
presented can just as equally be used as evidence that emotional distress gives rise to 
metacognitive beliefs and processes as vice versa, or that metacognitive beliefs, worry and 
self-focussed attention are simply associated with emotional distress.  Chapters 6 and 7 
attempted to address this issue by using a prospective design.  In addition, there is a problem 
inherent in using prospective multiple regressions (Chapter 6) to isolate the effects of 
underlying causal factors from baseline symptoms of the emotional outcome it is predicted to 
maintain.  That is, that generally, in prospective regression studies it is considered good 
practice to control for baseline levels of the variable you are trying to predict.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, it is apparent that by doing this we may actually be masking the effect 
of underlying causal variables (i.e. metacognitive beliefs) due to the overlap in variance 
explained by these variables and symptoms of distress at baseline.  This methodological issue 
may explain the predominant finding in the literature that baseline distress is the largest or 
only significant predictor of persistent emotional distress after cancer (Chapter 2).  In Study 4 
(Chapter 7), latent growth curve analysis was used to partial out variance attributable to 
enduring symptoms of emotional distress by looking at the association between changes in 
variables in parallel to the association between variables at baseline.  While this is an 
improvement over the standard hierarchical regression approach, it is still limited in the 
context of this thesis as with only two waves of data it is impossible to demonstrate temporal 
precedence of change in metacognitive beliefs over change in emotional distress.  Thus it is 
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essentially still cross-sectional and subject to the same limitations on interpretation as Study 
2.  Consequently, in order to provide more compelling evidence of a causal role for 
metacognitive beliefs and processes further prospective research with a minimum of three 
waves of data is needed.  Another approach would be to conduct prospective research looking 
at the predictive utility of metacognitive beliefs in groups divided according to baseline 
emotional status.  However, in order for such a study to be sufficiently powered a 
substantially larger sample would be needed than was achieved for this thesis.  
A linked issue to the problem of disentangling causal factors from the emotional 
outcomes they are predicted to maintain is related to how these various constructs are 
operationalised.  For example, distress outcomes are frequently defined by the cognitive 
processes that the metacognitive model suggests cause and maintain them; i.e. persistent 
worry is a key defining component of anxiety disorder and also a key component of the CAS.  
Furthermore as noted in Chapter 5, visual inspection of items on each measure indicated 
similarities between some of the items on the PSWQ, used to assess the CAS, and the 
‘Negative beliefs about worry’ subscale.  Consequently, it could be argued that is it not 
surprising that associations between emotional distress, the CAS and ‘Negative beliefs about 
worry’ were found for anxiety, but not for depression and trauma when the PSWQ was used.   
The inclusion of the CAS-1 scale as an alternative to the PSWQ goes some way to guarding 
against bias due to the common method variance resulting from this overlap in measurement. 
However, as the CAS-1 is intended as a clinical tool and therefore has not been formally 
psychometrically tested, it is clear that there is a need for improvement in measurement tools 
available for measuring the CAS.  Unfortunately the issue of overlap between hypothesised 
causal factors of the CAS and symptoms of emotional distress is difficult to resolve, although 
future research should take steps to minimise overlap in how these constructs are 
operationalised where possible.  In addition, as the measures of metacognitive beliefs and 
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CAS processes used in the current study were designed for use in mental health populations, 
and most specifically in relation to generalised anxiety disorder, it is likely that they lack 
sensitivity in a cancer population where heterognous presentation of anxiety, depression and 
trauma symptomsare common.  This is likely to have led to an enderestimation of the role of 
metacognitive beliefs in mediating the relationship between baseline and follow-up 
depression and trauma.  Before we can establish a more a more accurate picture of the 
association between metacognition and persistent emotional distress in cancer, further studies 
are required to develop more appropriate measures of metacognitive beliefs and CAS 
processes for use in this population. 
A final measurement issue pertains to whether the self-report measures used in this 
thesis are accessing the relevant cognitions or causing them (Ogden, 2003).  In her analysis of 
social cognition models, Ogden highlights that the standard practice used in theory testing, 
that is asking participants to complete self-report questionnaires about their cognitions, 
assumes that questionnaire items are able to access pre-existing cognitions, whereas an 
alternative explanation is that such cognitions are created by completing the questionnaire.  
This issue clearly applies equally to all self-report measures used in psychological research.  
However, it may be particularly pertinent to this thesis as it could be argued that by asking 
patients to respond to questions about their ‘thinking about cancer’, their feelings, and their 
‘thinking about thinking', we are in effect increasing patients' focus on their internal thoughts 
and feelings which is precisely the process predicted to  cause and maintain distress.  While 
this issue is not one that can be easily resolved in this type of cohort study, it is important to 
bear in mind when reflecting on the findings.  Furthermore, it is particularly important to 
consider this issue in clinical work, where completing self-report measures may initially 
increase rather than reduce self-focussed attention as was seen for some of the ATT 
participants in Study 5.  
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A final methodical issue is related to the question’ to what extent is it possible to test 
a theoretical model such as the metacognitive model of emotional disorder?’.  A good clinical 
prediction model consists of linked constructs that are sufficiently specific to generate 
testable hypotheses (Ogden, 2003).  That is, in order to provide strong statistical evidence of 
a causal relationship, arrows linking constructs should clearly indicate a direction of effect.  
However, in contrast, clinically useful models tend to be more fluid and flexible so that they 
can be used to create a narrative which the clinician can then use to help the patient 
understand their difficulties.  In reality, most psychological models fall somewhere between 
the two and in this respect the metacognitive model is no different.  While it has been 
possible to generate some directional, and therefore testable, hypotheses, it also recognised 
that the model contains feedback loops which are inherent to its clinical utility.  In this sense 
it may be argued that while key predictions can and have been tested in the current thesis, the 
model itself can never be tested in its entirety.  Consequently, support for the model can only 
come from combining evidence from this and further studies in the future that use a variety of 
observational and experimental approaches to test different predictions and components of 
the model. 
 
9.4 A final test - can an intervention designed to disrupt the CAS reduce emotional in 
cancer? 
As has been stated above, evidence presented in this thesis supports the hypothesis that 
metacognitive beliefs add to the variance explained in persistent anxiety and depression over 
and above that explained by negative content of thoughts, and that the relationship between 
metacognitive beliefs and emotional distress is mediated by the CAS.  Consequently, 
therapeutic approaches targeting metacognitive beliefs and CAS processes – rather than the 
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content of negative thoughts about cancer – should have the potential to reduce emotional 
distress in this population.  Study 5 (presented in Chapter 8) is an initial proof-of–principle 
test of whether an intervention aimed at disrupting the CAS might be of use in a cancer 
population.  The findings of this study were inconclusive regarding the overall effectiveness 
of ATT for reducing distress in cancer.  For participants who fully engaged with the 
intervention and understood the goal of treatment, ATT delivered in this format appeared to 
be effective.  However, for those who did not engage fully, it clearly was not.  Therefore the 
main issue appears to be the difficulty of getting participants to engage with and do the ATT 
task correctly.  The intervention was well received by those who completed the study, all of 
whom verbally reported having changed the way in which they responded to negative 
thoughts about the cancer.  However, it seems clear that using the ATT CD as a stand-alone 
intervention is unlikely to be an effective form of treatment.  There is a clear need to ensure 
participants are well-socialised to the model, engaged in meta–level dialogue and committed 
to practising tasks as directed and this is likely to require more regular therapist contact.  
While the result of this case-series study must be interpreted with caution, given the scale of 
the study as well as the problems encountered, when taken together with the positive findings 
of previous studies of full metacognitive therapy (MCT) in adult breast cancer (Butow et al., 
2013) and adolescent and young adult survivors of cancer (Fisher et al., 2015; McNicol et al., 
2013) they do suggest that there is promise in pursuing further development and testing of 
interventions based on MCT in this population.   
 
9.5 Recommendations for future research. 
It can be seen that while the current thesis presents valuable first evidence in support of the 
utlity of the metacognitive model for understanding emotional distress after cancer, 
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considerable further research is warranted.  Firstly, it is evident that there is a need for 
refinement or development of new instruments for assessing metacognitive beliefs and 
processes in cancer populations.  Measures are needed that have items which go beyond 
asking about worry in order to reflect the diversity of sympom presentation  that is is 
common in cancer patients.  Only then will study measures they have sufficient specificity to 
provide an accurate picture of the relationship between maladaptive metacognition and 
emotional distress after cancer.  Secondly, it is evident that further prosepective research is 
required.  The current study pertains only to breast and prostate cancer patients in the first 
year after their primary treatment.  Consequently, there is a need to replicate the current study 
in a more heterogenous sample in order to establish the generalisability of current findings 
and control forpotential gender and cancer diagnosis effects.  Prospective studies with longer 
follow-up, and at least three waves of data, are necessary to test the hypothesis of a temporal 
relationship between metacognitve beliefs and processes and emotional distress.  It will also 
be useful to explore differences between groups that exhibit different trajectories of distress 
(i.e. never distressed, recovered, maintained), while controlling for the occurence of any 
additional stressors or cancer recurrence in the intervening period.  Aside from such 
observational studies, experimental treatment studies are required that allow metacognitive 
beliefs and processes to be manipulated to test the hypothesis of a corresponding change in 
emotional symptomology.  In conculsion, it is noted that evidence of causality is never 
derived from a single study but through triangulation of evidence from a variety of studies 
that use different methodologies to address the same question.  
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EXIT INTERVIEW 
Questionnaires: 
MCQ-30 
FCRI   by post 
HADS/CAS-1 
 
 
Interview : by telephone or in-person (LMC) 
 
1) SCID  - current GAD, MDD, PTSD 
 
2) Feedback on ATT Intervention (unstructured) 
 
What was your understanding of the goal of the intervention? 
Was this achieved? 
 
When you have negative thoughts about [……….] how do you respond to them? 
Is this different to how you would have responded to them previously? [if yes, how?] 
 
On a scale of 1-10 how satisfied would you say you are with the intervention? 
 
 In general  
 How it was introduced at the first session  
 Practising ATT at home 
 Weekly phone calls 
 
[Explore with reference to good/bad point / suggestions for improvements] 
 
 
On a 1-10 scale how much confidence do you have that this technique will work for you 
in the longer term…….[explore response] 
 
What would you say to a patient considering whether or not to try ATT? 
 
Do you think it should be developed for use for people who have had cancer? 
 
If  yes, when would an intervention like this  be most useful? 
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